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Abstract
OLFACTION AS THE PARADIGM FOR PERCEPTUAL PHILOSOPHY
by
Andreas Keller
Advisor: Professor Jesse Prinz

Plato wrote that smell is of a "half-formed nature" and that not much can be said about it, and
Kant identified smell as the "most ungrateful" and "most dispensable" of the senses. Because
contemporary philosophers share this distaste for smell perception, olfaction is often dismissed
or ignored in philosophical accounts of perception. Instead, contemporary philosophy of
perception is based almost exclusively on visual perception. The goal of this dissertation is to
show that this focus on a single modality distorts our understanding of what perception is.

I am not the first to realize the potential of opening up perceptual philosophy to the non-visual
modalities. Bill Lycan asked "how the philosophy of perception would be different if smell had
been taken as a paradigm rather than vision." (Lycan 2000) (page 273). In this dissertation, I will
try to answer this question. My analysis will show that philosophy of perception would be very
different, were it based on olfaction. Many of the most basic concepts of philosophy of
perception are based on peculiarities of visual perception that do not generalize to other
modalities.
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Introduction
The main difference between this work and other works on perceptual philosophy is the focus on
olfaction (Figure 1). The main advantage of olfaction as the paradigm for perceptual philosophy
is that, compared with vision or audition, olfaction is a computational and anatomical simple
modality. In addition to the focus on smells, the account of perception presented in this
dissertation also differs from most other approaches in its appreciation of the fact that perception
is an evolved mechanism. As such, we can only understand perception within an evolutionary
framework. The questions addressed in this dissertation are the questions of perceptual
philosophy. The answers to these questions that I will present combine insights and results from
a variety of disciplines other than philosophy. Most of the interdisciplinary work surveyed here
will involve empirical results from neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychology.
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Figure 1: The olfactory system. Odor sources give off a mix of different types of odor
molecules (represented in this figure by blue rectangles, red stars, and green circles).
During sniffing, the odor molecules enter the nasal cavity. At the top of the nasal cavity is
the olfactory epithelium, which contains the odor-sensitive endings of the olfactory
sensory neurons. The olfactory sensory neurons form the olfactory nerve, which connects
the nasal cavity with the brain through small holes in the skull (in the cribriform plate). In
the brain, the olfactory sensory neurons terminate in the olfactory bulb, the first
processing center for odor information. The olfactory bulb is connected to other brain
regions through the olfactory tract. (modified from original work by The Emirr (diagram
of nasal cavity) and Takkk (flower) (in the public domain under the Creative Commons
license (CC BY 3.0))

This dissertation is divided into three parts: "Perceptual qualities", "Percepts", and "Cognitive
processes". In the first part, I will discuss topics related to perceptual qualities1. Philosophically
important issues related to perceptual qualities that will be addressed are the nature of perceptual
qualities, modality-individuation, and the possibility of third-person access to perceptual
qualities. I will discuss perceptual qualities as they are revealed by behavioral or psychophysical
experiments in which different behaviors are shown in response to different stimuli. In the first
chapter, I will suggest a strategy to arrange the perceptual qualities perceived by an individual
perceiver in a perceptual space that reflects the similarity relations between the perceptual
qualities. In the second chapter, the problem of comparing perceptual qualities between different
perceivers is addressed. I will suggest that it is possible to compare perceptual qualities
perceived by two different perceiver by aligning their perceptual spaces. Aligning two perceptual
spaces is however only possible under certain conditions.

1

A variety of terms has been used for what I will call "perceptual qualities". Daniel Dennett lists
"raw feels", "sensa", "phenomenal qualities", "intrinsic properties of conscious experiences",
"qualitative content of mental states", and "qualia" Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness
Explained. Boston, Little, Brown and Company. (page 372). Each term tacitly imports
assumptions about the phenomena that is labeled. I mean by "perceptual qualities" the mental
qualities which are different in cases in which two colors, smells, tastes, and so on can be
behaviorally discriminated.
2

Typically, perception is much more complex than a series of discriminable perceptual qualities.
In the second part, these complexities will be addressed. Perceptual qualities can be combined in
time and space, which is the topic of chapter 3. I will argue that olfactory perception has no
spatial structure and that its temporal structure is impoverished compared with other modalities.
In the modalities in which perception has a rich spatial and temporal structure, perception is
often thought of as the perception of objects that are spatially and temporally extended and
bounded. In chapter 4, I will apply common notions of perceptual objects to olfaction and show
that odor perception is not the perception of objects. Chapter 5, which is a bit of a digression,
will address the question of the evolutionary function of perception. I will argue that it is the
function of perception to guide behaviors and defend this idea against alternative proposals. The
general goal of the second part is to demonstrate that many of the complexities that are taken to
be an integral part of perception in other modalities are absent in olfactory perception. These
complexities therefore play no role in an account of perception that is based on olfaction.

Perception and non-perceptual cognitive processes are not always clearly separated. Perceptual
systems coevolved with cognitive systems that process perceptual information and motor
systems that execute an organism's behavior. Perception depends on these systems for being
useful for the organism. Perception itself has no adaptive advantages unless it results in a
stimulus-dependent modification of behavior2. In part III, I will address the tight connection
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As an illustration of the uselessness of perception for perception's sake, consider sea squirts.
Many species of sea squirts have a free-swimming larval form and a sedentary adult form.
During the development from the free-swimming to the adult form, both the muscular system
and the nervous system degenerate. The function of the brain is to guide behaviors and in the
3

between perceptual systems and non-perceptual cognitive systems. A review of the connections
between olfaction and cognitive systems in chapter 6 will show that the connections between
perceptual and cognitive processes are modality-dependent. The olfactory system evolved to be
closely connected to emotional systems, but not to language systems. Other perceptual
modalities are more closely connected to language than to emotion. In chapter 7, I will discuss
the structure of the mind more generally. I reject common approaches to describing the structure
of the mind and instead suggest a description of the mind as overlapping sets of functionally
coupled networks.

Throughout this dissertation, perception is discussed with respect to its ability to guide behaviors
and to make information available to cognitive processes. In many instances, the perception is
conscious. However, the conclusions drawn throughout this dissertation are supposed to hold for
conscious and non-conscious instances of perception (except when noted otherwise). Guiding
behaviors and making information available to cognitive processes are functions that do not
necessarily require consciousness. My goal is to investigate general features of perception that
are independent of consciousness.

absence of behavioral options, there is no need for a brain. Sensing a predator is only adaptive
for an organism that has behavioral strategies for predator avoidance.
4

Part I: Perceptual qualities
The basic building blocks of perception are perceptual qualities with no spatial or temporal
structure, like the redness of a tomato or the characteristic smell of a rose3. These perceptual
qualities are mental qualities that, in humans, are usually considered to be conscious. The
redness of the rose is experienced by the perceiver. Although this is the most familiar way in
which we encounter them, perceptual qualities are not necessarily consciously experienced
(Rosenthal 2010; Young, Keller et al. 2014; Rosenthal in press)). The fact that perceptual
qualities can be either conscious or non-conscious is best illustrated by cases in which behavioral
decisions are made based on perceptual qualities in the absence of consciousness. For example,
at very low odor concentrations people often report verbally that they cannot detect any odor,
although they discriminate stimuli successfully when they are asked to make a choice (Sobel,
Prabhakaran et al. 1999). At slightly higher concentrations, when the sensory information is
processed consciously, two odors are discriminated based on differences in their perceptual
qualities. It is parsimonious to assume that the same two odors at lower concentrations are also
discriminated based on differences in their perceptual qualities, even though the information is
not consciously processed. Denying the existence of non-conscious perceptual qualities would
require two theories of perception. One theory would have to explain how we can consciously
distinguish a green object from a red object based on the different perceptual qualities associated
with the objects. The second theory would have to explain how we execute stimulus-dependent
behaviors in the absence of conscious processes. The second theory would have to be different
from the first theory because if there are no non-conscious perceptual qualities, then the

3

As will be discussed in part II, these perceptual qualities often occur in complicated spatial and
temporal arrangements. However, for the treatment in the first part, I will abstract away from
spatial and temporal structures.
5

differential responses to different stimuli in the absence of consciousness cannot be based on
perceptual qualities.

To avoid the need for two different theories of perception depending on whether the perception
is conscious or not, one can also deny the existence of non-conscious perception. In olfaction,
evidence for non-conscious perception comes from experiments that have shown that odors can
have specific behavioral effects in the absence of conscious processing of olfactory information.
For example, sniffs are shorter and shallower when an unpleasant odor is encountered than when
a pleasant odor is encountered. This effect is independent of conscious experience (for a detailed
treatment of this topic in olfaction, see (Young 2014)). Influences of unconscious perceptual
qualities on behaviors are not peculiar to olfactory perception; they are also found in other
modalities. In vision, masked priming effects, for example, depend on the features of the masked
(e.g. not consciously perceived) stimulus (for reviews, see (Cruse, Kälberer et al. 2007; Hallett
2007). Evidence for non-conscious perception has accumulated over the last decade. However,
the complete absence of consciousness is difficult to prove and some researchers are not
convinced that non-conscious perception exists in humans
(Phillips). The account of perceptual qualities presented in part I does not depend on the
existence of non-conscious perception and non-conscious perceptual qualities in humans.
Instead, whether perception is conscious or not is irrelevant for this account because it is based
on the outcome of behavioral or psychophysical experiments alone. The results of this analysis
apply to perception in humans, birds, bacteria, robots, or any other system that shows differential
responses to different physical stimuli.

6

Perceptual qualities are the building blocks of perception and all instances of perception involve
perceptual qualities. All visual perception, for example, involves colors, although sometimes
they are achromatic colors (black, white, and all the shades of grey). Similarly, all olfactory
perception involves smells. There are myriads of colors and tones and smells. Attempts to bring
order to the diversity of perceptual qualities go back to the earliest days of philosophy. The most
promising approach has been to arrange perceptual qualities relationally according to their
similarities in a multi-dimensional mathematical space (Goodman 1951; Clark 1993; Matthen
2005; Rosenthal 2014; Young, Keller et al. 2014). Using this approach, researchers have
arranged all colors in a three-dimensional perceptual space (Figure 2), with the dimensions hue,
brightness, and saturation. All tones have been arranged in a two-dimensional space according to
their pitch and loudness4.

Arranging things depending on their relations has been a successful approach to order biological
diversity outside of perceptual research. The most prominent example is the arrangement of all
living things based on their evolutionary relationships in a phylogenetic tree. One of the reasons

4

I am ignoring timbre in the context of perceptual spaces. Timbre is the quality of sound that
allows us to discriminate between the sound made by a piano and by a guitar when they have the
same pitch and loudness. Timbre has been called, "...the psychoacoustician's multidimensional
waste-basket category for everything that cannot be labeled pitch or loudness." McAdams, S. and
A. Bregman (1979). "Hearing musical streams." Computer Music Journal 3(4): 26-43. (page 34).
The rationale for ignoring timbre is that it is determined by temporal characters of the sound, like
its onset and time envelope. The perceptual spaces discussed in the first part of this dissertation
are meant to be arrangements of perceptual qualities, abstracted away from their temporal and
spatial structure. Abstracting away from temporal structure is more difficult in audition than in
other modalities. Pitch, which is usually included as a dimension of tone spaces, is determined by
the frequency of a sound and therefore also dependent on the sound's temporal features. To
include pitch but exclude temporal features that contribute to timbre is admittedly arbitrary. I do
not think that expanding the tone space into a sound space by including the features that
contribute to timbre would have important theoretical consequences beyond increasing
complexity. However, this question may be worthwhile more consideration.
7

the phylogenetic tree is so important for evolutionary biology is that it includes all living things
and the relations between them. The perceptual space that I suggest similarly includes all
perceptual qualities, regardless of their modality. This is the philosophically most important
difference between the approach presented here and previous approaches which it is based on
(Goodman 1951; Clark 1993; Matthen 2005; Rosenthal 2014; Young, Keller et al. 2014).
Previous approaches usually focused on constructing perceptual spaces for individual modalities
(color space, smell space, etc.). It is my hope that a perceptual quality space that includes all
perceptual qualities is an interesting alternative. In the first chapter, I will outline an approach to
construct such a perceptual quality space that individuates perceptual qualities by arranging them
according to the similarity relations between them. Each perceptual quality is individuated by its
unique position in the perceptual quality space. I will suggest using triadic comparisons to
determine relative similarity between three stimuli to arrange the stimuli in a multidimensional
space. I will explain and justify this method and then speculate about the features that the
resulting perceptual quality space can be expected to have.

The obvious disanalogy between the phylogenetic tree and the perceptual quality space is that
there is only one phylogenetic tree. On the other hand, there are many different perceptual
quality spaces. Individuals with red-green-colorblindness have a different perceptual space from
normal-sighted individuals. Furthermore, an individual's perceptual quality space can change
depending on experiences and changes or deterioration of the sensory systems. In the second
chapter, I will first discuss this diversity of perceptual quality spaces to set up the problem of
comparing perceptual qualities between different perceivers. I will then show that, under certain
circumstances, individuating perceptual qualities without reference to subjective experience

8

through quality spaces makes it possible to compare perceptual qualities that are perceived by
different perceivers.

9

Chapter 1: Perceptual quality space
In this chapter, I will focus on how to construct the perceptual quality space for a given
individual at a given point in time. I will not concern myself with questions about how stable this
space is over time or how similar one individual's space is to another's. These topics will be
addressed in chapter 2. In chapter 1, I will only attempt to develop and defend a strategy that
arranges perceptual qualities in a way that reliably reflects the similarities between how they are
perceived by an individual perceiver. Traditionally, the problem of putting order to the
bewildering diversity of perceptual qualities has been addressed in two steps. In a first step, each
perceptual quality was assigned to a sensory modality. In the second step, the perceptual qualities
of each modality were arranged in a multidimensional space according to the similarities
between the perceptual qualities. The result of this two-step process is a list of modalities and
separate perceptual quality spaces for each modality. What is missing from this result is an
explanation of similarities between stimuli in different modalities. It can be argued that there are
no stable, meaningful similarity relations between tones, colors, tastes, and smells. However,
empirical results that suggest that perceived similarities between perceptual qualities do not
respect traditional modality boundaries. For example sugar, which is an odorless tastant, is
consistently experienced to be more similar to the tasteless odorant vanillin than to salt, another
odorless tastant (Rankin and Marks 2000). If all we have is a list of modalities and the structure
of the perceptual quality spaces for each of the modalities, then we cannot account for this fact.
To address this problem, I propose one-step strategy of arranging all perceptual qualities
regardless of their modality in a multidimensional space based on their similarity relations. The
resulting space will be exhaustive and relational "all the way down".

10

Figure 2: The perceptual color quality space. (A) The perceptual quality space is threedimensional and asymmetric. By convention, the hue dimension is represented as a
closed circle. The vertical dimension is brightness and saturation increases from the
inside of the circle formed by the hue dimension. (B) A section through the perceptual
color quality space at a given brightness. The asterisk marks the position of a color that
does not exist in normal perception. A perceptual quality with this combination of hue,
brightness, and saturation is not normally perceived by humans. (modified from original
work by SharkD (in the public domain under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share
Alike license (CC BY-SA 3.0))

1.1. Constructing an exhaustive perceptual quality space
An exhaustive perceptual quality space is a space in which all smells, colors, tones, tastes, and
other perceptual qualities are arranged according to the similarity relations between them.
Perceptual quality spaces consist of multi-dimensional coordinate systems in which different
locations represent different perceptual qualities. Partial perceptual quality spaces for tones and
colors (Figure 2) have already been established. As far as these partial spaces reflect similarity
relations between the perceptual qualities of a modality, they will become part of the exhaustive
perceptual space. A possible way to arrive at an exhaustive perceptual space is to first
individuate the modalities, then construct perceptual spaces for each modality, and then arrange
these perceptual spaces in a modality space. A modality space is a multidimensional space in
which modalities are arranged according to the similarities between them (Keeley 2002; Gray
11

2013; Macpherson 2015). I think that this strategy does not address the problem I am interested
in; the resulting modality space of perceptual spaces will not explain why sugar is more similar
to vanillin than to salt (Rankin and Marks 2000). I therefore propose a one-step procedure of
arranging all perceptual qualities in an exhaustive perceptual space based on psychophysical
measures of similarity.

Determining similarity between perceptual qualities
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of similarity judgments for an organism's survival.
Similarity judgments play a much more pronounced role in perception-based behaviors than
discrimination. Discrimination is not very useful because we almost never encounter
indiscriminable things. An apple can perceptually be discriminated from all (or most) other
apples perceptually. It can also be discriminated from all bananas and all other things in the
world. The capacity to discriminate a large, ripe, intact apple from another large, ripe, intact
apple is not a useful evolutionary adaptation. What is useful is to be able to judge that one large,
ripe, intact apple is similar to another large, ripe, intact apple. This allows us to respond similarly
to things that are perceived similarly. That we are able to make very fine discriminations is a
consequence of a perceptual system that evolved to judge similarities. As Quine wrote, "surely
there is nothing more basic to thought and language than our sense of similarity; our sorting of
things into kinds" (Quine 1970).

Experimentally, perceived similarities can be revealed in different ways (for a detailed
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of different strategies, see (Wise, Olsson et al.
2000)). Many of these experiments can be used in humans as well as in animals, and often they
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produce similar results (Chen and Gerber 2014). A reliable psychophysical method for
determining similarity relations between stimuli are triadic comparisons. In triadic comparisons,
three stimuli are presented to subjects who are instructed to pick the two stimuli that are the most
similar (MacRae, Howgate et al. 1990; MacRae, Rawcliffe et al. 1992). Other methods for
determining perceived similarities between stimuli include direct ratings of the similarity of two
odors, and measuring similarity between verbal descriptors that are applied to odors (Wise,
Olsson et al. 2000). Each of these methods has advantages and disadvantages and using different
psychophysical methods to determine stimulus similarity will undoubtedly lead to slightly
differently structured perceptual spaces. However, this dependence on the procedure used for its
construction does not diminish the explanatory power of the perceptual quality space. This can
be illustrated by comparison to the phylogenetic trees. A phylogenetic tree can be build based on
skeletal anatomy, on genomic sequences, or on a combination of both. The resulting trees will be
different. Mostly the differences will be small, but sometimes they will be consequential. The
extent evidence is unlikely to be sufficient to resolve all uncertainties about shifts in populations
that occurred hundreds of millions of years ago. There is a phylogenetic tree that accurately
reflects all relationships between all living things; however, it is likely that science will never be
able to represent all aspects of it in a phylogenetic tree with great certainty. This uncertainty does
not diminish the importance of phylogenetic trees for biology. Similarly, there are, for a given
perceiver at a given time, true similarity relations between all perceptual qualities. Different
psychophysical methods or combinations of these methods will result in slight differences in
how these relations are represented in a perceptual quality space. However, the importance of the
perceptual quality space is not undermined by ambiguities due to different methods of
constructing it.

13

Different methods can be used to establish similarity relations between stimuli. Using triadic
comparisons has several advantages over other methods. One advantage of this method is that it
requires only ordinal judgments. The similarity between stimuli does not have to be quantified,
which is a cognitively very demanding task. Another advantage is that, as forced-choice tests,
triadic comparisons are independent of conscious perception of similarities. Subjects that report
that all three stimuli are the same may still perform non-randomly when asked to pick the two
that are the most similar. A further advantage is that triadic comparisons, or equivalent stimulus
generalization experiments, can be performed by all species and in all modalities. Presenting
three stimuli in a row and asking subjects to group them according to similarity is possible in all
modalities. Other methods to gain information about the similarity relations between stimuli are
based on presenting two stimuli, for example colors, simultaneously. These types of experiments
are only possible for modalities in which stimuli can be perceived simultaneously.

A complication for all attempts to constructing a perceptual quality space is the existence of
perceptual qualities that are not directly associated with physical stimuli. There are, for example,
"impossible" perceptual color qualities that can be only produced by combining the perception of
the afterimage of one color with the perception of another color. If one looks at a pale blue-green
surface and immediately afterwards at a maximally saturated orange surface, for example, the
combination of the orange afterimage and the orange perception results in the perception of a
hyperbolic orange that is more ostentatiously orange than every orange normally seen
(Churchland 2005). Producing such color qualities poses a practical problem for constructing the
perceptual space. Instead of simply presenting the stimulus, the whole sequence of stimuli that
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reliably leads to the perceptual quality has to be presented. However, as long as the perceptual
qualities are predictably inducible, the problem is only practical. If some perceptual qualities are
only perceived in hallucinations, and this perception is independent of a stimulus and impossible
to predict, then these qualities cannot be captured by the method I propose.

Relation between similarity measures and discrimination tasks
Similarity-based psychophysics are not usually used to construct perceptual spaces. More
commonly, perceptual quality spaces are constructed using just-noticeable-differences between
stimuli (Goodman 1951; Clark 1993; Matthen 2005; Rosenthal 2014; Young, Keller et al. 2014).
The just noticeable difference between two stimuli can be determined by forced-choicediscrimination tasks. The experiments start with two discriminable stimuli. The subject is asked
to discriminate the stimuli and when they do so reliably, the physical properties of one of the two
stimuli are gradually made more similar to the physical properties of the other stimulus. When
the point is reached at which they can no longer be discriminated, the just-noticeable-difference
between the two stimuli has been discovered. If the two stimuli cannot be made to be
indiscriminable, then they belong to different modalities (Rosenthal 2014). The just-noticeabledifference-method results in a color space, a smell space, and several other quality spaces. It does
not reveal anything about the relations between these spaces.

The results of forced-choice discrimination tasks are the subset of the results of triadic
comparisons. When the subject in a triadic comparison task is presented with three stimuli, two
of which are identical, then the grouping of the stimuli depends on whether the subject can
discriminate the two identical stimuli from the third stimulus. When the difference between the
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stimulus that is presented in duplicate and the third stimulus is just noticeable, the subject will
rate the two identical stimuli as being the most similar pair. When the third stimulus is then
altered so that it can no longer be discriminated from the two identical stimuli, then the responses
will be random, with each pair being identified as the most similar pair with equal likelihood. In
this way, triadic comparisons provide information about just-noticeable-differences.

Triadic comparison delivers the same information that forced-choice discrimination tasks
deliver. However, in addition to the information whether two stimuli can be discriminated, it
delivers information about the relative perceptual similarity of discriminable pairs of stimuli.
This information is necessary to arrange all perceptual qualities, even those that are associated
with stimuli that cannot be altered so that they cannot be discriminated. This information is
necessary to construct an exhaustive perceptual quality space and account for similarity relations
between perceptual qualities in different modalities.

Despite the additional information that can be obtain through similarity-based psychophysics,
psychophysicists are usually more comfortable with discrimination tasks than with similaritybased psychophysics. One reason why discrimination tasks are often preferred to similarity
judgments is that discrimination tasks are the paradigmatic example of psychological measures
of performance that probe human abilities. Similarity judgments on the other hand, are often
considered to be based on the report of mental content rather than on performance (Wise, Olsson
et al. 2000). However, when triadic comparisons are used to determine similarity relations, this is
not the case. There are objectively correct facts about perceptual similarities and similarity tasks
are a test of the ability to identify them. The length of three-inch nail is more similar to the length
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of a four-inch nail than to the length of an eight-inch nail. Similarly, of the distances between
three perceptual qualities in a perceptual space, one distance is in most cases shorter than the
other two distances. To deny that there are correct answers to triadic comparisons is to deny that
the perceptual qualities involved in the triadic comparison can be arranged according to
similarity in a perceptual quality space.

I said that, in triadic comparisons in most cases one of three distances between the three
perceptual qualities is shorter than the other two. The only situation in which no distance is
shorter that the other two is when all three distances are the same. They can all be zero, in which
case the three stimuli are indiscriminable, or all three distances can have the same non-zero
length. In this case, the stimuli can be discriminated, but the similarities between the stimuli are
indiscriminable. This will most often occur when the three stimuli are all very dissimilar. With
increasing dissimilarity, differences in similarity become irrelevant. The function of similarity
judgments is to cluster, generalize, or categorize things, and when things are so dissimilar that
they clearly are not in the same cluster, it is not necessary to be capable of comparing
similarities. This failure to perform in triadic comparisons of three very different stimuli is not a
bug, but a feature. Whether people can or cannot compare the similarities between stimuli has to
be found out experimentally for individual cases. I predict that a triadic comparison between the
color red, cold temperature, and bitter taste will not reveal anything about the similarity relations
of these perceptual qualities. If this is the case, then the data from this triadic comparison will not
contribute to the construction of the perceptual quality space. However, I may be wrong about it
and people group cold temperature with bitter taste. Then this data-point can be used in the
construction of the perceptual quality space.
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Another common objection to using similarity judgments in psychophysics is that similarity can
be judged along different criteria (Wise, Olsson et al. 2000). Imagine for example a triadic
comparison of dark blue, light blue, and dark green. Some subjects may use darkness as a
criterion whereas others may use hue. Imagine, as suggested by Matthen (Matthen 2005) (page
131), that you are asked whether the US, Russia, or China is more similar to Canada. Your
answer will depend on the context in which the question is asked, and depending on the context,
you will privilege different criteria (climate, political system, size, population, etc.) in answering.
However, there is an important methodological difference between the cases of judging
similarity between countries and between perceptual qualities. Unlike for countries, for
perceptual qualities there are always comparisons available in which the perceptual qualities that
are compared differ in only one criterion. Perceptual color qualities can be matched for
brightness and saturation and then the similarity between them will be judged only according to
hue. This is not the case for judging similarities between countries. It is not possible to compare
two countries that differ in their population while they have the same climate, political system,
and size. That similarities can be judged along different criteria is therefore not as big a problem
for assessing similarities between perceptual qualities than it is for assessing similarities between
countries. It merely is a practical problem in that it requires a very large number of comparisons
to tease apart all the different criteria along which perceptual qualities can differ.

A further objection against similarity-based groupings is that similarity judgments are not stable
over time. Instead, similarity judgments can be altered by experiences. In some cases, for
example, odors that are presented in a mixture with another odor can take on some qualities of
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the odor they were mixed with. An odor smells different depending on what other odors it has
been experienced with previously (Stevenson 2001). Presumably, this change in perceived
quality results in changes in similarity judgments of the odors involved. It is certainly true that
similarity-judgments depend to some degree on experience. However, these experiencedependent effects on similarity judgments are minute compared to the effects of innate standards
of similarity5. Although similarity judgments for very dissimilar odors change slightly depending
on what other odors they were paired with, it seems unlikely that one could get a subject to rate
fir oil as smelling more like fish than like pine oil by repeatedly exposing the subject to a mix of
fir oil and fish. There are strong innate mechanisms of similarity perception that are unchanging.
Furthermore, experience-dependence of performance is common in all types of psychophysical
testing. The capacity to discriminate odors, for example, is also affected by experience (Rabin
1988; Jehl, Royet et al. 1995).

In summary, for constructing a perceptual space that reflects similarity relations, similarity-based
methods are the obvious choice. However, psychophysical similarity judgments can be
problematic because they are cognitively more demanding than discrimination tasks. Humans
are, for example, not good at comparing similarities between very dissimilar stimuli. For this
reason, discrimination tasks are more stable and reliable and they have been the method of
choice for constructing perceptual quality spaces. My goal is to construct an exhaustive
perceptual quality space that includes the perceptual qualities of all modalities arranged by

5

As Quine pointed out, if all stimuli would be equally alike and equally different, we could
never acquire generalized behavioral responses Quine, W. V. (1970). Natural kinds. Essays in
Honor of Carl G. Hempel. N. Rescher. Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company., and all our
behavioral responses are generalized responses that will be elicited by a group of similar yet
discriminable stimuli.
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similarity relations between them. I do not know how this could be accomplished using
discrimination tasks. I therefore propose to give up the methodological advantages of
discrimination tasks to gain the possibility of constructing a perceptual space that arranges
perceptual qualities regardless of their modality according to their similarities. One can disagree
whether this is a good trade. If there were no interesting similarity relations between different
modalities, one would not gain anything from such a move. In the next section, I will speculate
how the exhaustive perceptual space would look, in an attempt to show that interesting things
about the relations between perceptual qualities in different modalities could be learned from
such a space.

1.2. Features of the perceptual quality space
Using triadic comparisons to construct an exhaustive perceptual space is an ambitious empirical
project. It would take a large number of triadic comparisons to reveal the detailed structure of
this space. However, we already know enough about perceptual qualities and their similarity
relations that one can speculate about the most important features of the perceptual quality space.
In this section, I will speculate about the number of dimensions of the exhaustive perceptual
space and about what the dimensions represent. I will then introduce a method of individuating
modalities based on the distribution of perceptual qualities in the exhaustive perceptual quality
space.

Dimensionality of the perceptual quality space
An important question about the perceptual space is how many dimensions it has. The number of
dimensions is a direct result of the similarity relations (Clark 1993) (pages 84-89). For every set
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of similarity relations, the lowest-dimensional space in which all of them can be represented can
be found. Figure 3 illustrates how arranging the same number of stimuli by similarity can require
one, two, or three dimensions, based on the similarity relations between them.

Figure 3: Determining the number of dimensions of a perceptual space. Depending on the
experimentally determined relations between perceptual qualities on the left, one (top),
two (middle), or three (bottom) dimensions are required to arrange them in perceptual
space (modified after (Clark 1993) (pages 84 to 89).

To illustrate how the dimensionality of the perceptual space is revealed by the similarity relations
between perceptual qualities, consider sets of qualities that are all equally similar to one another.
Consider three perceptual qualities: A, B, and C. If A is as similar to B as it is to C and as B is to
C, then these three qualities cannot be arranged in a one-dimensional space in a way that reflects
all three similarity relations. The simplest way to arrange three equidistant perceptual qualities in
space is to place them in the corners of an equilateral triangle. Triangles are two-dimensional
structures and the existence of three equidistant perceptual qualities shows that the perceptual
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space they belong to has to be at least two-dimensional. The simplest way to arrange four
equidistant perceptual qualities is to place them into the four vertices of a regular tetrahedron,
which is the only possible arrangement of four equidistant points in three-dimensional space.
This means that a perceptual quality space that contains four equidistant perceptual qualities has
to be at least three-dimensional.

We do not know yet how many dimensions are required to accommodate all perceptual qualities.
However, partial quality spaces in which perceptual qualities from a single modality are arranged
have been constructed. These quality spaces illustrate the explanatory power of this approach by
arranging large numbers of perceptual qualities in low-dimensional spaces. The millions of
colors can be arranged in a space that has three dimensions (hue, saturation, and brightness)
(Hardin 1988; Hilbert and Kalderon 2000). The approximately 340,000 tones can be arranged in
a two-dimensional space (loudness and pitch) (Stevens and Davis 1938). Temperature space and
pressure space presumably only have a single dimension. There are many more smells than
colors and tones (Bushdid, Magnasco et al. 2014). Accordingly, no smell space has yet been
constructed. However, it has been speculated that an olfactory perceptual space would have
many more dimensions than the quality spaces that we know now (Auffarth 2013).

Having an X-dimensional perceptual quality space does not mean that each perceptual quality in
the space can only be fully described by X dimensions. It is possible that some perceptual
qualities have zero values for many of the dimensions. Just because an X-dimensional space is
required to accommodate all perceptual qualities does not mean that the X-dimensional space is
required to accommodate each perceptual quality (Figure 4). Greys are colors that differ only in

22

their brightness. However, although the greys could be arranged in a one-dimensional quality
space, they are commonly included in the three-dimensional space that can accommodate also
those colors that have hue and saturation. Let us assume that the exhaustive perceptual space has
ten dimensions. This does not mean that color perceptual qualities gain seven dimensions in
addition to hue, brightness, and saturation.

Figure 4: Not all dimensions in a perceptual space are shared by all perceptual qualities.
A hypothetical distribution of perceptual qualities in a three-dimensional quality space is
shown. The perceptual qualities form two clusters, shown in red and blue. Both
modalities share the y-axis, but only the perceptual qualities in the red cluster vary along
the x-axis and only perceptual qualities in the blue cluster vary along the z-axis.

Dimensions of the perceptual quality space
Once we know how many dimensions the perceptual space has, we will want to know what the
dimensions represent; we will want to label the dimensions. Ultimately, it is a matter of
convention how to label the dimensions of a perceptual space. The dimensions of the perceptual
space may align with words that are used in pre-theoretic vocabulary to talk about perceptual
qualities. However, it is also possible that the newly discovered dimensions of the perceptual
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space require new labels. Consider the labels for the dimensions of the color or tone space.
"Hue" was an obscure Old English word for color that was revived by scientists in the 19th
century to have a specific word for the perceptual property that is distinct from "color". In
German, "hue" is "Farbton", which translates to "tone of the color", in analogy to auditory
perception. "Pitch" was first used to describe perceptual auditory qualities in 1590, and the
relations to the other meanings of the word are unclear. In German, "pitch" is "Tonhöhe", which
translates to "height of the tone", reflecting the spatial position of tones in musical annotation.
These examples show that labels for the dimensions of perceptual quality spaces were invented
or re-appropriated by experts after the structure of the underlying perceptual space was
understood. The same approach should be followed for labeling the dimensions of the exhaustive
perceptual space.

That scientific progress brings with it a new vocabulary instead of relying on pre-theoretical
language is a common occurrence. One example in which bringing systematic order to biological
diversity required a new vocabulary is phylogenetic systematics and the naming of animal
species. The pre-scientific vocabulary to refer to animals was not systematic. The many species
of flying insects that bite or sting are called "mosquitoes". Myriads of small invertebrate species
are referred to as "bugs". Only species that are of ecological importance to humans, like
domesticated species or important pests, have common names. In some cases, cultivars or
varieties also have proper names. With the rise of the biological sciences, a second vocabulary
for talking about living things has been developed. Scientific names of species are based on the
structure of the phylogenetic tree. The new names for the species were invented by scientists.
This scientific vocabulary was developed without any regard as to whether it aligns well with the
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established ways of referring to living things. The scientific vocabulary had little impact on
language. We still say that we have been bitten by a mosquito, not that we have been bitten by
Anopheles gambiae. However, the scientific vocabulary has the advantage that it reflects the
empirically determined structure of the phylogenetic tree.

New scientific discoveries commonly require a new vocabulary. Otherwise, there would be no
need for experiments and one could deduce the structure of reality from language use. The lack
of pre-theoretical verbal labels for the dimensions of the perceptual space is not a surprise and
does not pose a problem because our vocabulary has "no more of a representational relation to
an intrinsic nature of things than does the anteater's snout or the bowerbird's skill at weaving"
(Rorty 1998) (page 48). Contrary to this insight, a strong preference for an account of perception
that aligns with the pre-theoretical vocabulary has also been expressed:
"It is therefore crucial to my thesis to emphasize that sense impressions or raw feels are
common sense theoretical constructs introduced to explain the occurrence, not of white
rat type discriminative behavior, but rather of perceptual propositional attitudes, and are
therefore bound up with the explanation of why human language contains families of
predicates having the logical properties of words for perceptible qualities and relations"
(Sellars 1965).

My preferred strategy is to first construct the perceptual quality space and then attempt to
describe it using non-scientific nomenclature. If this turns out to be impossible, a scientific
vocabulary has to be invented. Admittedly, an account that would explain both perception and
the way we talk about perception would be more powerful than an account of perception alone.
However, I do not believe that such an account exists. Why we have words for some parts of the
perceptual space and how these words relate to each other is a linguistic question. The structure
of perceptual quality spaces, which can be constructed for bats or bacteria in the same manner
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they are constructed for humans, is independent of this linguistic question (for interesting
treatments of the language used to describe perceptual qualities, see (Berlin and Kay 1969) for
colors, and (Castro, Ramanathan et al. 2013) for smells).

Even though building a perceptual space proceeds without regard of pre-theoretic language, it is
likely that at least some of the dimensions of the perceptual space can be interpreted in pretheoretical language. One of the dimensions of the exhaustive perceptual space will presumably
represent perceptual intensity. Intensity is a quality shared by perception in many modalities, and
stimuli of similar intensity in different modalities are perceived to be more similar than stimuli of
different intensity. It has for example been shown that darker colors are matched to stronger
odors (Kemp and Gilbert 1997). It is also likely that stronger odors will be matched to louder
sounds and stronger pains. These results show that intensity is an important feature of perceptual
qualities across modalities. This will likely be reflected by the structure of the perceptual space.
A separate dimension of the perceptual space may correlate with perceived pleasantness, which
is also a quality of perception that is found in different modalities. Pleasantness, for example,
plays an important role in the non-random matching of odors to sounds (Crisinel and Spence
2011). For tastes and smells, pleasantness may even be the dominant perceptual dimension
(Khan, Luk et al. 2007)6.

6

There is a question whether pleasantness should count as a dimension of perceptual qualities.
The question mirrors by the question whether painfulness should count as a feature of perceptual
qualities, which has been discussed by Austen Clark Clark, A. (2005). Painfulness is Not a
Quale. Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. M. Aydede.
Cambridge, MIT Press: 177-197.. According to Clark, pain is accompanied by specific sensory
qualities, but it is not one itself. The intuitive test whether one agrees with this is whether two
equally painful pains, for example the pain of a sunburn and of a pulled muscle share a common
sensory quality or not. The olfactory equivalent would be to ask whether two equally pleasant
smells, for example the smell of bacon and that of vanilla share a common quality or not. Clark
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Beyond intensity and pleasantness, correspondences between perceptual qualities in different
modalities are more difficult to interpret using pre-theoretical language. Some crossmodal
correspondences are easily explained through associations. The color green is matched to the
smell of grass because the color and the smell are properties of the same object (Levitan, Ren et
al. 2014). Other crossmodal correspondences, for example between pitch and smell, cannot be
explained through associations and are grounded in perceptual similarities across modalities (for
a review of crossmodal correspondences between smells and perceptual qualities in other
modalities, see (Deroy, Crisinel et al. 2013)). However, ordinary language has no word for a
perceptual quality dimension that is shared by pitch and smell that could be used to label this
emerging dimension of the perceptual quality space. A new label has to be invented for this
dimension and presumably also for many other dimensions.

Modality-representing clusters of perceptual qualities
Many methods of bringing order to perceptual qualities start by assigning each perceptual quality
to one of the sensory modalities7. The method suggested here arranges all perceptual qualities
according to their similarities in a perceptual space. The modalities, rather than being categories
used to arrange perceptual qualities emerge from the arrangement of perceptual qualities.

concludes that pain is not a perceptual quality, instead, the close connection between certain
perceptual qualities and pain is that the sensory qualities are wired "directly into the creature's
preference functions" ibid.. Whether something that is directly wired into perception is part of
perception or not is part of the difficult problem of drawing the line between perception and
cognition.
7
A notable exception is Rosenthal, who uses the just-noticeable-difference-method to both
construct perceptual quality spaces and individuate modalities Rosenthal, D. (2014). Quality
spaces and sensory modalities. The Nature of Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and
Consciousness. P. Coates and S. Coleman. Oxford, Oxford University Press..
27

The coordinate system that contains the exhaustive perceptual space is not fully packed with
perceptual qualities. Instead, it is sparsely populated by perceptual qualities that are interspersed
by empty areas that do not correspond to any perceptual qualities. Presumably, there is no
continuum of perceptual qualities between a color of a certain hue, brightness, and saturation,
and a tone of a certain pitch and loudness. We cannot start with a perceptual color quality and
change it in small steps until we have changed it into a perceptual tone quality. If this is correct,
then the area between colors and smells in the coordinate system that contains the exhaustive
perceptual space is empty. Presumably, there will be many other empty areas surrounding
perceptual qualities8. It is very likely that the perceptual qualities are not distributed at random in
the coordinate system; presumably, they form clusters. These clusters of perceptual qualities can
be interpreted as modalities. If people perceive colors to be more similar to other colors than to
any other perceptual quality, then all colors will be close to each other in a cluster that can be
interpreted as the visual modality.

Modality-representing clusters of perceptual qualities emerge when perceptual qualities are
arranged according to their similarities. However, because a variety of different formalized
algorithms (Everitt, Landau et al. 2011) can be employed to detect clusters, cluster analysis

8

Some of the empty space in the coordinate system corresponds to potential perceptual qualities.
The perceptual color space in Figure 2 shows that only certain combinations of hue, brightness,
and saturation are perceived by humans. Very bright yellows are for example sometimes more
saturated than maximally saturated less bright yellows. The asterisk in Figure 2B marks the
position of a yellow that is never perceived because yellows of this brightness cannot be that
saturated. The asterisk marks the position of a potential perceptual quality. Many other areas in
the coordinate system that contains the exhaustive perceptual quality space, like the area between
colors and tones, will not correspond to any actual or potential perceptual qualities.
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allows for several different outcomes. The same arrangement can be interpreted as three
modalities (Figure 5A), five modalities (Figure 5B), or three modalities with two of the
modality-representing clusters subdivided into sub clusters (Figure 5C). The hierarchical
organization of modalities that is shown in Figure 5C is probably the most accurate reflection of
the relations between perceptual qualities. The best-known illustration of such a hierarchical
structure is the arrangement of the perceptual qualities associated with touch. Touch includes
every perception that is not vision, audition, gustation, or olfaction. Touch can therefore be
further subdivided into proprioception (sensing relative positions of body parts), mechanoception
(pressure), thermoception (temperature), nociception (pain), and maybe others.

Figure 5: Modality individuating clusters of perceptual qualities. A hypothetical
distribution of perceptual qualities in a three-dimensional quality space is shown.
Depending on the parameters that one uses for identifying modality-representing clusters,
this distribution can be interpreted as three (A) or five (B) modalities, or as three
modalities, two of which can be further subdivided (C) .

Because the results of applying cluster analysis to the perceptual space depend on the criteria
used to individuate clusters, cluster analysis cannot decide unambiguously how many modalities
there are and where the boundaries between them are located. However, the advantage of cluster
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analysis is that it can be used to test accounts of modalities for their consistency. For example,
the set of algorithms that clusters smells, tastes, colors, and tones all in their own modalityrepresenting cluster can be investigated. If no algorithm in this set clusters all other perceptual
qualities together in a single touch modality, then the classic account of the five human senses is
wrong.

The big advantage of modality individuation through modality-representing clusters over other
strategies of modality individuation is that it not only individuates modalities, but also reveals
the relation between modalities. The distance between two modality-representing clusters in the
perceptual space is a measure of the similarity between the two modalities. More interestingly,
the cluster analysis also reveals the relative orientation of modality-representing clusters to each
other. The distance between these clusters and how they are oriented with respect to each other
represent similarity relations between perceptual qualities in different modalities. Consider again
that sugar, an odorless tastant, is consistently experienced to be more similar to the tasteless
odorant vanillin than to salt, another odorless tastant (Rankin and Marks 2000). The traditional
two-step procedure of modality individuation and subsequent quality space construction cannot
account for this fact. In contrast, the perceptual quality space that contains all perceptual qualities
can account for all similarity relations between perceptual qualities, regardless of the modalityrepresenting cluster they belong to. In Figure 6, a hypothetical arrangement of the cluster of
gustatory perceptual qualities and olfactory perceptual qualities is shown. This arrangement
preserves the distinction between the olfactory modality and the gustatory modality while also
explaining why sweet taste is more similar to vanilla odor than to salty taste.

30

Figure 6: Similarity between perceptual qualities in different modalities. A hypothetical
arrangement of smells and tastes in perceptual space that would explain why sweet taste
is more similar to vanilla odor than to salty taste despite sweet and salty being perceptual
qualities in the same modality is shown.

Interpreting clusters of perceptual qualities in the perceptual space as modalities is a form of
individuating modalities based on behaviors, because the perceptual space was constructed
through behavioral experiments. This is an unusual strategy. It is more common that modality
individuation is based on representations, phenomenal character, the proximal stimulus, or the
sense-organs (Grice 1962; Macpherson 2011)9. However, behavior-based modality individuation

9

How the sense modalities should be individuated has been a topic of philosophical
investigations since Aristotle's De Anima Aristotle (2011). Excerpt from On the Soul (De
Anima). The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. F. Macpherson.
New York, Oxford University Press: 47-63, Sorabji, R. (2011). Aristotle on Demarcating the
Five Senses. The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives. F. Macpherson. New York,
Oxford University Press: 64-82.. Traditionally, modality individuation has been based on
representations, phenomenal character, the proximal stimulus, or the sense organs. All four
approaches largely agree when individuating vision and audition. Vision, for example, is the only
sense that represents colors, the proper sensible of vision. Our eyes are at all levels of description
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has also been suggested previously. Most notably, the just-noticeable-difference-method that has
been used to construct quality spaces has recently been extended to provide a method for
individuating modalities based on discriminative abilities (Rosenthal 2014). The just-noticeabledifference-method and the method proposed in section 1.1. have many similarities. The most
notable difference between the two methods is that the method proposed in this chapter arranges
perceptual modalities relative to each other according to the similarities between their perceptual
qualities. As was pointed out above, the discriminative abilities that are revealed by the justnoticeable-difference-method are also revealed by relative similarity judgments. When subjects

(anatomical, cellular, and molecular) sufficiently distinct from other sensory structures. Photons,
the proximal stimulus, are also sufficiently distinct from other stimuli. The phenomenal character
of all visual experiences allows distinguishing these experiences from other sensory experiences.
However, it is merely a contingent fact of the biology of human vision that all four approaches
agree on how to individuate it. With olfaction and other modalities they often produce
contradictory results, as has been anticipated by Aristotle, who wrote "the distinguishing
characteristic of smell is less obvious than those of sound or colour" Aristotle (2011). Excerpt
from On the Soul (De Anima). The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Philosophical
Perspectives. F. Macpherson. New York, Oxford University Press: 47-63. (page 52). One
example of chemosensory perception that is difficult to categorize is the perception mediated by
the TRPV1 receptor. TRPV1 is a type of molecular receptor that is sensitive both to hot
temperature and to capsaicin, the pungent chemical found in chili peppers Caterina, M. J., M. A.
Schumacher, et al. (1997). "The capsaicin receptor: a heat-activated ion channel in the pain
pathway." Nature 389(6653): 816-824.. This receptor is expressed in sensory neurons on the
tongue and these neurons therefore respond equally to chili peppers and to hot water. If the sense
organ criterion is applied, capsaicin and heat are considered two stimuli in the same modality.
However, if the stimulus criterion is applied, then the TRPV1 receptor mediates perception in
two different modalities. Two stimuli that are sensed by the same molecular receptor will result
in the same neuronal activity and therefore in the same phenomenal character; therefore the
phenomenal character criterion would judge heat and capsaicin to be two stimuli in the same
modality. However, what is represented by the two stimuli is a botanical compound and hot air,
respectively. TRPV1 is just one of many examples of chemical receptors that are sensitive to
physically different stimuli Dhaka, A., V. Viswanath, et al. (2006). "Trp ion channels and
temperature sensation." Annual Review of Neuroscience 29: 135-161.. A prominent example
from the olfactory system is the TRPM8 receptor, which is activated by the odor menthol as well
as by cold air. In all these cases of receptors sensitive to two physically very different stimuli, the
stimulus and representation criteria come to the conclusion that the receptor mediates perception
in two different modalities whereas the phenomenal character and sensory organ criteria come to
the contradictory conclusion that the two different stimuli are stimuli in the same modality.
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are presented with three stimuli, two of which are identical and the third different, triadic
comparisons mimic discrimination tasks. It can therefore be suspected that the modality
individuation through both methods results in the same set of modalities. The method proposed
in section 1.1. individuates the modalities in a similar way to the just-noticeable-differencemethod and constructs similar perceptual spaces for each individual modality. However, it also
arranges the modality-representing clusters of perceptual qualities in a way that reflects the
similarities between perceptual qualities in different modalities.

1.3. Orderliness of the perceptual quality space
The perceptual tone space and the perceptual color space have explanatory power because they
arrange a large number of perceptual qualities in orderly spaces. The approximately 340,000
tones (Stevens and Davis 1938) can be arranged in a two-dimensional space (loudness and pitch)
and the millions of discriminable colors (Nickerson and Newhall 1943; Pointer and Attridge
1998) can be arranged in three dimensions (hue, saturation, and brightness) (Hardin 1988;
Hilbert and Kalderon 2000). This means that each of millions of colors can be identified by three
coordinates that represent hue, saturation, and brightness. Giving a full account of perceived
colors therefore does not require a description of millions of colors, but only a description of
three dimensions.

The reduction in complexity from hundreds of thousands or even millions of perceptual qualities
to two or three dimensions is what makes the color space and the tone space useful. They would
lose their usefulness if they were less orderly and arrange perceptual qualities in spaces with
hundreds instead of two or three dimensions. If it were not possible to arrange all perceptual
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qualities in a low-dimensional space, the exhaustive perceptual space would not contribute to our
understanding of perception. The perceptual qualities that so far have been most resistant to
being arranged in a perceptual space are smells. There have been so many failed attempts to
construct a smell space that some doubt that it is possible (Lycan 2000). If there would be no
orderly smell space, there also would be no orderly space that includes all perceptual qualities
and the project outlined in this dissertation would not succeed.

Orderliness in the olfactory perceptual space
After reviewing the many failed attempts to put order to the olfactory perceptual space, Lycan
writes, "... smell may catch up to color and hearing in the orderliness of its quality space and in
the accompanying explanatoriness of the underlying neurophysiology. But that is not
overwhelmingly likely." (Lycan 2000) (page 280). Such pessimism is based on the failure of all
previous attempts to arrange smells in a perceptual space (Berglund and Höglund 2012; Kaeppler
and Mueller 2013). However, these failures could also be due to three main shortcomings in the
attempts to build smell spaces.

One common mistake is that many approaches are not driven by perceptual qualities but by
verbal labels for smells. Researchers often take odor labels like "burnt", "fragrant", and "spicy",
and then arrange olfactory perceptual qualities according to how burnt, fragrant, and spicy they
smell. An example that is still found in psychology textbooks is Henning's smell prism (Henning
1916), which is a triangular prism, the six corners of which are labeled "flowery", "foul",
"fruity", "spicy", "burnt", and "resinous". All olfactory perceptual qualities are supposed to be
located within this three-dimensional space. Projects like this conflate constructing a perceptual
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smell space with establishing smell categories. The dimensions of the three-dimensional
perceptual color space are hue, saturation, and brightness. This space could have never been
discovered using an approach in which color categories like "red", "green", and "blue" are taken
to be foundational. On closer examination, it turns out that most of the projects that seem like
failed attempts to establish a smell space were instead successful attempts to establish an "odor
descriptor space" (Castro, Ramanathan et al. 2013). These attempts were successful in
establishing the odor descriptor space. However, the odor descriptor space does not correspond
to a perceptual space. This lack of correspondence is to be expected since it is also seen with the
color space that the linguistic analysis of color terms does not result in in a better understanding
of the structure of the perceptual color space.

The second problem faced by researchers trying to elucidate the structure of the smell space is
the difficulty of finding the right odorants to use for such a project. The number and diversity of
odorous molecules is immense. More than one billion different chemicals have a smell (Joel
Mainland, personal communication). Choosing a few dozens of these stimuli to use in
psychophysical experiments is a daunting task. Traditionally, there was no attempt to find
representative stimuli for psychophysics. Instead, especially salient, interesting, and ecologically
or economically important stimuli have been used. Avery Gilbert and Mark Greenberg succinctly
summarized the danger of this predominant approach when they wrote that "we are creating a
science of olfaction based on cinnamon and coffee" (Gilbert and Greenberg 1992) (page 329).
This is equivalent to a color science based on the colors of earth, fire, and water. It is not
surprising that attempts to construct smell spaces based on perfumery raw materials failed.
Thanks to the work of Noam Sobel and his group, now sets of odorants that are representative of
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all odorants can be identified. Sobel and coworkers accomplished this by arranging odorous
chemicals according to the similarity of their chemical and physical properties in a stimulus
space. Once such a stimulus space has been established, sets of odorants that are representative
for this stimulus space can be identified (Haddad, Khan et al. 2008). It is therefore, for the first
time, possible to use representative odorants in psychophysical experiments and then generalize
the results of these experiments to all of olfaction.

The third shortcoming of most attempts to construct a smell space is that they are based on
individual odorous molecules (benzaldehyde, hexanal, vanillin, and so on) (Wise, Olsson et al.
2000). A perceptual space that is based on the smells of individual molecules only covers a tiny
fraction of all olfactory qualities because mixtures of odorous molecules frequently have
qualities that are different from the qualities of its components and of all other odorous
molecules. To construct an olfactory perceptual space that covers all olfactory perceptual
qualities, the olfactory qualities of odor mixtures have to be included. The perceptual qualities of
odor mixtures are the qualities we are familiar with because the smells encountered in nature are
usually mixtures. The characteristic scents of a rose (Ohloff 1994) (pages 154-158), coffee
(Grosch 1998), and red wine (Aznar, López et al. 2001) are all complex mixtures of hundreds of
components. The components of these mixtures interact in a variety of ways that are not well
understood (Ferreira 2012; Ferreira 2012).

Previous attempts to reveal the structure of the smell space have failed. However, concluding
from these failures that no orderly smell space exists would be premature. Before coming to this
conclusion, it is worthwhile to try an approach that does not rely on our limited olfactory
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vocabulary and uses mixtures of representative odorants. Such a semantic-free approach, which
is more similar to the approaches that were successfully applied to colors and tones, may result
in the discovery of an orderly smell space.

Size of the olfactory perceptual space
How orderly the space that contains all perceptual qualities is depends on how orderly the smell
space is. Most perceptual qualities that we can discriminate are olfactory perceptual qualities.
There are more than one trillion discriminable olfactory stimuli (Bushdid, Magnasco et al. 2014).
The actual number is higher because the estimate of one trillion is based on mixtures of 30 out of
a collection of 126 different odorous molecules. However, many more than 126 different
odorous molecules exist (Joel Mainland, personal communication) and molecules can be mixed
into mixtures of more than 30 components. Furthermore, the odors can be mixed at different
proportions. Whatever the actual number of olfactory qualities is, it is several orders of
magnitude higher than the number of visual and auditory qualities.

A human takes less than one billion breaths in his or her lifetime. We encounter only relatively
few ecologically relevant odors regularly. It is therefore surprising that we can discriminate so
many different smells. We did not evolve to be able to distinguish such a large number of smells.
Instead, we evolved to be able to discriminate minute differences between two olfactory stimuli.
The large number of discriminable smells is a consequence of our evolved discriminatory
capacity. Olfactory systems evolve to discriminate complex mixtures that differ in few of their
components. In prehistoric times, it may have been important to distinguish the smell of several
babies that were raised together to avoid feeding unrelated babies in times of scarcity. The body
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odors of related babies that live together are very similar. Body odors are complex mixtures that
share many components but also differ in a few. Similarly, the odor of food and the same food
that shows the first signs of being spoiled can be very similar. Again, the two different stimuli
have many shared components, but they also differ in the components that are produced by the
bacteria as the food starts to spoil. Detecting this difference can mean the difference between a
nutritious meal and food poisoning. The ease with which we detect cork taint is a good example
of the incredible resolution of our olfactory system. Detecting cork taint amounts to detecting the
presence of a small amount of the chemical 2,4,6-trichloroanisole in the mixture of hundreds of
diverse molecules that make up the wine aroma (Aznar, López et al. 2001).

Because minute amounts of chemicals that are added to complex mixtures of other chemicals
usually lead to a change in the perceived smell of the mixture, and because the number of
potentially odorous chemicals is in the billions (Joel Mainland, personal communication), it has
been suggested that the number of distinguishable olfactory stimuli is "unlimited" (Wright 1964)
(p. 80). If the number of perceptual qualities were indeed unlimited, no perceptual quality space
that contains all of them could be constructed. However, a recent breakthrough in olfactory
psychophysics showed that our ability to discriminate smells is limited. Tali Weiss and
colleagues showed that mixtures with many components, when each component is diluted so that
all components have similar intensity, converge perceptually. This means that mixtures of
random odorous molecules with a large enough number of components smell similar and share
an olfactory quality that has been called, in analogy to vision, "olfactory brown" or "olfactory
white" (Weiss, Snitz et al. 2012). The reason why the complex mixtures of odorous molecules
that we encounter when we smell roses or coffee do not smell similar is that the components of
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these mixtures are not a random sampling of odorous molecules and they do not contribute
equally to the smell of the mixture. Instead, in many cases, the smell of a natural mixture is
dominated by a few components. How many components are necessary in mixtures to render
them indistinguishable from one another is not yet known (Weiss, Snitz et al. 2012). However,
that larger mixtures converge perceptually shows that the resolution of the olfactory system is
limited. The number of perceptual qualities is finite and they therefore can be arranged in a finite
perceptual quality space.

There are two possibilities of how a perceptual space can accommodate a very large number of
perceptual qualities. A large number of perceptual qualities can either result from a high
resolution along the dimensions of the quality space or from a large number of dimensions.
Quality spaces are mathematical constructs that have whatever number of dimensions is needed
to capture the similarity relations of the relevant qualities (see Figure 3). It is unlikely that the
odor space will have only two or three dimensions like the tone or color space. Smell space has
been suggested to have a higher dimensionality than quality spaces in other modalities (Berglund
and Höglund 2012; Auffarth 2013). It simply is not possible to arrange all olfactory qualities in a
low-dimensional space. However, it is also unlikely that the number of dimensions of the smell
space is very high. The number of perceptual qualities that can be accommodated in a perceptual
space increases exponentially with the number of dimensions of the space. Maybe the smell
space will reduce the complexity by a similar degree as perceptual spaces in other modalities.
Approximately 5 million discriminable colors are arranged in a three-dimensional space and
around 340,000 tones are arranged in a two-dimensional space. The cube root of 5,000,000 is
171 and the square root of 500,000 is 583, which means that each dimension of these spaces can
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be divided into a few hundred discrimination steps. If in the olfactory space 500 discriminable
perceptual qualities are arranged along each dimension, then five dimensions would be required
to accommodate a trillion olfactory perceptual qualities.

How orderly the exhaustive perceptual space is, is an empirical question that can only be
answered with certainty after the psychophysical experiments required to construct the
exhaustive perceptual space have been performed. Partial perceptual spaces are already known.
The color and the tone space arrange a large number of perceptual qualities in spaces with three
and two dimensions. It is likely that spaces for temperature or touch qualities will also have few
dimensions. The only potential problem is how to arrange smell qualities. I have shown in this
section that there are many more discriminable smells than other perceptual qualities.
Accordingly, the smell space is likely have more dimensions than the color space or the tone
space. However, although we will have to await the construction of the smell space to be sure, I
am optimistic that the smell space will not have more than a few dozen dimensions. It is likely
that the smell space will increase order by a similar degree as the perceptual spaces in the other
modalities10. There is hope that it will reduce complexity enough to be a useful construct for
perceptual philosophy. If this is the case, then the exhaustive perceptual space will be orderly
enough to play an important role in our understanding of how perception works.

10

The procedure for constructing perceptual spaces described in section 1.1. will result in a
perceptual space regardless of the similarity relations between the perceptual qualities. Any set
of perceptual qualities can be arranged in a multidimensional space according to their similarity.
It is therefore not possible that there is no perceptual smell space. However, a perceptual space in
which a trillion perceptual qualities are arranged in a trillion-dimensional perceptual space would
be nothing more than a list of the perceptual qualities and not a useful theoretical construct.
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1.4. Conclusion: Perceptual qualities can be individuated by their position in a similarity
space
All perceptual qualities perceived by a perceiver can be individuated based on their similarity
relations with other perceptual qualities (Goodman 1951; Clark 1993; Matthen 2005). Sensory
modalities can then be interpreted as clusters of perceptual qualities in this exhaustive perceptual
space. The relational account of perceptual qualities that I developed here is based on the Quality
Space Theory (Rosenthal 2005; Rosenthal 2010), but it uses different behavioral methods and
therefore can account for similarity relations between perceptual qualities in different modalities.
Relational accounts of perceptual qualities are alternatives to accounts that determine perceptual
qualities by their intrinsic properties. Accounts that individuate perceptual qualities by intrinsic
properties often lead to the conclusion that the only thing that can provide access to perceptual
qualities is first-hand conscious experience. A relational account avoids this conclusion by
showing how we can describe every perceiver's perceptual qualities.

Importantly, perceptual qualities are arranged in the perceptual space based on behavioral
experiments and regardless of whether they are consciously perceived or not. What it feels like to
perceive a certain perceptual quality is not used as a basis to construct the perceptual space.
Instead, what it feels like to perceive a certain perceptual quality reflects its position in the
perceptual space. The perceptual space is a mechanistic explanation of the qualities of subjective
awareness. Individual instances of subjective awareness are not necessarily relational. At any
time, we just smell a single odor. There are no relations to other perceptual olfactory qualities.
However, how the odor smells is determined by its position in the perceptual space. This position
can be expressed by coordinates along the dimensions of the perceptual space.
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Chapter 2: Third-person access to perceptual qualities
In chapter 1, I have introduced a strategy to arrange all perceptual qualities according to the
similarity relations between them that are revealed through behavioral experiments. The resulting
exhaustive perceptual space makes it possible to individuate each perceptual quality through its
position within the space. This is an important step towards a science of perceptual qualities
because it makes it possible to identify and compare perceptual qualities without having to refer
to the subjective experiences of the perceiver.

However, the strategy presented in the previous chapter does not give us a universal perceptual
space, or the human perceptual space, or even the stable perceptual space of a given individual.
This is not a shortcoming of the proposed strategy. There is neither a universal perceptual space,
nor the human perceptual space, nor an individual's unchanging perceptual space. The
experimental strategy introduced in chapter 1 produces an exhaustive perceptual space for a
given perceiver at a given time. If one is interested in another perceiver's perceptual space, the
strategy has to be repeated with the other perceiver. The perceptual spaces of two perceivers will
differ. It is therefore necessary to develop a strategy of comparing perceptual qualities in
different perceptual spaces. If no such strategy is available, then third-person access to
perceptual qualities would not be possible and studying perceptual qualities in a systematic way
would be a very daunting task.

In this chapter, I will present a strategy for comparing perceptual qualities that are perceived by
different perceivers by first constructing and then aligning the perceptual spaces of the two
perceivers. To set up the problem, I will first review the diversity of perceptual spaces and the
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different ways in which they can differ. In the second part of the chapter, I will then explain how
other perceiver's perceptual qualities can be accessed under certain circumstances.

2.1. Diversity of perceptual spaces
Perceptual quality spaces can be constructed for every perceiver that can be made to respond
differently to different stimuli. The perceivers can be humans, animals, plants, machines, robots,
or extraterrestrials. Each perceiver has a different mechanism for perceiving and for processing
sensory information. Different types of robots and machines are built according to different
specification. Different species evolved different perceptual systems and brains that are adapted
to the perceptual needs of their ecological niche. Different individuals of the same species can
also vary considerable, and even the brain and sense organs of an individual change over time.
This diversity of perceptual systems is reflected by the diversity of perceptual spaces.

The realization that there are as many perceptual spaces as there are perceivers could be
discouraging and interpreted as a sign that perceptual spaces are not useful constructs for
theorizing about perception. However, this would be the wrong response. The diversity and
malleability of perceptual spaces does not reduce the explanatory power of these constructs. That
diversity can increase explanatory power can be illustrated by the role of genomes in
understanding phenotype determination. Like perceptual quality spaces, genomes are diverse.
Different species have different genomes, and individuals of the same species carry different
genetic variants of many genes in their genomes. Genomes also change over time due to
mutations. Rather than diminishing the explanatory power of genomes, this diversity is the
reason why genomes have become so important for our understanding of biology. Differences in
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genomes explain anatomical and physiological differences between species. The differences
between the genomes of members of the human species explain why some humans have blue
eyes while others are lactose intolerant. Changes in the genomes of our cells over time are the
cause of cancer. That it is not possible to identify the genome, or the human genome, or the
genome of a given individual does not diminish the important role that genomes play in
understanding biology. Similarly, the diversity of perceptual spaces does not reduce their
usefulness for our understanding of perception.

However, the diversity of perceptual spaces has to be acknowledged and the differences between
perceptual spaces have to be known for perceptual spaces to be a useful theoretical construct. In
this section, I will use the relatively well-understood color space as an example of how
perceptual spaces differ between different perceivers. Perceptual spaces are arrangements of
perceptual qualities according to similarities between them within a multidimensional coordinate
system. Two perceptual spaces can have the same coordinate system, but differ in the
arrangement of perceptual qualities within that coordinate system. Alternatively, perceptual
spaces can differ in the coordinate system in which the perceptual qualities are arranged.

Diversity of the arrangement of perceptual qualities in perceptual spaces
In humans, the perceptual color quality space of has three dimensions: hue, saturation, and
brightness. In this section, I will consider how color spaces that have these three dimensions can
differ from one another. In the next section, I will then speculate about color quality spaces with
different dimensions.
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The color spaces of different mammalian species differ considerably. Color perception in these
animals is the consequence of differential activation of sensory neurons that carry different types
of cone photopigments. These cone photopigments, like all proteins, are encoded by genes and
these genes, called opsin genes, are subject to evolution through natural selection. In mammals,
there have been many dramatic evolutionary changes in the opsin genes (Jacobs 2009). Opsin
genes can change, which can alter their sensitivity to light of specific wavelengths. More
dramatically, opsin genes can duplicate and then change, which results in species that have more
opsin genes than their ancestral species. Not only can species gain opsin genes, they can also lose
them. An opsin gene is lost when a mutation that renders the photopigment non-functional
occurs. Humans have three opsin genes and it is therefore said that they are trichromatic. Most
other mammals have only two opsin genes. They are dichromatic. Some species, like the owl
monkey, are monochromats that have only a single opsin gene. Some birds have more than three
opsin genes. Most birds are tetrachromatic, while pigeons are pentachromatic. Behavioral
experiments have shown that species with fewer opsin genes generally are worse at
discriminating colored stimuli (for a review of comparative color vision, see (Jacobs 1981)).
Additional opsin genes convey the ability to discriminate more color stimuli.11. The distribution

11

Having more types of receptors with different sensitivities does not always lead to more
discriminable perceptual color qualities. The direct relation between the number of different
receptors and the number of discriminable perceptual qualities only holds when the information
collected by the receptors is processed in the same way. This has been illustrated by research into
species of mantis shrimp that have up to twelve different photoreceptors, each sampling a
different narrow range of wavelengths Marshall, J., T. W. Cronin, et al. (2007). "Stomatopod eye
structure and function: A review." Arthropod Structure & Development 36(4): 420-448.. Based
on the large number of photoreceptors with different sensitivities, it has been speculated that
mantis shrimp have a very large and complex color space. However, behavioral experiments
revealed that this is not the case, which led to the suggestion that mantis shrimp do not use
comparisons between different channels to discriminate between colors Thoen, H. H., M. J.
How, et al. (2014). "A Different Form of Color Vision in Mantis Shrimp." Science 343(6169):
411-413.. Assuming that the processing of color information is relatively conserved, a relation
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of these qualities in the hue-saturation-brightness-space is different depending on the number of
types of receptors with which light is perceived.

In addition to the differences between different species, there are also substantial differences
between individuals that belong to the same species, as can be illustrated by human variability in
color vision. There are different forms of color blindness in humans. Some humans are
dichromats. They lack one of the three cone photopigments. Depending on which of the three
cone photopigments is missing, this condition is known as protanopia, deuteranopia, or
tritanopia. In Figure 7, how individuals with those conditions perceive the color spectrum is
simulated. As can be seen by comparing the colors perceived by individuals with these
conditions with the colors perceived by individuals with normal trichromatic vision (top of
Figure 7), dichromats perceive fewer distinguishable colors. Some wavelength that are
associated with yellow or cyan in trichromats are indistinguishable from white for them.
Furthermore, they cannot distinguish some wavelength pairs that are easily distinguishable by
trichromats. In protanopia, some colors that are perceived as green, yellow, or red by those with
normal color vision are indistinguishable. Individuals with tritanopia cannot discriminate what in
the normal case is perceived as yellow from what in the normal case is perceived as pink. If on
would construct the color spaces for dichromats based on similarity relations between perceptual
qualities, these spaces would be different from the normal color space shown in Figure 2.
However, the colors that are perceived by dichromats all have hue, saturation, and brightness,
like colors perceived by normal perceiver. Each perceptual color quality, regardless whether it is

between the number of opsin genes and the number of colors that the species can discriminated
can be expected in vertebrates.
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perceived by human trichromats or dichromats can be individuated by its position in the color
space that has three dimensions representing hue, brightness, and saturation.

Figure 7: Variability in color perception between individuals. How lights along the
frequency spectrum are perceived by humans with different systems for color perception
is shown. A color blindness simulator was used to generate this figure. (modified from
original work by Nanobot (in the public domain))

Diversity of the dimensions of perceptual spaces
Very rarely, individuals have even more impoverished color vision than dichromats. Individuals
that suffer from total colorblindness, or achromatopsia, see the world only in different shades of
grey. This condition can be caused by mutations that disrupt the molecular mechanisms with
which cone cells respond to light. When this mechanism is disrupted, none of the three types of
cone cells functions. Individuals with such mutations are not blind because in addition to cone
cells, humans also have photosensitive rod cells. However, in the absence of functioning cone
cells, humans only perceive different shades of grey. The visual perceptual qualities perceived by
achromatopsic individuals all have the same hue and saturation. They differ from one another
only in their brightness. The visual perceptual qualities of achromatopsic individuals can
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therefore be arranged in a one-dimensional space. The same is true for the visual perceptual
qualities of monochromats such as seals and owl monkeys.

Brightness, the one dimension of an achromatopsic individual's color space is also one of the
three dimensions of the three-dimensional color space of individuals with normal vision. The
one-dimensional achromatopsia color space is a subspace of the three-dimensional normal color
space. The one-dimensional achromatopsia color space can therefore be transformed into a threedimensional normal color space by adding two dimensions (saturation and hue) and assigning
each color the value zero for both of these dimensions. In general, a low-dimensional perceptual
space that is a subspace of a higher-dimensional perceptual space can be represented in the same
coordinate system as the higher-dimensional perceptual space. The difference in coordinate
systems is then reduced to a difference in the number and arrangement of perceptual qualities.

Since there are some species with lower dimensional color spaces than humans, it is likely that
some species have visual perceptual quality spaces that have more than three dimensions. We
know that many animals can perceive features of light that we cannot perceive. Some species, for
example, can perceive the pattern of polarized light in the sky. When this pattern is visualized in
textbooks, the differences of polarization angle are represented as differences in hue or
brightness of the color of the clear blue sky, which looks homogeneous and uniform to us.
However, we would have to construct the perceptual color space for such a species to find out
how the polarization pattern is actually perceived by them. It is possible that polarizations angles
of light change the perceived hue, saturation, or brightness in species that are sensitive to
polarization of light. However, it is also possible that the physical feature "angle of polarization"

48

corresponds to a fourth dimension of color quality space that is inaccessible to humans.
Similarly, we do not know whether pigeons, which are believed to be able to discriminate several
billion colors, discriminate all colors depending on their hue, brightness, and saturation.
Alternatively, the pigeon color space could have a fourth dimension that makes it easier to
accommodate the large number of colors.

It would be arrogant to assume that no other species has a higher dimensional color space than
us. However, it is also understandable. It is very easy to accept that the achromatopsic, who
cannot perceive saturation or hue, is missing an important part of what makes visual perceptual
qualities. However, it is much more difficult to imagine that we are also missing an important
dimension of visual perceptual qualities. What else could there be to colors other than hue,
saturation, and brightness? That this question is impossible to answer for somebody whose firsthand visual experience consists only of hue, saturation, and brightness illustrates the importance
of relying on behavioral experiments rather than subjective experience in individuating
perceptual qualities.

2.2. Third-person access to perceptual qualities
Every perceiver perceives similarities between perceptual qualities differently and the perceptual
spaces between different perceiver therefore differ either in their dimensions, or in the
arrangement of the perceptual qualities. These differences in perceptual spaces make it difficult
to compare perceptual qualities between perceivers. However, comparing perceptual qualities
between perceivers is necessary for third-person access to perceptual qualities which, in turn, is
necessary for a science of perceptual qualities.
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In this section, I will suggest that it is possible to compare perceptual qualities that are perceived
by different perceivers even if their perceptual spaces differ. The question how similar two
perceivers' perceptions of the color of a ripe tomato are can therefore be answered objectively.
However, I will also show that comparing perceptual qualities between perceivers is only
possible when the two perceivers' perceptual spaces can be aligned either directly or through
intermediates.

Possibility of third-person access to perceptual qualities
How can we measure the similarity between perceptual qualities that are perceived by different
perceivers? The similarity between perceptual qualities that are perceived by the same perceiver
is represented by the distance between the two perceptual qualities in the exhaustive perceptual
space. However, as discussed above, perceptual spaces differ between perceivers. This
introduces a problem for comparing perceptual qualities that are not perceived by the same
perceiver. As an illustration, consider a city map. I can mark locations on a city map and then
compare one location to another. When the marks are close on the map, the positions they
represent are geographically close. When the marks are far apart, then they represent
geographically distant locations. Two marks at the same spot on the map represent the same
location in the city. Now imagine that a friend of mine has the same city map and that she marks
locations on her map. It will be easy, at least theoretically, to compare locations marked on the
two maps. All that needs to be done is to transfer the marks from one map to the other identical
map and then measure the distances between them. This is analogous to comparing perceptual
qualities between two perceivers that have the same perceptual space. However, as reviewed

50

above, no two perceivers have the same perceptual space. The analogous situation is therefore a
situation in which different locations have been marked on two different maps of the city.
Imagine that one map is a 1:10,000-scale map and the other a 1:20,000-scale map. In this
situation, the two maps have to be aligned before locations that are marked on the different maps
can be compared. In the case of a 1:10,000-scale map and 1:20,000-scale map, aligning them
simply requires rescaling one of the maps. The solution to the problem of comparing perceptual
qualities in different perceptual spaces is similar to the problem of comparing locations marked
on different maps: the two perceptual spaces have to be aligned before perceptual spaces on them
can be compared.

Consider a hypothetical example. In the top row of Figure 8A-C, the two perceptual spaces of
two different perceivers and the position of the perceptual quality associated with a light stimulus
of 430 nm in each of the spaces are shown. The question we want to answer is whether the
perceptual quality that is associated with a light stimulus of 430 nm is the same for both
perceivers. To answer this question, the two perceptual spaces have to be aligned based on their
overall structure (lower row in Figure 8A-C)12. When the two spaces are aligned, the distance
between the perceptual qualities associated with light of 430 nm wavelength in the two
perceivers can be measured. In Figure 8A, the perceptual qualities of perceiver 1 and 2 are at the

12

The two spaces have to be aligned depending on their structure not depending on their
dimensions. As Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore discussed in the context of State Space Semantics
Fodor, J. and E. Lepore (1996). Paul Churchland and State Space Semantics. The Churchlands
and their critics. R. N. McCauley. Cambridge, Blackwell Publishing: 145-159., attempts to align
similarity spaces based on their dimensions merely succeed in shifting the problem from thirdperson access to perceptual qualities to third-person access to the dimensions of perceptual
spaces. Instead of wondering whether your blue is the same as my blue, we wonder whether your
saturation is the same as my saturation. Aligning the spaces depending on their structures avoids
this problem.
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same position in the combined perceptual space, which means that the same perceptual quality is
associated with this stimulus in those two perceivers. In Figure 8B and C, different perceptual
qualities are associated with the same stimulus in different perceivers. The perceptual qualities
associated with light of 430 nm wavelength in perceiver 1 and 3 are similar (Figure 8B), whereas
radically different perceptual qualities are associated with this stimulus in perceivers 1 and 4
(Figure 8C).

Another question one can ask is which stimuli elicit the same perceptual qualities in two
perceivers. The strategy to answer this question is illustrated in Figure 8D-F. To answer this
question, the two perceptual spaces have to be aligned and the position of the perceptual quality
under study in them has to be marked (upper row in Figure 8D-F). Then, the physical stimulus
that elicits this perceptual quality can be identified (lower row in Figure 8D-F). For perceivers 1
and 2, the same stimulus elicits the perceptual quality under study (Figure 8D). In perceiver 3,
light of 460 nm wavelength elicits the same perceptual quality that is elicited by light of 430 nm
wavelength in perceiver 1 (Figure 8E). In perceiver 4, light of 650 nm wavelength elicits the
same perceptual quality (Figure 8F).
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Figure 8: Determining similarity of perceptual qualities perceived by different perceivers.
(A-C) The perceptual quality associated with light of 430 nm wavelength in perceiver 1 is
compared to the perceptual quality associated with light of 430 nm wavelength in three
other perceivers. (A) In perceivers 1 and 2, the same perceptual quality is associated with
light of 430 nm wavelength. (B) In perceivers 1 and 3, a similar perceptual quality is
associated with light of 430 nm wavelength. (C) In perceivers 1 and 4, very different
perceptual qualities are associated with the same stimulus. (D-F) The stimulus that is
associated with a specific perceptual quality in perceiver 1 is compared to the stimuli
associated with the same perceptual quality in three other perceivers. (D) In perceivers 1
and 2, the same stimulus (light of 430 nm wavelength) is associated with the perceptual
quality. (E) The perceptual quality associated with light of 430 nm wavelength in
perceiver 1 is associated with light of 460 nm wavelength in perceiver 3. (F) The
perceptual quality associated with light of 430 nm wavelength in perceiver 1 is associated
with light of 650 nm wavelength in perceiver 4.

It is important to understand that the physical nature of the stimulus cannot play a role in
aligning two perceptual spaces. It may be tempting to use salient physical stimuli that are
perceived by both perceivers to anchor the two perceivers' perceptual spaces. One could for
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example align the perceptual color space of a bee and the perceptual color space of a human by
distorting them so that the perceptual qualities that are associated with 480 nm light (blue for
humans), 560 nm light (green for humans), and 710 nm light (red for humans) are in the same
position. Then, one could identify the position of the perceptual quality associated with UV light
(which can be perceived by bees, but not by humans) in the bee's perceptual space and measure
what the closest perceptual quality in the human's perceptual space is. This, one might believe,
would be a way to identify the human color perception that is most similar to how bees perceive
UV light. However, this strategy is flawed because it assumes that the perceptual qualities blue,
green, and red are elicited by the same stimuli in humans and bees, and there is no evidence
supporting this assumption.

Let us return to the city map analogy. That the physical nature of the stimulus cannot play a role
in aligning perceptual spaces in analogous to saying that the marks on the maps cannot play a
role in aligning the maps. Imagine two different maps of the city. On one, I have marked the
location of my home, my workplace, my barber, and my favorite restaurant. On the other, you
have marked your home, your workplace, your barber, and your favorite restaurant. We want to
know how close our favorite restaurants are. We cannot achieve this by distorting one of our
maps so that the marks marking your home and my home, your workplace and my workplace,
and your barber and my barber are at the same position and then measuring the distance between
the marks marking your favorite restaurant and my favorite restaurant. The marks on the maps
cannot be used to align the maps. Only features of the maps themselves can be used to align
them. Similarly, the only way to find out which of your perceptual qualities is most similar to the
perceptual quality associated with UV light in bees is to construct your own perceptual space and
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the perceptual space of the bee. If the two spaces can be aligned, the position of the perceptual
quality associated with UV light in the bee can be compared to your perceptual space and the
perceptual quality in your perceptual space closest to it can be identified.

Examples of third-person access to perceptual qualities
Consider, as an example of how two perceptual spaces can be aligned, the perceptual space of
someone who suffers from specific anosmia for musks. Specific anosmias are conditions in
which people with an otherwise normal sense of smell cannot smell a certain type of odor, for
example musk odors (Amoore 1967). This condition can be caused by a disruptive mutation in
the odorant receptor sensitive for these odors (Whissell-Buechy and Amoore 1973; Keller,
Zhuang et al. 2007; Mainland, Keller et al. 2014). How could somebody with specific anosmia to
musk find out something about the perceptual qualities that are associated with musk?
Knowledge about the musk-sensitive odorant receptors and about the musk molecules is not
going to be helpful because neither similarity between odorous molecules, nor between odorant
receptors is a reliable predictor of similarities between olfactory perceptual qualities. The way to
learn about the perceptual qualities of musk is therefore to build two smell spaces, one for an
individual with a normal sense of smell and one for an individual with specific musk anosmia.
The two smell spaces will be identical except that one will have a hole at the position at which
the musk perceptual qualities are located in the smell space of the normal subject (Figure 9A,
left). This hole represents the blind spot for musks and it is surrounded by the perceptual
qualities that constitute the border of the hole. The smell of musk is between the smell of
perceptual qualities on opposing sides of the hole that represents the musk blind spot. The
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individual with musk anosmia can find out what the physical stimuli are that are associated with
the perceptual qualities around the blind spot and then smell them.

The advantage of specific anosmia as an example is that it is an actual condition. The
disadvantage is that the smell space is not known yet and the example can therefore only be
discussed in abstract terms. To complement the example of specific anosmia, imagine a fictional
example that is similar to Hume's Missing Shade of Blue. Imagine someone having a normal
auditory system with the exception of the inability of hearing the pitch D3. When somebody is
playing a scale on a piano, there will be a moment of silence between C3 and E3 for this person.
People with an intact auditory system will hear D3 between C3 and E3. The tone space is twodimensional. One dimension is pitch and the other loudness. D3-deaf people will not hear
anything at the pitch D3 at any loudness, so the tone space of the D3-deaf person will differ from
that of a person with normal hearing by lacking a stripe along the pitch dimension. The tone
space will be cut into two tone spaces, one space for tones higher than D3 and one space for
tones lower than D3 (Figure 9A middle). Because in a scale, the perceptual qualities are ordered
along the dimension (pitch) in which there is the specific blindness, the note before and after the
moment of silence will provide information about the perceptual quality of D3 to the D3-deaf
subject.

Consider a third example. People suffering from ageusia have no sense of taste. Constructing a
perceptual quality space of such an individual will result in a space in which one modalityrepresenting cluster, the one that represents taste qualities, is missing. It will likely be possible to
align such a perceptual quality space with the perceptual quality space of a person that has all
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senses (Figure 9A right). There is no continuum of perceptual qualities between the gustatory
qualities and qualities in other modalities, so there are no perceptual qualities that are directly
adjacent to the missing taste qualities. However, there are proximity relations between perceptual
qualities in non-gustatory modalities in the ageusia patient's perceptual space and taste qualities
in the normal perceptual space the patient's perceptual space is aligned with. Unless the
experiments are performed and the exhaustive perceptual spaces are constructed, the nature of
the proximity relations between these perceptual qualities is unknown. However, it can be
speculated that the alignment will reveal to the ageusia patient that the gustatory perceptual
quality associated with chili peppers is similar to the perceptual quality associated with high
temperature perceived at the tongue. The gustatory perceptual quality associated with sugar is
close to the perceptual qualities associated with vanilla smell and soft touch perceived at the
tongue.

These examples show that the strategy for third-person access to perceptual qualities outlined
above can be successful. It is possible for the individual with musk anosmia to have information
about how an individual with a normal sense of smell experiences musks. There is no ontological
or epistemological barrier that precludes us from knowing other minds. This is a very important
result because without a way to compare perceptual qualities regardless of who perceives them,
there could be no objective science of perception. The fact that nothing precludes knowledge of
other minds in principle does not mean that there are no practical problems with third-person
access to perceptual qualities. In the next section, I will discuss these practical problems and
show that some of them are unsurmountable and can be considered limits to third-person access
to perceptual qualities.
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Limits of third-person access to perceptual qualities
The strategy for third-person access to perceptual qualities outlined above depends on aligning
the perceptual spaces of the two perceivers whose perceptual qualities we want to compare.
Aligning perceptual spaces however may not always be possible. In other situations, there may
be more than one possible alignment, so the two perceptual spaces cannot be aligned
unambiguously.

In general, the more similar two spaces are, the easier it is to align them. In Figure 9A, three
hypothetical examples of pairs of perceptual spaces with sufficient similarity in shape to align
them are shown. The perceptual space pairs correspond to the examples of musk anosmia (left),
D3-deafness (middle), and ageusia (right). In each of these three examples, the space on the right
is derived from the space on the left by subtracting a small area. This makes it easy to align the
two spaces. In Figure 9B, three pairs of perceptual spaces that are so dissimilar that it is not
possible to align the grey space with the red space unambiguously are shown. In most cases in
which two perceptual spaces have to be aligned, the decision whether it is possible to align them
unambiguously or not is presumably not as clear-cut as in the examples in Figure 9 A-B. The
perceptual spaces of two human individuals with normal perceptual capacities will presumably
have very similar overall shapes. However, when zooming in, one will discover small differences
between the spaces. Maybe the cluster representing colors is slightly elongated in one of the
spaces, and the distance between the cluster of smells and tastes is not the same. It will certainly
be possible to align the two exhaustive perceptual spaces, but it may be that several, slightly
different, alignments are possible. One then has to use an algorithm to decide which alignment is
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the best. Which algorithm is chosen will be to some degree arbitrary. Another complication for
deciding whether two spaces can be aligned is that it has to be decided which transformations of
the spaces should be allowed to align them. If any type of transformation is acceptable, then
every space can be distorted so that it will perfectly align with every other space. Because of
these complications, there will be cases in which it is disputable whether two exhaustive
perceptual space can be aligned or not. However, in other cases it will be clear whether two
perceptual cases can be aligned or not.

When two perceptual spaces that clearly cannot be aligned directly are found in different animal
species, a strategy to align them despite their very different structures is sometimes available.
The strategy is to find intermediates that can be used to create a chain of aligned perceptual
spaces. The two dissimilar perceptual spaces I and VIII in Figure 9C cannot be aligned directly.
They are the same pair of perceptual spaces shown on the right in Figure 9B as an example of
spaces that cannot be aligned. However, as is shown in Figure 9C, I and VIII can be aligned
indirectly through the series of perceptual spaces II to VII. Perceptual space I can be aligned with
perceptual space II, perceptual space II can be aligned to perceptual space III, and so on until
spaces I to VIII form a chain of unambiguously aligned perceptual spaces. The direct alignment
between I and VIII has not been possible because of the different shapes of the two perceptual
shapes. This is symbolized by the red arrow connecting I and VIII directly in Figure 9C. The
indirect alignment of I and VIII through a series of intermediates has however been possible.
This is symbolized by the circle of black arrows connecting I and VIII indirectly in Figure 9C.
To provide a hypothetical example, it may not be possible to align the human perceptual space
directly with the perceptual space of the mouse. However, if the human perceptual space can be
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directly aligned with the monkey perceptual space, and the monkey perceptual space can be
directly aligned with the rabbit perceptual space and the rabbit perceptual space can be directly
aligned with the mouse perceptual space, it would still be possible to compare the perceptual
qualities associated with 480 nm light in mice and in humans.
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Figure 9: Aligning perceptual quality spaces. (A) Three pairs of perceptual spaces that are
sufficiently similar in their shape to be aligned. (B) Three pairs of perceptual spaces that
are too dissimilar to be unambiguously aligned. (C) Perceptual space I and perceptual
space VIII are not similar enough to be directly aligned. However, through a chain of
intermediates (perceptual spaces II to VII), they can be aligned indirectly. (D, E)
Symmetrical perceptual spaces can be aligned in more than one orientation.
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Perceptual spaces that are too different to be aligned are not the only possible problem for
aligning two perceptual spaces unambiguously. Another possible problem for comparing
perceptual qualities between different perceivers are symmetrical perceptual spaces that can be
aligned in more than one orientation (Figure 9 D, E). Mirror symmetric perceptual spaces can be
aligned in two different orientations (Figure 9D). Radial symmetric perceptual spaces can be
aligned in any orientation (Figure 9D). Symmetry is more likely in simple perceptual spaces. In
humans, neither the three-dimensional color space, nor the two-dimensional tone space is
symmetrical. The structure of perceptual spaces in other modalities is not well known. Maybe the
one-dimensional temperature space that goes from hot to cold is symmetrical. Your hot may be
my cold. The exhaustive perceptual space that contains all perceptual qualities is complex and
contains the non-symmetrical color and tone spaces, so the worry about symmetry is not pressing
for the account of human perceptual qualities that I propose. However, if a symmetrical
perceptual space were to be discovered in an animal species, the correct orientation could
probably be found by studying the perceptual space of closely related species with a similar, yet
not symmetrical, perceptual space. The most likely situation in which symmetry of the space will
limit third-person access to perceptual qualities is when it comes to the perceptual spaces of
machines, which can be purposefully designed to have symmetrical perceptual spaces.

In the philosophical literature, discussions of the possibility of symmetrical perceptual quality
spaces has a long tradition since John Locke's discussion of the possibility of spectrum inversion
in color perception (Locke 1689/1975) (for an overview of the literature, see (Byrne 2010)).
Locke, writing long before the human perceptual color space had been established, discussed the
hypothetical case of a symmetrical color space. In this case discussed by Locke, strawberries
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elicit the perceptual qualities that are elicited by cucumbers in normal perceivers. Cucumbers
elicit the perceptual qualities normally elicited by strawberries. Locke goes on to assure the
reader that despite this possibility of an inverted color spectrum, he thinks that the same object
will elicit the same, or very similar, mental qualities in different individuals. Because the
perceptual spaces of humans are not symmetrical, it is now possible to empirically test this
proposal and search for individuals that perceive as green what others perceive as red. John
Dalton discovered more than hundred years after Locke's hypothetical case that some individuals
are red-green colorblind. In these individuals, cucumbers and strawberries elicit some of the
same perceptual qualities.

Because the exhaustive perceptual quality space containing all perceptual qualities is not
symmetrical, undetectable inversion is not possible in humans. However, it is possible in
creatures with symmetrical perceptual quality spaces (if such creatures exist). This theoretical
possibility of undetectable spectrum inversion is sometimes used in arguments against
behaviorism and functionalism (Fodor and Lepore 1996). The argument is that, in undetectable
spectrum inversion, two behaviorally or functionally identical perceivers could perceive different
perceptual qualities in identical situations. It would however be impossible to prove the existence
of an actual case of spectrum inversion (hence "undetectable" spectrum inversion).

2.3. Conclusion: Aligning perceptual spaces enables third-person access to perceptual
qualities
Different perceivers perceive stimuli and the similarity between stimuli with different perceptual
systems and they therefore have different perceptual quality spaces. This diversity of perceptual
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spaces complicates comparisons between perceptual qualities that are perceived by different
perceivers. In this chapter. I proposed a strategy for third-person access to perceptual qualities
that is based on aligning perceptual spaces. Quantifying the distance between perceptual qualities
that are perceived by two different perceivers is possible by aligning the two perceptual spaces
and then measuring the distance between the perceptual qualities in the combined space. This
objective measure of similarity between perceptual qualities regardless of whom they are
perceived by could provide the basis for the scientific study of perceptual qualities.

Because the strategy for third-person access depends on the ability to align the perceptual spaces
of the two perceivers that are compared unambiguously, it is not always possible. One problem
are perceptual spaces with structures that are so different that they cannot be aligned. The
structure of the perceptual space of a perceiver depends on its perceptual systems and on the
processing of sensory information. The perceptual systems of two biological perceivers are
connected through the perceptual system of their last common ancestor. It is therefore unlikely to
find perceptual spaces so radically different that they cannot be aligned among close relatives. It
is also possible, when two perceptual spaces cannot be aligned directly, to use a chain of
intermediates to align them indirectly. However, this is not always possible. Humans are
evolutionary so distant from bacteria that it will very likely not be possible to align the human
perceptual space through intermediate steps with the perceptual space of a bacterium. It is
probably not possible to compare a given human perceptual quality with a given bacterial
perceptual quality. The situation becomes even more hopeless when the two perceivers that are
to be compared are not connected through a common ancestor. The perceptual space of an
animal is unlikely to be similar enough to the perceptual space of a robot or of an extraterrestrial
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for the two spaces to be aligned unambiguously. It will therefore not be possible to find a
stimulus that is associated with the same perceptual quality in a robot and in a bat.

Another problem case for the strategy of comparing perceptual qualities between perceivers by
aligning the perceivers' perceptual spaces are symmetrical perceptual spaces. Symmetrical spaces
can be aligned in more than one orientation. The exhaustive perceptual space in humans is not
symmetrical, so this is not a concern when it comes to comparing our own perceptual qualities to
those of other perceivers. However, it is possible that some perceivers have symmetrical
perceptual spaces13. It is most likely that symmetrical perceptual spaces will be found in very
simple organisms, or in machines, which can be purposefully designed to have symmetrical
perceptual spaces.

13

Rosenthal argues that it is impossible for a space that is based on an individual's discrimination
abilities to be symmetrical because a symmetrical space would collapse around the axis of
symmetry Rosenthal, D. M. (2010). "How to think about mental qualities." Philosophical Issues:
Philosophy of Mind 20: 368-393.. This is not the case for the perceptual spaces discussed here.
To illustrate that symmetrical perceptual spaces are possible, let us consider a simple perceiver
that can only perceive two discriminable perceptual qualities. The perceptual space of this
perceiver would consist of two points that represent the two perceptual qualities. This space
would be symmetric because it is always possible to draw a symmetry axis between two points.
If one would collapse this space around the axis of symmetry, the two perceptual qualities would
fall into the same location. Since the two perceptual qualities can be discriminated, the collapsed
space would not represent the similarity relations between the perceptual qualities accurately.
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Part II: Percepts
In the first part of this dissertation, I have discussed perceptual qualities abstracted away from
the spatial and temporal structure of perception. Perceptual qualities are the basic building blocks
of perception. However, many normal instances of perception are much richer and more complex
than a series of changing perceptual qualities. In this second part, I will describe how this
complexity emerges through the combination of perceptual qualities. In chapter 3, I will describe
how percepts are formed through the combination of perceptual qualities in space and time. In
chapter 4, the notion of objecthood in the context of perception will be examined, and in chapter
5, I will discuss the function of perception. Specifically, I will argue against the proposal that it is
the function of perception to collect correct information about the physical world. Instead, I will
show that it is the function of perception is to guide behaviors.

In this part, I will cash in the promise from the title and focus heavily on olfactory perception. I
hope that it will become apparent that notions like object-oriented perception and the idea of
perception as a mirror of reality, which seem intuitive when considering visual perception, fail to
capture the nature of olfactory perception.
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Chapter 3: Olfaction in space and time
Percepts are formed by temporal and spatial arrangements of perceptual qualities. A visual
scenery is a spatial arrangement of colors. A noise is a temporal arrangement of tones. In this
chapter, I will discuss the structure of olfactory percepts. I will first discuss spatial structure and
then temporal structure. As is always the case in perceptual philosophy, it is important to
distinguish between the structure of the stimulus and the structure of the perception and I will
therefore discuss these two topics separately. The review will reveal that olfactory percepts are
much less structured than percepts in vision or audition. Olfactory perception has no spatial
structure and a very impoverished temporal structure. For the most part, olfactory perception is
the perception of a series of changing perceptual qualities.

3.1. Olfaction in space
Introspectively, it does not seem that the perception of odors is spatially structured. Olfactory
perception has been called "a single unitary experience" (Stevenson 2009) (page 1010), "a state
of consciousness, having neither geometry nor articulate individuation" (page 282) (Lycan
2000), and a "nominal sense" that simply provides "data of qualitatively different odors in our
surroundings" (Köster 2002) (page 28). On the other hand, humans can indisputably use
olfactory information for navigation. This is only superficially a contradiction because the ability
to navigate using olfactory stimuli does not imply that olfactory perception is spatially
structured.
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Spatial structure of the olfactory environment
Our olfactory environment is spatially structured at different scales. At the largest scale, New
Delhi, the Bavarian Forest, the Mexican resort town of Cancún, and the Mojave Desert in the
southwestern United States can all easily be distinguished from one another based on the odorous
molecules in the air at these locations. Each of these places has a different distinct smell. On a
smaller scale, different ecosystems also have different smells. The ocean smells different from
the tidal zone, which smells different from the beach, which smells different from the marshland.
If one walks towards the ocean from a few miles inland, the odor environment will change in a
predictable pattern. On a yet smaller scale, the bakery in the mall smells different from the shoe
store. At an even smaller scale, my apartment smells different from the hallway and from my
neighbors' apartments. Within my apartment, the kitchen, the bathroom, and the bedroom all
have unique smells. Within the kitchen, the area by the oven smells different from the sink or the
trashcan. Finally, my hands, feet, and armpits all have characteristically different smells.

The spatial distribution of odorants in the world is due to the spatial arrangement of the odor
sources that release characteristic odorants. The concentration of the released molecules is, on
average, higher close to the source than further away. Some odor sources remain at the same
position in the environment and give off the same odorants for a long time. The ocean, for
example, is a reliable olfactory landmark. Many other odor sources are much less permanent and
reliable. The bakery in the mall will stop giving off bakery smells when it closes for the night.
Apple trees may be good olfactory landmarks when they are flowering and then again when the
apples are rotting under them, but not during the winter months. The difference between
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olfactory landmarks and visual landmarks, like trees, rivers, buildings, and mountains, is that
olfactory landmarks are less stable over time.

The distribution of odorous molecules in the environment is especially unstable at the scale
between meters and kilometers that is behaviorally relevant to humans. At this scale, the spatial
distribution of odorous molecules is determined mostly by turbulent airflow (Weissburg 2000).
At a lower scale between millimeters and centimeters, odor distribution is mainly determined by
diffusion. The diffusion of odorants results in the formation of gradients and odor gradients can
be used to locate the odor source. This is how insect larvae use smell for navigation. At a larger
scale of tens or hundreds of kilometers, odor distribution is determined by climate events that
produce stable spatial gradients in ratios of atmospheric trace gases (Wallraff and Andreae
2000). These stable gradients at a kilometer scales allow homing pigeons to smell their way
home (Gagliardo 2013). At the human scale, stable patterns of odor distribution are
comparatively rare, even in the presence of stable odor sources.

Dogs, rats, and other animals successfully use odors for navigation, which shows that, at least
sometimes, odorants have stable spatial distributions at the scale that is behaviorally relevant for
humans. However, dogs, rats, and all other terrestrial mammals normally do not use odorous
molecules in the air for navigation. Instead, they use odors deposited on the ground as trails or
markings. Trails and markings are much more stable over time than clouds of molecules.
However, trails and markings are not accessible to humans because with the development of
bipedalism our noses have been moved too high above the ground. Other species found solutions
for similar problems. The elephant's olfactory epithelium is far from the ground, but it
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compensates for this with its trunk that constitutes a vacuum system to suck the odorous
molecules from trails and markings on the ground up to the nasal cavity. Humans may be the
only species of terrestrial mammals that is not aware of the trails and markings that structure the
ground they walk on.

In summary, in the physical world, some non-random distributions of odorous molecules are
stable over certain periods, for example odor gradients at the centimeter scale in soil. However,
in the air several feet above ground, where our noses are, the distribution of odorous molecules is
generally strongly influenced by turbulent airflows and very unreliable.

Spatial structure of olfactory perception
Our odor environment has a spatial structure and it would be possible that this structure is
reflected in the structure of olfactory perception. However, laboratory experiments have shown
that human olfactory perception is spatially unstructured. The simplest possible spatial structure
of olfactory perception, a division of the perception into left nostril and right nostril, would be
revealed by the ability to tell whether an odor is applied to the left or to the right nostril. Subjects
fail even at this simplest task. It is usually not possible to discriminate between a stimulus being
presented in the left nostril and the same stimulus being presented in the right nostril (Radil and
Wysocki 1998; Frasnelli, Charbonneau et al. 2008). In seeming contradiction, it has also been
reported that humans can compare the olfactory input between their two nostrils (von Békésy
1964; Porter, Anand et al. 2005; Porter, Craven et al. 2007). It has subsequently been shown that
the performance in these experiments was not based on the spatial structure of olfactory percepts,
but on chemesthesis (Kleemann, Albrecht et al. 2009; Croy, Schulz et al. 2014).
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Chemesthesis is, by all accounts except those that individuate modalities solely on the physical
properties of the stimuli, a different modality than olfaction. Chemesthesis is the chemical
sensitivity of the skin or mucous membrane. The hotness when eating chili peppers, but also the
burning when fingers touch the eye after handling chili peppers is mediated by chemesthesis.
The sting when smelling vinegar and the perceived coolness of the smell of menthol are other
examples of chemesthetic perception. Chemesthesis is mediated through receptors that mediate
pain, touch, and temperature, which explains why chemesthetic experiences are described in
terms of temperature and touch perception. The mucous membrane inside our nasal cavity has
chemesthetic sensitivity. Like the entire surface or our body, this membrane is spatially mapped
in our brain and we can tell whether the skin in our left or in our right nostril is being irritated.
Chemesthesis in the nasal cavity is mediated by the trigeminal nerve. Experimentally
dissociating olfaction and chemesthesis is notoriously difficult because at high concentrations
many volatile molecules activate both the olfactory system and the trigeminal nerve. However,
other than sharing the same stimuli, olfaction and chemesthesis have little in common (Figure
10). Olfaction is not involved in the ability to locate certain stimuli that was demonstrated by von
Békésy and others (von Békésy 1964; Porter, Anand et al. 2005; Porter, Craven et al. 2007). We
can tell that a jar of menthol is placed to our left because the skin in our left nostril feels colder
than in our right nostril. The reason why we can tell that acetic acid is to our right is that it
induces a stronger stinging in our right nostril than in the left. These perceptions are mediated by
the trigeminal nerve. Abolishing olfactory perception by cutting the olfactory nerve would not
affect this ability to locate the multimodal stimulus.
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Figure 10: Perception mediated by the olfactory and by the trigeminal nerve. (A) The
olfactory nerve and the trigeminal nerve enter the brain in different locations. (B) The
olfactory nerve innervates the olfactory epithelium in the nasal cavity, whereas branches
of the trigeminal nerve innervate the respiratory epithelium in the nasal cavity. (C, D)
Different brain areas are involved in the processing of trigeminal information (C) and of
olfactory information (D). (in (C) and (D) primary cortex is represented in blue,
secondary cortex in green, and non-cortical regions in violet). ((A) modified from
original work by Patrick J. Lynch (in the public domain under the Creative Commons
license (CC BY 2.5); (B) modified from original work by FrozenMan (in the public
domain under the Creative Commons license (CC BY-SA 4.0))

Odor-guided navigation without spatially structured perception
A possible objection to the thesis that our olfactory perception has no spatial structure is to point
out that humans can successfully navigate using olfactory information. It is possible to find the
source of an odor in a room. When humans navigate towards an object based on visual or
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auditory information, they use the spatial structure of the visual or auditory perception for
guidance. The parsimonious assumption is that humans use the same strategy when using odor
information to navigate towards an object. However, investigating instances of odor-guided
navigation shows that this is not the case. Humans use different strategies for navigating based
on olfactory perception than for navigating based on perception in modalities in which
perceptions have spatial structure.

Although humans do not routinely use olfaction for navigation, there can be no doubt that it is
possible. The paradigm example for olfactory navigation in humans is the nipple search
behavior, in which infants use olfactory cues to orient towards their mothers' breasts (Varendi,
Porter et al. 1994; Varendi and Porter 2001). There are also other examples. In dense tropical
forests, visual navigation can be difficult, but there are many distinct odor sources available for
olfactory navigation. Consequently, people living in this environment sometimes develop smell
maps which they use for navigation (Classen, Howes et al. 1994) (pages 97-99). Smell can also
provide valuable information about one's position with respect to an odor source, for example a
lion. One can, using olfactory information, avoid areas that have a strong lion smell.
Undoubtedly, this ability has saved many human lives.

These observations show that humans can use their sense of smell for orientation. That humans
have the ability to navigate using odors has also been shown experimentally. It has been
demonstrated that blindfolded human subjects have the ability to follow, crawling on all fours, a
scent trail of chocolate essential oil (Porter, Craven et al. 2007). In another experiment, subjects
were shown to be able to determine their position with respect to two odor sources by analyzing
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the ratio of the two smells (Jacobs, Arter et al. 2014). In institutions for mentally or visually
handicapped people in the Netherlands, odorizing different hallways with different odors reduced
the number of inhabitants that got lost trying to find their rooms (Köster, Møller et al. 2014).

That humans can use olfactory perception to navigate is not surprising. All perception of stimuli
that are spatially structured in the environment provides the necessary information for
navigation. If, in the experiment by Porter and colleagues (Porter, Craven et al. 2007) a salt trail
would have been laid on the ground instead of a chocolate odor trail, blindfolded subjects
presumably could have licked their way along the salt trail. Similarly, in a gustatory version of
the study by Jacobs and coworkers (Jacobs, Arter et al. 2014), the floor of a room would have to
be covered by a salt gradient and a perpendicular sugar gradient. In this situation, each location
in the room can be gustatorily identified by the intensity and the salt/sugar-ratio.

However, that a stimulus is used for navigation does not mean that the perception of the stimulus
has spatial structure. Even the most simple and unstructured signal can be used for navigation.
Imagine an individual that gets headaches when standing close to a power line. Let us assume
that the headaches have no spatial structure and that there are no qualitative differences between
two headaches, but the intensity of the headache depends on the distance to the power line. This
individual could use their headache to find a power line and to follow it from one city to another
using electricity-guided navigation. If, while walking in a straight line, the headache decreases,
the individual knows that they are moving away from the power line. The ability to use the taste
of salt or an electricity-induced headache for navigation does not show that the salt perception or
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the headache have a spatial structure. Any perception of a stimulus can be used for navigation
when the stimulus has spatial structure.

The strategy that humans most commonly use to navigate with the help of olfactory information
is the same as used by the individual who uses electricity-induced headaches for navigation:
active exploration of the spatial distribution of the stimulus through movement. We move our
body, or at least our nose, to find out where the smell is coming from (Richardson 2011). When
the intensity of a smell decreases during movement, we know that we are moving away from the
odor source. This strategy of sampling odors at different positions and comparing the intensities
is often applied for finding the source of an odor.

Another way of using olfactory perception for navigation despite its lack of spatial structure is to
combine olfactory information with other sensory information. The wind provides especially
useful information. When we perceive the odor of a barbeque and simultaneously perceive
airflow from the left, then we can infer that there is a barbeque to our left. This is how many
flying insects use olfaction to find an odor source. Smelling the odor they are interested in, most
commonly pheromones released by other members of the species, elicits flight against the
airflow. When they lose the trail, they change their flight path into a random search pattern until
they pick it up again, at which point they continue to fly upwind.

The fact that some instances of perception have no spatial structure has drastic consequences for
philosophy of perception, as has been discussed previously (Lycan 2000; Smith 2002; Matthen
2005; Peacocke 2008; Batty 2010). Due to the lack of spatial structure of olfactory perception,
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concepts depending on spatial relations such as position, orientation, directedness, and
movement, which play a very important role in philosophy of perception that is based on visual
perception, play no role in an alternative account of the philosophy of perception for which
olfaction is the paradigm. As a consequence, many theories that have been developed with the
visual system in mind are incoherent when the paradigmatic sense is olfaction. Views that
consider the body and its movements to be central for perceptual consciousness (for an overview,
see (Prinz 2009); for an example, see the sensory motor contingency theory (O'Regan and Noë
2001)), for example, may be plausible for vision or other forms of perception that involve "an
actively-explorable anisotropic field" (Humphrey 2001), but not for olfaction.

Olfaction is probably the only major human sensory modality that never perceives perceptual
qualities that are arranged spatially (although it is possible to design stimuli that result in
spatially unstructured percepts in every modality). In vision, touch, and taste, sensory neurons
are arranged spatially and their patterns of activation are mapped onto perception so that the
spatial structure of the percepts resembles the spatial structure of the perceived stimulus. In
vision and touch, this spatial mapping is central to the function of these senses. In gustation, the
mapping does not seem to be central to the function of taste perception. However, although this
information does not seem to be important, it is easy to tell the difference between a few grains
of salt on the left part on the tongue versus on the right part of the tongue. In audition the main
strategy for structuring perception spatially is to compare input to the two ears. This comparison
makes it easy to auditorily distinguish a car approaching from the left from a car approaching
from the right.
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3.2. Olfaction in time
Although olfactory perception has no spatial structure, it certainly has some type of temporal
structure. All perception has temporal structure because perception by definition involves
changes depending on the presence or absence of a stimulus over time. There would be no
adaptive value to perceiving an unchanging stimulus. The temporal structure of olfactory
perception is determined by the temporal structure of odor stimuli and by the characteristics of
the olfactory sensory system. The stimulus, odor molecules floating through the air, is much
slower than light, sound, and other stimuli. As expected, the olfactory sensory system is therefore
not optimized to sense stimuli with great temporal resolution. Although olfactory perception is
temporally structured, the structure is much less complex and carries much less important
information than the temporal structure of vision or audition.

Temporal structure of olfactory stimuli
The ratio of different types of odorous molecules in the air at a given position changes over time.
Large cities often smell like rotten garbage during the summer and like burnt coal during the
winter. Farther away from cities, the smell of flowers fills the air in spring, the smell of burnt
grass in summer, and the smell of decaying leaves in fall. Some societies have used such
seasonal regularities in the temporal patterns of odors to construct calendars based on olfaction
(Classen, Howes et al. 1994) (pages 95-97). Different times of the day also have different smells.
For some, mornings smells like coffee, mid-day like cafeteria food, and evenings like beer.

In addition to these regular annual and circadian fluctuations in odors, regularly occurring events
are also sometimes associated with specific smells. These can be natural events, like the

77

blooming period of a certain flower, or cultural events like Christmas or Thanksgiving.
Successions of smells can also form olfactory events on shorter time-scales. An example of such
a temporally structured olfactory event is the grilling of a steak. The smell of the meat will
intensify as it heats up on the grill. Then the smell will change in quality from cooked meat to
burned meat. After the steak is entirely burned, the smell will become less intense and eventually
disappear.

Because of the difference in physical nature between odorant molecules, vibrating air, and
photons, olfactory events unfold several orders of magnitude slower than auditory or visual
events. To illustrate the difference, let us consider an event that can be perceived both visually
and olfactorily: the removal of a bouquet of fragrant flowers from a room. The visual perception
is mediated by the photons that are reflected by the flowers. When somebody comes in, picks up
the bouquet of flowers, and takes it away, the photons that are reflected by the flowers no longer
reach the perceivers eye. The photons that were reflected by the flowers before they were
removed from the room have been absorbed by matter. In contrast, the olfactory perception is
mediated by odorous molecules given off by the flowers. When somebody comes in, picks up the
bouquet of flowers, and takes it away, all the molecules that have been given off by the flowers
before the flowers were removed remain in the room. As long as the flowers were in the room,
there was an equilibrium. The flowers gave off a certain amount of odorous molecules per time
unit and a certain amount of odorous molecules escaped from the room through the gaps under
the door, etc. After the flowers have been removed, the concentration of odorous flower
molecules in the room will slowly decline. How long it will take until the concentration is
appreciably reduced depends on the circumstances. It can take hours or days. A perfectly
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insulated room that is filled with an odorant will remain filled with the odorant for weeks or
months. When a different bouquet of flowers is brought into the room, the odorous molecules
from the new flowers will mix with the odorous molecules from the flowers that were in the
room before. The stimuli in olfaction are, under normal conditions, rarely temporally separated.
Instead sequential stimuli overlap and mix.

Temporal structure of olfactory perception
Not surprisingly, our olfactory sensory system is adapted to the slow-moving stimulus that it
detects and not optimized for high temporal resolution. Before an odor molecule can be sensed, it
has to be transported to the top of the nasal cavity through sniffing. Once it reached the olfactory
epithelium, it has to diffuse through the olfactory mucus, a gel-like secretion that protects the
sensory neurons from physical damage, but allows odor molecules to diffuse from the nasal
cavity to the surface of the sensory neurons. The molecular processes at the surface of the
sensory neurons through which odorants activate sensory neurons are also much slower than
those through which photons activate photoreceptors.

In addition to the relative slowness with which it unfolds, olfactory perception also differs from
other modalities in that it is temporally discontinuous. Olfactory perception is discontinuous
because it depends on sniffing (Mainland and Sobel 2006). We perceive our chemical
environment as parceled by sniffs: in short, discreet olfactory experiences every 1.6 seconds
(Laing 1983; Mainland and Sobel 2006). Because of this discontinuity, human olfaction has been
called "a constant state of change-blindness" (Sela and Sobel 2010). The analogy between
olfaction and change blindness in vision is that change in an image is easy to detect when the
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altered image appears immediately after the original image. In contrast, when the two images are
temporally separated by a mask, the change is more difficult to detect due to change-blindness
(Simons and Rensink 2005). Similar phenomena have also been described in touch (Gallace, Tan
et al. 2006) and audition (Vitevitch 2003). However, in olfaction, two percepts are always
separated by a period of no perception. The special experimentally induced conditions under
which change detection fails in other modalities are very similar to the normal condition of
olfactory perception. Consequently, the detection of temporal changes in olfaction is more
challenging than in other modalities. To overcome this challenge, the olfactory system has
adopted an adaptation-based strategy of change detection (Wilson and Stevenson 2006). If
sequential sniffs bring the same stimulus to the olfactory sensory neurons, the neurons will adapt
to the stimulus and their response rate will decline. If a novel stimulus is encountered, neurons
will start firing again. This is how change is perceived in olfaction.

The combination of the temporal structure of odor stimuli and the characteristics of the olfactory
sensory apparatus result in a very impoverished temporal structure of olfaction. The main
temporal aspect of odor perception is that intensity and quality of the perceived smell change
over time. In vision and audition, in contrast, temporal structure can add much more information.
Consider for example bird song, or language, in which the temporal sequence within an auditory
perception carries all the relevant information. Similarly, the sequence within a visual perception
makes the difference between a movement from left to right and a movement from right to left.
In olfaction, neither the encoding of information in sequences that is seen in audition, nor the
combination of spatial and temporal perception to perceive motion is possible. All that the
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temporal structure in olfaction informs us about is the change of the type and number of odorous
molecules in our nasal cavity.

3.4. Conclusion: Olfactory perception is the perception of a sequence of spatially
unstructured perceptual qualities
In this chapter, I have shown that olfactory perception has no spatial structure and a severely
impoverished temporal structure. On the other hand, as discussed in chapter 1, olfaction has
many more discriminable qualities than other perceptual qualities. This suggests that in olfaction,
the nature of the perceptual qualities is the important information. In vision, it is how the
perceptual qualities are arranged in space, and in audition, the important information is the
temporal arrangement of perceptual qualities. The differences are differences of degree;
however, they are the cause of how we tend to think about these three modalities. In this
conclusion, I will illustrate these differences using thought experiments.

In visual perception, the behaviorally most relevant information is in the spatial structure of the
perception. Wearing goggles that invert the visual field so that what is on the left in physical
space is perceived to be on the right and vice versa severely reduces the ability to use vision to
guide the behaviors it usually guides. Inverted visual perception is of no help in winning a fight,
hunting a boar, or manipulating tools. Punching to the left when one's opponent is to one's right
is not adaptive. Eventually, people adjust to inversion goggles and start to punch to the left when
they perceive their opponent on their right. However, one can imagine goggles that present the
visual field in continuously changing, random orientations. It is not possible to adjust to such
goggles and to the individual wearing those goggles, vision will be almost completely useless.
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The goggle leave the temporal structure of visual perception intact. Colors are also perceived the
same with the goggles as they are perceived without them. This shows that disrupting the spatial
orientation of the percepts alone, while leaving other aspects of perception unchanged, has a very
strong impact on the usefulness of visual perception. Seeing a boar does not help in hunting the
boar when one cannot see where it is. Seeing that a fist is about to strike does not help in
blocking the blow when one cannot see from where it is about to strike. Seeing a tool does not
help manipulate that tool when one cannot see where the tool is. It is only through its spatial
structure that visual perception enables us to do all those things.

In auditory perception, the spatial arrangement of perceptual qualities is much less important
than in vision. Instead, most of the behaviorally relevant information in audition is in the
temporal sequence of perception. To illustrate the importance of temporal information for
auditory perception, imagine headphones that temporally rearranged the sequences of perceived
auditory perceptual qualities. This would make audition almost completely useless, because we
usually recognize auditory events through their typical temporal structure. Listening to
recordings backwards makes it difficult to identify auditory events. It is possible to learn to
recognize temporally inverted events. However, when the perceptual qualities that make up those
events are randomly rearranged, it will be very difficult to recognize them. The headphones that
rearrange auditory perceptual qualities in time leave the spatial structure of auditory perception
intact and do not change the pitch and loudness of tones. However, without the temporal
sequence information, auditory information would be almost completely useless. The impact of
such a manipulation of auditory perception on its utility would be much more severe than the
impact of manipulating the spatial arrangement of auditory perceptual qualities. Redirecting the
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input that normally reaches the left ear to the right ear and vice versa will affect some behaviors
guided by audition, like turning away from an explosion to protect one's face. However, many
other auditorily guided behaviors, for example those dependent on communication, are
independent of the spatial information reflecting the source of the sounds.

In olfaction, neither the manipulation that would dramatically disrupt visually guided behaviors
nor the manipulation that would dramatically disrupt auditorily guided behaviors would have a
noticeable effect. Redirecting the air that would normally go into the left nostril to the right
nostril at random would not change perception at all, because humans cannot tell the difference
between the two conditions. Dividing the olfactory stimuli into short temporal sections and then
presenting these sections out of sequence would presumably be noticeable under certain
circumstances, depending on how long the temporal sections are. However, in contrast to the
effect on sound-guided behaviors, such a manipulation would not affect odor-guided behaviors
dramatically. In olfaction, all the behaviorally important information is in what type of
perceptual quality is perceived. This is why there are trillions of different smells and only a few
hundred thousand tones.

Of course, the perceptual qualities are central to perception in all modalities. It is the
arrangement of these perceptual qualities in space or time that provide the behaviorally most
relevant information in vision and audition. If there were no perceptual visual qualities, they
could not be arranged in space or time. The difference between olfaction and the other senses is
that in olfaction the nature of the perceptual qualities carries all the behaviorally relevant
information. Imagine goggles that change each type of color quality into a random other type of
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color quality. Bright and fully saturated orange would be perceived as dark, unsaturated blue.
Many visually guided behaviors -- manipulating tools, hunting boars, fighting -- would be little
affected by such a change. The effect of changing each type of perceptual quality in audition into
another type would be similarly limited. Imagine headphones that change each type of auditory
quality to a different type of auditory quality. This would not have a large impact on our
auditorily guided behaviors. In contrast to the limited effect in vision and audition, if a device
would change each type of olfactory perceptual quality into another type, olfaction would be
completely useless. Perceiving vanilla smell as leather smell and rose smell as rotten meat smell
will make it impossible for any adaptive behavior to be executed in response to olfactory
perception14.

14

The importance of the type of perceptual quality over their position in space and time that is
found in olfaction is presumably the original, and most common, state of perception. When it is
cold, we know to wear a coat or show other heat preserving behaviors, regardless of the spatial
and temporal structure of the cold. When we taste sugar, we should swallow what is in our
mouth because it likely has high caloric content. The spatial and temporal structure of the
gustatory perception is not important for guiding this behavior. Human vision and human
audition are highly specialized evolutionary derived instances of perception in which
arrangement in space and time has become more important.
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Chapter 4: Olfactory objects
In the first three chapters, I have discussed perceptual qualities and how perceptual qualities can
be arranged in space and time to form percepts. Introspectively, it usually does not appear to us
as if we perceive arranged perceptual qualities. Instead, it appears as if we perceive objects and
their properties. Based on this introspective evidence, object-based accounts of perception have
been developed. Objects of perception are most often associated with vision and touch. The
traditional auditory counterpart to the visual object is the auditory event (Blauert 1997). In the
name of identifying commonalities between modalities, talk of "auditory objects" has become
more common both in neuroscience (Griffiths and Warren 2004; Bizley and Cohen 2013) and in
the philosophy of perception (O'Callaghan 2008; Matthen 2010; Nudds 2010)15.

The modality to which an object-based account of perception has been most difficult to
generalize is olfaction16. Barwich writes: "The more we understand about the
multidimensionality of olfactory experiences and the processes of smell perception with which
they resonate, the more apparent it should become that object-based talk about perceptions is no
longer tenable, if it ever was" (Barwich 2014). I agree with Barwich and in in the first part of this
chapter, I will show that the common criteria for objecthood fail to pick out olfactory objects. It

15

As reasons why it is justified to think of audition as involving objects, it has been pointed out
that "audible individuals are temporally extended and bounded, serve as the locus for auditory
attention, prompt completion effects, and are subject to figure-ground distinctions in pitch space"
O'Callaghan, C. (2014). "Auditory Perception." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, from
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/perception-auditory/. O'Callaghan
O'Callaghan, C. (2008). "Object perception: Vision and audition." Philosophy Compass 3: 803829. proposed that objects in vision and in audition are mereologically complex individuals. In
vision, complexity is conveyed by the perception's spatial features, whereas in audition temporal
structure makes perception complex.
16
For a defense of olfactory objects, see Stevenson, R. J. (2014). "Object concepts in the
chemical senses." Cognitive Science 38(7): 1360-1383.
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is possible to relax the criteria for objecthood so far that by definition all perception, including
olfactory perception, is the perception of objects. In the second part of this chapter, I will show
that under these circumstances, when olfactory perception is postulated to be the perception of
objects, there are no satisfying candidates for what the objects of olfactory perception could be.

4.1. Is olfactory perception the perception of objects?
If a given instance of perception can be either the perception of objects or objectless perception,
then criteria to decide whether a given instance of perception involves objects or not has to be
developed. I will discuss in this section the two criteria that are most frequently applied. The first
criterion, which dominates the scientific literature, is that perception is the perception of objects
when it involves figure-ground segregation ((Kubovy and Van Valkenburg 2001) (page 102)
(Stevenson and Wilson 2007) (page 1823)). The second criterion for perceptual objecthood that
will be discussed in this section is that perception involves perceptual objects when the Many
Properties Problem can be solved (Batty 2014; Carvalho). The Many Properties Problem is the
problem of distinguishing stimuli in which the same properties are instantiated in different
arrangements. That we can tell the difference between a painting of a blue triangle next to a red
square and a painting of a red triangle next to a blue square shows that vision can solve the Many
Properties Problem.

Figure-ground segregation
Seeing a person standing in front of a wall or a banana lying on top of a table are instances of
perceiving a figure (the person or the banana) that can be distinguished from the ground (the wall
or table). For smell, whether percepts have a figure-ground structure is less obvious than for
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instances of visual perception. It has been argued that there is figure-ground segregation, and
therefore an object of perception, in olfaction (Stevenson and Wilson 2007). I will investigate
this claim here. I will consider whether there is figure-ground segregation in olfaction first for
olfactory perception without temporal structure and then for instances of olfactory perception in
which the potential figure has a temporal structure.

At any given moment, a mixture of different odor molecules at different ratios activates our
olfactory system. This ratio carries no spatial information (see section 3.1.). A rose under your
nose will produce the exact same activity of the olfactory sensory neurons as an intricate spatial
arrangement of 275 vials, each of which containing the appropriate concentration of one of the
275 chemicals that are found in rose oil (Ohloff 1994) (pp. 154-158). An apple under your nose
in a vineyard can produce the exact same pattern of activity in the olfactory sensory neurons as a
bunch of grapes under your nose in an orchard. More generally, a weak source of odor A that is
placed close to the perceiver in front of a strong background of odor B can be indiscriminable
from a weak source of odor B close to the perceiver in front of a strong background of odor A.
Olfactory perception does not have a figure-background structure that reflects position of the
stimuli in physical space like the figure-background structure in visual perception.

The conclusion that there is no figure-ground segregation in olfaction because olfactory percepts
do not reflect positions of stimuli in physical space can be challenged in several ways. First,
instead of being based on the perceived spatial relation between figure and ground, the
distinction between figure and ground in olfaction could be based on intensity. Smells in nature
are usually mixtures of many different odorants. When one of these odorants within the mixture
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dominates the perceived smell, it could metaphorically be thought of as "rising above the
background". This could be interpreted as intensity-based figure-ground segregation. Imagine
smelling a wine that smells strongly of apple as well as weakly of pineapple, cinnamon, and
cherry. Smelling this wine could be described as a figure of apple with a background of
pineapple, cinnamon, and cherry. Another way in which olfaction could accomplish figureground segregation is through differential familiarity. An odor mixture could acquire a figureground-structure when its components differ in their familiarity. Imagine smelling a wine that
has a weak apple smell as well as weak cardamom, turmeric, and elderberry smells. Imagine
further that you never before smelled cardamom, turmeric, and elderberry. This situation can be
described as perceiving an apple object and an unidentifiable background. Finally, a similar
phenomenology can emerge due to violation of expectation. A wine that smells like a normal
wine but also has an unexpected fishy smell can be described as a fish object and a wine
background. In all these examples of olfactory perceptions that could be considered as having a
figure-background structure, the distinction between figure and background is based on the
prominence of some aspect of the olfactory percept. The prominence can be conveyed through
intensity, familiarity, or unexpectedness. The prominent aspect is interpreted as the figure while
the less prominent aspects form the background.

To decide if any of these situations should be considered as evidence for figure-ground
segregation in olfaction, it is informative to compare them to analogous situations in visual
perception. The first case, strong apple odor perceived simultaneously with weaker other odors,
corresponds to the visual scenery of looking at a tiled bathroom wall with differently colored
tiles. The color of one tile is darker and more saturated than the colors of the other tiles. The
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second situation, apple odor together with an unknown mix of odors, corresponds to the visual
experience of seeing a pile of unfamiliar-looking alien artefacts with a dead cow in between
them. The third situation, unexpected fish odor mixed with regular wine odors, corresponds to
the visual perception of a pink banana in a bunch of yellow bananas. A review of the literature
on visual perception shows that such situations would be described as allocation of spatial
attention depending on stimulus salience. They would not be considered instances of figureground segregation. Since salience-based attention allocation is not considered to be evidence for
figure-ground segregation in vision, it should also not count as evidence for figure-ground
segregation in olfaction.

My discussion of figure-ground segregation in olfaction so far has abstracted away from the
temporal structure of perception. I have only shown that stationary olfactory snapshots do not
have a figure-ground structure. Differential prominence of different features of an olfactory
percept does not amount to figure-ground segregation. However, olfactory perception does also
have a temporal structure. The figure-ground segregation in olfaction could be based on the fact
that different sets of features of an olfactory percept covary over time (Wilson and Stevenson
2006; Carvalho 2014). This is an intriguing idea because our sense of smell is optimized to
detect changes rather than states. We adapt quickly to any temporally constant odor and therefore
stay sensitive to changes (Dalton 2000; Stevenson and Wilson 2007). The constant odor to which
we are adapted, and therefor perceive only weakly, can be considered "background odor". Any
change "in front" of this background can then be considered an object. Olfactory objects,
according to this description, are similar to auditory events. There may be an olfactory
background consisting of a mix of body odors and low-grade pollution and then a strawberry
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odor appears and lasts for a few moments before it disappears again. The strawberry odor that
changed while the other odors remained constant can be thought of as an olfactory perceptual
object.

As with prominence-based attention, it is informative to consider whether covariation over time
would be considered as evidence for figure-ground segregation in visual perception. Consider the
banana as a figure and the table as a background. Now imagine that there is some localized
damage and skin abrasion to the banana. Over time, the damaged spots of the banana will turn
brown while the rest of the banana and the table do not change color. This would not result in a
reassessment of the figure-ground segregation so that the brown spots on the banana are now
considered the object and the yellow part of the banana and the table the background. Temporal
changes do not introduce figure-ground relations in vision. It is therefore parsimonious that such
temporal changes also do not introduce figure-ground relations in other modalities.

Another reason to resist a notion of perceptual objecthood that is based on the temporal structure
of perception is that such a notion would be so inclusive that "perceptual object" would become a
synonym of "percept". If appearance and disappearance of a perception is sufficient to make it
the perception of an object, then all perceptual systems that detect change over time detect
perceptual objects. A hypothetical sensory system that consists of a single sensory neuron can
distinguish objects from background, when objects are defined by their temporal structure. The
neuron will permanently be activated at an intermediate level due to background levels of the
stimulus. Occasionally, it will be strongly activated for a certain period of time when it
encounters high levels of the stimulus. Afterward it will go back to the intermediate level of
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activation. The periods of strong activation can be interpreted as the objects that can be
segregated from the constant background. Under this notion of perceptual object, all perception
is the perception of objects and the dispute about objecthood becomes a dispute about
terminology.

The Many Properties Problem
Instead of using figure-ground segregation as the criterion of objecthood in perception, it has
been suggested that perception is only the perception of objects when the Many Properties
Problem can be solved. The Many Properties Problem (Jackson 1977) is the problem of
assigning properties to objects in situations in which several objects are perceived
simultaneously. When we see a blue circle and a red square, we can solve the Many Properties
Problem and assign the properties "blue" and "round" to one object and the properties "red" and
"square" to the other object. The way the Many Properties Problem is solved in visual perception
is by grouping properties together based on their location in perceived space. Properties that
move through space together are properties of the same object. In olfaction, there is no perceived
space. Regardless, two different identifiable smells can be identified at the same time. We can
simultaneously perceive wine smell and sausage smell. If either the sausage smell or the wine
smell has a spicy quality, can we assign the spiciness to one of the two smells? If we can, then
olfaction can solve the Many Properties Problem.

It has been suggested that olfaction can solve the Many Properties Problem and that "spicy wine,
and sausage" does in fact smell different from "wine, and spicy sausage" (Carvalho) (page 12).
However, no biological mechanism on which this capacity could be based has been suggested.
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The molecules that arrive at the olfactory epithelium and elicit the percept of "spicy wine and
sausage" are identical to the molecules that elicit the percept of "wine and spicy sausage". One of
the many molecules that are perceived as spicy is cuminaldehyde. Cuminaldehyde is found in
some wines and it gives the smell of those wines a spicy note. However, cuminaldehyde is also
given off by some spicy sausages. When the cuminaldehyde molecules reach the olfactory
sensory neurons, they do not carry information about their source. The perception is the same
regardless of whether the cuminaldehyde is given off by the sausage or by the wine. Olfaction
cannot solve the Many Properties Problem (Batty 2010; Batty 2011). Because we cannot tell
which property belongs to which potential olfactory object, we also cannot tell how many
potential olfactory objects contribute to a given instance of perception. Instead of smelling spicy
sausage and wine, or spicy wine and sausage, we may smell wine, sausage, and a jar of cumin
oil.

The finding that we cannot assign properties to smells seems to defy everyday experience. When
an anchovy and garlic pizza is delivered, we know that the anchovy smell and the garlic smell
are both properties of the pizza smell. However, this knowledge is based on background
knowledge and assumptions rather than on perceptual grouping of the anchovy and garlic smell.
If the pizza that is delivered does not have anchovies on it, but the pizza deliveryman carries
some anchovies in his pocket to snack on, we will incorrectly assume that both the garlic smell
and the anchovy smell are properties of the pizza. This is because our assigning of properties to
smells is not based on the structure of our percepts, but on our assumptions about the most likely
scenarios. Similarly, an individual familiar with spicy sausages but not with spicy wine will
interpret the stimulus discussed above as the perception of wine and spicy sausage. An individual

92

that is familiar with spiced wines, but not with spiced sausages will interpret the same stimulus
as the perception of spiced wine and sausage. Nothing in the olfactory percept itself enables us to
assign the spiciness to either of the two smells.

Just like figure-ground segregation, solving the Many Properties Problem is possible in olfaction
when the temporal structure of olfactory perception is taken into account. Covariance between
the sausage and spice smell over time are good evidence that they are released by the same odor
source and that they are properties of the same object. However, as discussed above, if temporal
criteria would be sufficient for objecthood, then all perception with temporal structure would be
the perception of objects and "object-based perception" would just be a different word for
"perception".

4.2. What could be an olfactory object?
In section 4.1., I used two different criteria for objecthood to investigate whether olfactory
perception involves the perception of objects. The result of this investigation was that the only
conceptual framework under which olfactory perception is the perception of objects is one under
which every instance of perception is the perception of objects. If such a definition of objecthood
is endorsed, the question whether olfactory perception is the perception of objects is not an
empirical question. Instead, olfactory perception is by definition the perception of olfactory
objects. In this section, I will investigated what the objects of olfactory perception that are
postulated by such an approach could be.
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I will first discuss candidates for olfactory objects that have been suggested in the literature. The
most obvious candidates for olfactory objects are the source of the odorous molecules, the clouds
of odorous molecules that are given off by the source, and the molecules themselves. In the
second part of this section, I will use phenomenal presence as the criterion for what the objects of
olfactory perception are. This criterion has been suggested by Budek and Farkas, who propose
that the causes of an instance of perception that are present in phenomenology are the objects of
that instance of perception (Budek and Farkas 2014).

Potential odor objects
A straightforward proposal about olfactory objects is that the source of the odorous molecules is
the object of the olfactory perception. Benjamin Young calls this view, which is based on naive
realism about perception (Gibson 1966), the "ordinary object view" (Young) (page 46).
According to the ordinary object view, the objects of the smell of lions are lions. One problem
with this view is that the source of odorous molecules can be specified at different levels. What
appears to be lion smell is mostly the smell of lion urine, so both the urine and the lions
themselves are possible objects of the perception. Somebody driving by the zoo may think of the
entire zoo as the object of the lion smell. Lion urine, individual lions, the pack of lions, the lion
enclosure, and the zoo all can be considered as the source of the lion smell and therefore as its
object.

Another problem of the ordinary object view of olfactory perception is that the link between the
source of molecules that cause olfactory perception and the perception is much weaker and less
direct than the link between the source of the light that causes visual perception and the
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corresponding visual perception. The smell of lions will linger for a long time after the lions
have been moved to another zoo. The lion odor will also stick to their zookeeper's clothes so that
when she comes home, she will smell of lions. Are the zookeeper's clothes now the object of
perception? These examples show that smells, after they are given off by their sources, are no
longer linked to them. It is therefore difficult to identify the "original" source of a smell, and
practically often impossible to track a smell back to its source17.

Because of these problems with applying the ordinary object view to olfaction, several
alternatives have been proposed. One alternative suggestion is that the cloud of odorous
molecules given off by the odor source is the object of olfactory perception (Lycan 2000). This
cloud object view avoids the problems of unambiguously identifying the source of the cloud of
molecules that make the ordinary object view unattractive for olfaction. The disadvantage of this
view is that it cannot be integrated into an evolutionary account of perception. The perception of
lions provides useful information that can guide behaviors that increase the perceiver's fitness by
decreasing the likelihood of being eaten by a lion. The perception of a cloud of odor molecules,

17

How strongly the messengers of perception are linked to their source is a matter of degree. The
difficulties pointed out here are not unique to olfaction; they are however much more
pronounced in olfaction than in other modalities. An example of a weak link between the
messengers of perception and their source in vision is our visual perception of objects that are
very far away. We can see stars that no longer exist, because the light from the stars takes a long
time to reach our eyes and sometimes a star will cease to exist while the light is travelling from it
to the earth. Even the stars that still exist are perceived to be at the position in the sky where they
were when they gave off the light and not where they are when we perceive them. The path of
light can also be changed through gravitational deflection. All these phenomena make the link
between light and its source less direct. In most cases of everyday perception, the connection
between light and its source is however much more direct than the connection between an odor
and its source.
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on the other hand, is in most cases not adaptive (as has been pointed out by Ruth Millikan in
conversation with Bill Lycan (Lycan 2014) (page 7)).

A more technical problem with the cloud object view is that an odor source usually gives off
hundreds of different odorous molecules. Presumably, under the cloud object view, each type of
molecule is considered to form its own cloud. The perception of the smell of lions therefore is
the perception of hundreds of different objects. Alternatively, all the different types of molecules
given off by the lions could be considered to form a single cloud. However, at any time, different
types of molecules that have been given off by different odor sources are in the air. The only
thing the different types of molecules that are given off by a lion have in common is that they
have been released from the same source. The only way to determine which of the many
molecules in the air belong to the lion odor cloud is therefore by reference to the odor source.
This reintroduces all the problems of the ordinary object view that the cloud object view was
supposed to solve.

An alternative to the ordinary object view and the cloud object view is the molecule object view,
according to which the odorous molecules that bind to our odorant receptors are the olfactory
objects. Benjamin Young has developed a proposal along these lines, although he does not
consider the entire odorous molecule, but just its chemical structure, to be the object of olfaction
(Young 2011). The advantage of a molecule object view over the cloud object view and the
ordinary object view is that the perceptual qualities associated with olfactory perception are
related to properties of the molecules, not to properties of the ordinary object or the cloud.
Depending on the different chemical and physical properties of the molecules, they interact with
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different combinations of odorant receptors. This combinatorial code determines the perceived
smell. Differences in molecules therefore result in differences in perception. With the molecule
object view, the correlation between physical differences between two objects and differences in
the perceptual qualities associated with the two objects is much higher than with the ordinary
object view or the cloud object view.

Accounting for the differences and similarities in perceived smells is an important advantage of
the molecule object view. However, the molecule object view faces the same problems faced by
the cloud object view. It fails to provide a connection between perception and adaptive behavior.
Smelling macrocyclic rings with two hydrogen bonds at the central oxygen conveys no adaptive
advantage. Another problem that the molecule object view inherits from the cloud object view is
the unsatisfying account of the perception of odorant mixtures. Wine gives off hundreds of
different types of molecules that have different chemical structures (Aznar, López et al. 2001). If
molecules (or their structure) are the objects of olfactory perception, then we perceived hundreds
of different objects when opening a bottle of Chardonnay.

The ordinary object view, the cloud object view, and the molecule object view all have their
advantages and disadvantages. Maybe it is not necessary to pick one over the others. Instead, the
advantages of all three views could be combined. The zoo, the lions, their urine, the cloud of
molecules that forms above the urine, and the structure of the molecules in that cloud could all
be objects of olfaction. Such a layered account of objecthood has been suggested by Lycan
(Lycan 2014; Lycan 2014). This layered account of objecthood is inspired by the layered
accounts of referring. Lycan's example of a layered account of referring is that we can point at a
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chalk mark on a board and thereby refer to a number; thereby we refer to a room; thereby we
refer to the occupant of that room. The analogous account for olfaction would be that by
smelling a certain molecule, we smell the cloud of molecules it belongs to; thereby smelling the
lions that gave off the cloud of molecules; thereby smelling the zoo in which the lions are
housed.

Phenomenal presence as a criterion for objecthood
There are different suggestions about what the objects of olfactory perception could be. How can
we decide which of the different proposals correctly identifies the olfactory object? It may be
counterintuitive that we perceive hundreds of different objects when we perceive a Chardonnay.
However, if a theorist is willing to accept this consequence of her view of olfactory objects, what
procedure can be used to find out whether she is right? One proposal for identifying the object of
an instance of perception is to use phenomenal presence as the criterion for objecthood.
Following this proposal, the objects of an instance of perception are the causes of that instance of
perception that are present in phenomenology (Budek and Farkas 2014) 18.

Every instance of perception has causes. The perception of rose odor is caused by the rose and by
the clouds of odor molecules given off by the rose and by the binding of those molecules to

18

The investigation of phenomenal presence as a criterion for objecthood is the only part of this
dissertation in which it is important whether perception is conscious or not. Phenomenal
presence requires conscious perception, so non-conscious perception cannot involve objects.
Even when unconscious perception involves the perception of figures with properties that are
correctly assigned to them in front of a background, it is not the perception of objects. On the
other hand, according to the proposal by Budek and Farkas, every instance of conscious
perception is an instance of the perception of objects because in every instance of conscious
perception something is phenomenally present. That something is the object of the instance of
perception.
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olfactory sensory neurons. One could consider these causes of the instance of perception to be its
objects. Lycan's layered account of objecthood suggests something similar. However, calling the
causes of an instance of perception its objects does not result in an interesting notion of
objecthood. Instead, it merely results in a change in terminology from "causes" to "objects". The
proposal suggested by Budek and Farkas is that only a subset of the causes of perception, namely
those causes that are phenomenally present are the objects of that instance of perception (Budek
and Farkas 2014). We may "see" that it is cold outside because it is snowing, but the temperature
is not present in our visual phenomenology and therefore not an object of our visual perception.
The snow, on the other hand, is present in our phenomenology, and is therefore an object of this
instance of perception. The objects are whatever is phenomenally present in a given instance of
perception. What would this be in the case of olfactory perception?

The methods of determining what is phenomenally present are problematic because the main
evidence for phenomenal presence is introspection, and introspections differ between
individuals. This variability has resulted in different proposals about the objects of visual
perception. Some theorists have argued that in instances of visual perception only colors and
shapes are present in phenomenology (for example (Tye 1995)). Others have reported that
objects such as pine trees are present (for example (Siegel 2006)). I hope that in the case of
phenomenal presence in olfactory perception things are so clear-cut that there are no
disagreements about introspections.

For people who are unaware of the advances in smell research, the only things that can be
phenomenally present in olfaction are ordinary objects. It has been a scientific discovery that

99

odor perception is mediated through molecules that form clouds. Not that long ago, it was
speculated that olfaction could be mediated by waves in a way similar to the way in which
audition and vision are mediated. It is not uncommon to meet people who are not aware that
olfaction is mediated by molecules. An even more recent scientific discovery was that the
structure of a molecule determines its smell. This discovery is so recent that it is still disputed
and not universally accepted. The alternative suggestion is that intramolecular vibrations of the
molecule determine the molecule's smell (Turin 1996). What does this mean for the phenomenal
presence of clouds of molecules and of features of those molecules? Is the object of olfactory
perception for scholars who believe in the vibrational theory of olfaction the vibrations of the
molecules, whereas it is the structure of the molecules for those who believe that the structure
determines a molecule's smell, and for the vast majority of humans who have no knowledge
about these things, it is neither? Such an account of perceptual olfactory objecthood as dependent
on the perceiver's believes and knowledge about olfactory perception is unsatisfying. A scholar
who believes in the vibrational theory of perception would perceive the odor molecules'
vibrations, whereas a supporter of the shape theory of olfaction would perceive the odor
molecules' shape. Which of the two perceptions is veridical (if any of them is) depends on yet
unknown facts about the perceiver's olfactory system. The perceptual objects are perceiverdependent.

Perceiver-depend olfactory objects have also been suggested in the context of the perceived
valence of perceived odors. In this context, what the object of olfactory perception is does not
depend on the perceiver's textbook knowledge about olfaction, but on the perceiver's attitude
towards the odor. Yeshurun and Sobel write:
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We suggest that an odor object is the integration of the odor’s inherent pleasantness (...)
with the subjective state at the moment of coding: mood, hunger, fear, etc. Therefore, an
odor object is not the odor of the banana but rather an integration of the pleasantness of
the banana odor with the subjective state at which it was encountered. (Yeshurun and
Sobel 2010) (page 229)

A similar proposal suggests that the object of olfactory perception is the biological value to the
perceiving organism (Castro and Seeley 2014). What is phenomenally present when an odor is
perceived, according to these proposals, is the pleasantness, or the value, of the odor. As a
consequence, if objecthood depends on phenomenal presence, what the object of a given instance
of olfactory perception is does not depend on the physical features of what is perceived or on the
perceptual system with which it is perceived. Instead, what the perceptual object of an instance
of olfaction is depends on the current behavioral goals and motivational states of the perceiver.

4.3. Conclusion: Olfactory perception is not the perception of objects
I do not want to deny that most instances of perception appear to us as if they are the perception
of objects. Consider for example the tactile perception of an object that is stuck in your throat, or
under your eyelid. The object that is stuck under the eyelid has a certain size and it is located at a
certain position. The object also has non-spatial properties. It may be hot or rough, for example.
As we know, the perception of an object stuck under the eyelid is in many cases illusionary.
Such a perception is often not caused by a physical object. Instead, the perception of something
being stuck in the perceiver's throat or under her eyelid, similar to the perception of an insect
walking over the perceiver's skin, is usually caused by localized irritation of the skin or mucosa.
This illusion of objecthood shares many features with other types of illusions. The illusion of
objecthood, for example, resists cognitive influence. Even when my doctor inspects the inside of
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my eyelid and informs me that the perception is caused by localized irritation and not by a
physical object, the illusion of perceiving an object under my eyelid continues.

A thought experiment shows how tightly illusory objecthood is linked to the spatial arrangement
of perceptual qualities. Imagine that the skin irritation under the eyelid starts to spread. Once the
perceptual qualities have spread to cover half of the perceiver's face, they are not perceived as an
object that covers a large area of the face. Instead, they are now perceived as spatially arranged
perceptual qualities. Because the perception of perceptual qualities that are spatially localized
has a strong tendency to induce the perception of illusory objects, olfaction, in which perceptual
qualities are not arranged spatially, is an ideal system to investigate perceptual objecthood
without this complication.

There are two ways to think of the role of objects in perception. One approach is to establish
criteria for when an instance of perception involves objects and then investigate whether a given
instance of perception is the perception of an object or not. The alternative approach is to
postulate that all perception is the perception of objects. This makes sense when one believes that
perception is best described in terms of perceptual objects. The question, when all perception is
postulated to be perception of objects, is what the object of a given instance of perception is.

In this chapter, I investigated two criteria that allow for an empirical test whether an instance of
perception involves objects or not. The two criteria for objecthood I investigated are
susceptibility to figure-ground segregation and capacity to solve the Many Property Problem. I
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argued that olfactory perception fails to satisfy both criteria19. I have shown that those that
claimed otherwise stretched the notion of figure-ground segregation so that it includes figures
that are delineated only by temporal structure. Because every perception has a beginning and an
end, this results in the conclusion that all instances of perception are instances of object
perception. Any proposal of an empirical test that judges some instances of perception to be the
perception of objects and other instances of perception to not be the perception of objects, judges
olfactory perception to be not object-directed.

However, testing for objecthood can be dispensed off when the olfactory perception is postulated
to be perception of objects. There are many notions of objecthood that are so loose that they
include all instances of olfactory perception. Jonas Olofsson for example writes that the unified
olfactory percept is "commonly referred to as an olfactory object" (Olofsson 2014) (page 2). This
approach suggests that there is no difference between the perception of objects and other
perception, but that it is preferable, for theoretical reasons, to think about all instances of
perception as involving objects. The important question, when perception is postulated to involve
objects, is the nature of those objects. It is not easy to see what could count as a criterion for
objecthood in such a situation20.

19

That olfactory perception in humans does not satisfy these criteria for objecthood is contingent
on the structure of our olfactory system. If our body were covered in odor-sensitive cells, then
some instances of olfactory perception could have a spatial structure and we could sometimes
segregate odor figures from an odor ground. Olfaction's ability for figure-ground segregation
would under these circumstances be similar to figure ground segregation in thermoperception.
We can segregate the sun's heat radiation from background radiation. The sun is then the object
of our perception of heat. Similarly, a hot potato that we hold in our hand can easily be
discriminated from the temperature background.
20
Lycan comes to a similar conclusion, that it is hard to argue for a claim for what vision does
and does not represent Lycan, W. G. (2014). What does vision represent? Does Perception have
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I have reviewed some suggested objects of olfactory perception: the odor source, clouds of odor
molecules, and the molecular structure of the odor molecules. I then used phenomenal presence
as the criterion to decide what the object of olfactory perception is. What is phenomenally
present in olfactory perception depends on the perceiver. When a perfumer's olfactory sensory
neurons are activated by the synthetic molecule Galaxolide, the Galaxolide molecule, or its
structure, are phenomenally present for the perceiver. When the same molecule activates the
olfactory sensory neurons of an average consumer, laundry detergent, or fresh laundry is
phenomenally present. Galaxolide is added to laundry detergent to give it its characteristic smell.
In 1964, before Galaxolide was first synthetized, the object of perception that is triggered by
Galaxolide would have been "something smelly", because nobody could have associated the
perceptual quality associated with Galaxolide with a specific molecule, or a specific source of
odor molecules. In general, for all odors for which the perceiver neither knows the molecule nor
the source, what is phenomenally present is "something smelly". This is unsatisfying, because it
means that the perception of an unidentified extremely unpleasant and an unidentified extremely
pleasant odor would have the same object. It has therefore been suggested to add an additional
level of complexity by making the perceiver-dependent pleasantness of the odor a part of the
olfactory object.

The proliferation of different concepts of olfactory objects and the suggestions to make the
relation between the perceiver and the odorous molecule part of the olfactory object show that no

Content? B. Brogaard. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 311-328.. So maybe these problems are
not unique to olfaction.
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candidate for olfactory object resembles the common notion of perceptual object. This, I suggest,
is because olfaction is not an object-directed process. It is therefore not justified to postulate that
all perception is the perception of objects. The notion of objects unnecessarily complicates the
description of olfactory perception. An alternative view, which I endorse, has been proposed by
Clare Batty, who holds that what we perceive in olfaction is not objects, but existentially
quantified properties ("There is F-ness here") (Batty 2010; Batty 2011). According to Batty,
olfactory perception does not involve objects that have properties. Instead, in olfaction,
perceptual properties are "free-floating" or "object-less" (Matthen 2005; Batty 2010). Batty calls
this view, which is motivated by many of the same considerations discussed in this chapter, the
abstract view of olfactory content.
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Chapter 5: The function of perception
An important step to understanding any biological system is to identify its evolutionary function.
What is the evolutionary function of perception21? Why have so many living things evolved
elaborate systems to distinguish perceptual properties and to arrange them in spatial and
temporal patterns? In this chapter, I will argue, perhaps uncontroversially, that it is the function
of perception to guide behaviors. I will contrast this proposal with the alternative proposal that it
is the function of perception to collect accurate information about the physical world22. In many
instances of perception, this seems like a false dichotomy. Is it not possible that perception
guides behaviors by collecting accurate information about the world? In this chapter, I will show
that this is not possible. In some situations, guiding behaviors and collecting accurate
information about the world are in conflict. In these situations, behavior guidance is always
given priority over perceptual accuracy. I therefore propose that perception was shaped by
natural selection to guide behaviors adaptively. The fact that in many cases it also collects
accurate information about the physical world is due to the constraint that in some, or maybe
even most, situations, behavioral guidance requires correct information about the physical

21

There are diverse philosophical theories about what "functions" in biology are (for a collection
of essays on the topic, see Buller, D. J., Ed. (1999). Function, Selection, and Design. Albany,
SUNY Press.). Functions can be either teleological functions, or causal (or systemic) functions.
The teleological function of a biological structure or mechanism is what it was selected for
Millikan, R. (1984). Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge, MIT
Press.. The causal function of a mechanism is the role of a structure or mechanism within a
complex system Cummins, R. (1975). "Functional analysis." The Journal of Philosophy 72: 741765.. This discussion is about the teleological function of perception. The teleological function is
supposed to explain why something is there. The teleological function of something is the same
as its adaptive value or the reason why it was selected.
22
I chose “collecting accurate information” as the alternative possibility of what perception’s
non-behavioral function cold be. However, there are many similar proposals. One suggestion
would be that perception maps the physical world accurately another that it represents the
physical world accurately. My arguments that it is the function of perception to guide behaviors
works against all of these non-behavioral proposals equally.
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features of the environment. The collection of accurate information through perceptual systems
is not a direct product of evolution. Perception-dependent behaviors are the direct products of
evolution and the collection of correct information is a spandrel23.

Let me illustrate the difference between correctness of information and behavioral-guidance
using subway maps as an example. The function of subway maps is to help people navigate the
subway system. It is not the function of subway maps to provide accurate information about the
physical location of subway lines and stations. Of course, in many cases subway maps do
provide accurate geographical information. However, whenever the map designer has to make a
decision between two designs, one of which is more accurate and the other more useful, she will
decide to make the map as useful as possible for those trying to navigate the subway system.
This is because it is the function of the subway map to help riders navigate the subway system.
That is what the map is for24.

How can it be that reduced geographical accuracy of a subway map increases its usefulness as a
tool for navigating the subway system? For the answer to this question, one has to compare a
city's subway map with a geographical accurate map of the same city. Take New York City as an

23

Evolutionary biologists call byproducts of the evolution of other characteristics that
themselves are not direct products of adaptive selection "spandrels" Gould, S. J. and R. C.
Lewontin (1979). "The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A critique of the
adaptationist programme." Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B 205(1161):
581-598.,
24
Helping riders navigate the subway system is the function of the subway maps on display in
subway stations. One can imagine other subway maps with other functions. There could be a
map of the subway system used by the fire department for emergencies. In this map,
geographical accuracy is important and it is irrelevant how helpful it is for navigating the subway
system.
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example. In Figure 11A, a section of the official Metropolitan Transportation Authority subway
map of New York City is shown. In Figure 11B, the same section form an alternative,
geographically more accurate, map is shown for comparison. The designers of the official
subway map have sacrificed accuracy in the geographical information conveyed by the map to
increase the map's usefulness in many instances. Most obviously, in the official map, Manhattan
is represented as less narrow than it is. This makes it easier to discriminate and follow the many
parallel train lines connecting uptown Manhattan to downtown Manhattan. The official subway
map also smoothens the tracks of the lines, as can be seen for example in the section of the B and
D train within the red rectangle in Figures 11A and B. In the red circle at the southern tip of
Manhattan, it can be seen how the designers of the official map distorted the map to separate
stations that are very close to one another. This makes it easier to identify and distinguish these
stations.

Another geographical inaccuracy that has been purposefully introduced by the designers of the
official subway map to make it more useful is that they exaggerated the width of the Harlem
River that separates Manhattan and the Bronx (black rectangles in Figures 11A and B). How
does representing the river to be wider than it is make the map more useful? The river is a barrier
and people taking the subway should be made aware of this barrier so that they can plan to exit
the subway at a station that is on the same side of the river as their destination. How wide the
river is does not matter, what matters is that it cannot be crossed. This is a typical situation in
which geographical accuracy of a map and usefulness of a map are in conflict. Whenever a
decision between accuracy and usefulness has to be made, the designer decides to make the map
as useful as possible.
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Figure 11: Two ways of representing the subway stations and tracks in Manhattan. A
section of the official MTA subway map of New York City (A) and the corresponding
section of a geographically more accurate alternative subway map (B) are shown. There
rectangles, red squares, and black rectangles mark corresponding locations on the two
maps. ((A) modified from the official MTA subway map; (B) modified from original
work by SPUI (in the public domain under the Creative Commons License).

Just as it is the function of subway maps to help riders navigate the subway system, the function
of perception is to guide the perceiver's behavior. Subway maps often, but not always, use
accurate geographical representations to help riders navigate the subway system and perception
often collects accurate information about the physical world to guide behavior. However,
collecting accurate information about the physical world is only one of many different strategies
used by perception to fulfill its function. Collecting accurate information is the intermediate
function of some forms of perception, whereas guiding behaviors is the ultimate function of all
perception.

In this chapter, I will show that chemosensory perception, and perception in general, fails
spectacularly at collecting accurate information about the physical world. By "accurate" or
"correct" perception, I mean perception that reflects similarities in the physical world in
similarities in perception. Similar things are correctly perceived when they are perceived to be
similar. In section 5.1., I will review evidence that different individuals, especially when they
belong to different species, often perceive the same stimulus or object differently. Identical
things are usually not perceived identically by two different perceivers, which shows that at least
one of the perceivers perceives incorrectly. In section 5.2., I will then show that even within the
same perceiver similarity relations in the physical world are not accurately reflected in
perception. In all the cases that I will discuss, perceivers have evolved to perceive the physical
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world less accurately than they could. In contrast, they perceive in all those cases the world in a
way that ensures that they interact with it behaviorally in the most beneficial way for them. This
discrepancy indicates that perception evolved to fulfill behavioral needs rather than to collect
accurate information about the world. Those who resist a behavior-centered conception of the
function of perception have responded to the type of evidence I will present in sections 5.1. and
5.2. by redefining "correctness". In section 5.3., I will discuss the alternative notions of
correctness that have been proposed and show that they result in a notion of correctness
according to which perception is correct when it elicits an adaptive behavioral response. When
such a behavior-based notion of correctness of perception is endorsed, then guiding behaviors
and collecting correct information are the same thing and the conflicts between them that exist
when correctness of perception is based on a relation between what is perceived and how it is
perceived disappear.

5.1. Perceptual variability
If all living things had evolved to collect accurate information about the physical world, one
would expect all living things to collect very similar information, since they all live in the same
physical world. In this section, I will show that this is not the case. I will provide a few examples
of perceptual differences between different species, as well as examples of how the same stimuli
are perceived differently by members of the same species, depending on their behavioral goals.
Perceptual variability between species
Comparative ecology has shown that different animal species often differ dramatically in how
they perceive the physical world. Often this variability can be explained by the ecological niche
inhabited by the species in question and by the behavioral repertoire with which the species
111

interacts with the environment. Bees, for example, visit flowers, where they collect nectar. It is
therefore important for bees to be able to distinguish flowers. Since many flowers have UV
patterns, bees evolved the ability to detect UV light, so they can distinguish flowers using the
UV patterns on the flowers' petals25. Another example of animal species that have evolved the
capacity to sense stimuli that humans are blind to are those species that can perceive electrical
stimuli. Because water is a much better conductor of electricity than air, electroreception is most
often found in aquatic animals. Sharks, for example, can sense the weak electric fields generated
by the nerve and muscle activity of potential prey. Some shark species, such as the lemon shark,
use this information to coordinate their attacks. Other animal species lost some perceptual
capacities because they moved into an ecological niche in which there was no need to detect
certain aspects of the physical world. Some species of cavefish, which live in dark caves, have
lost their eyes and therefore their ability to perceive light (Jeffery 2009). Similarly, carnivorous
mammals, which have a sugar-free, meat-only diet, do not need to perceive sweet tastants.
Consequently, many species like the cat, the spotted hyena, and the fur seal, have lost their sweet
taste receptor, Tas1r2 (Jiang, Josue et al. 2012).

One could argue that in all these cases, the different species do not perceive the physical world
differently; instead, they perceive different properties of the physical world. For example bees,
with their capacity to perceive UV light, perceive the UV-reflecting property of the physical
world. The blind cavefish, in contrast, do not perceive any light-reflecting properties of the
physical world. However, in many cases, different animal species perceive the same properties of

25

The flowers provide from being visited by nectar-collecting bees because the bees carry pollen
from one flower to the other, pollinating them. The bees' capacity to detect the UV patterns of
flowers and the UV patterns of flowers therefore presumably coevolved.
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the physical world, but the properties are perceived differently. Many examples have been
discussed in section 2.1., where I discussed the diversity of perceptual spaces. However, not only
the perceptual qualities themselves can differ between different species. The spatial and temporal
arrangements of the perceptual qualities can also differ. Visual perception in fruit flies, for
example, has higher temporal, but lower spatial resolution than human vision. The properties of
the physical world that fruit flies and human perceive visually overlap largely, but how the two
species perceive the physical world visually differs dramatically.

Perceptual variability within the same species
How the physical world is perceived differs not only between different species. Even members
of the same species can have different behavioral goals and therefore different ways of
perceiving their environment. In some species, for example, the perceptual systems differ
between the sexes. The best-known examples are perceptual systems that are specialized for
finding mates or facilitating courtship. Male moths, for example, have sensory organs that are
specialized for the detection of the pheromones released by the females of the species. In other
species, perceptual systems that are not involved in guiding sexual behaviors are sexually
dimorphic. Some species of anglerfish, for example, show extreme sexual dimorphism. The male
anglerfish are tiny compared to the females and spend most of their life as parasitic appendages
attached to a much larger female. These males have very different behaviors than the females
and therefore perceive the physical world very differently from them. Before the males attach to
the female, they have large eyes that are specialized for detecting the bioluminescent lure of the
female. After they attach to the female, the eyes degenerate.
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Even within the same individual, the behaviors and therefore the demands on perception can
change. Consider for example the fruit fly, which lives as a larva before it pupates and then
emerges as an adult fly. The behaviors that need to be guided by perception for the larva are very
different from the behaviors that perception has to guide in adults. The larva hatches from the
egg on rotten fruit and spends the entire time before pupation eating. The adult fly that emerges
from the pupae has a much richer repertoire of behaviors that includes finding a mate, mating,
finding an appropriate site to lay eggs, laying eggs, and so on. Consequently, the same individual
has a much richer perception of its environment as an adult. Most notably, adults fly whereas
larvae cannot fly. The high temporal resolution of visual perception that flies need to execute
flight maneuvers is therefor only found in the adult.

In other cases, perception changes with the behavioral demands within the same individual in the
same developmental stage. Female mosquitoes, for example, have to find an animal to bite
because blood is their main source of protein. They need protein to produce eggs. After filling up
with blood, the mosquito has to find a puddle of water to lay eggs in. This abrupt change from
having to find a source of blood to having to find a place to lay eggs is mediated by a change in
the olfactory sensory neurons of the animal. These neurons become less sensitive to body odors
and more sensitive to odors given off by potential egg-laying sites (Davis 1984). Similar
changes in the activity of the most peripheral olfactory sensory neurons have also been found in
other species (see for example (Root, Ko et al. 2011; Saveer, Kromann et al. 2012)).

In humans, a good example to illustrate the dependence of perception on changes in behavioral
goals is the change in is the change in olfactory perception during pregnancy (for a review, see
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(Doty and Cameron 2009)). A large number of self-reports indicate that the perception of food
smells changes during pregnancy. The reason for this is that the most adaptive eating behavior is
different during pregnancy. A pregnant woman has to not only feed herself, but also the embryo
growing in her. An adult usually eats for energy, but during pregnancy, there is rapid tissue
growth that needs to be sustained with a different combination of nutrients. In addition to the
need to fuel the embryonic growth, pregnant women also need to be more vigilant than usual to
avoid food that, although save for adults, might endanger the embryo. The most adaptive
behaviors towards the same food items are therefore different during pregnancy as during other
times. Consequently, the smell of these food items is perceived differently during pregnancy.

Different perceivers all encounter the same physical world. How they perceive this world differs
dramatically. The largest differences are found between members of different species, but
members of the same species can also differ dramatically in how they perceive the same
stimulus. If correctness of perception is based on a relation between what is perceived and how it
is perceived, then there are instances in which animals evolve to perceive the physical world less
accurately, which is a strong indication that perceiving the world accurately is not the
evolutionary function of perception.

5.2. Similarity of percepts and similarity of stimuli
"Perception and desire have to meet certain standards of accuracy to enable creatures to
survive in the world: they have to enable us to respond similarly to things that are similar
and differently to things that are different, to avoid what is harmful, and to pursue what is
beneficial" (page 73) (Nagel 2012).
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In this quote from Thomas Nagel, two standards that have to be met by perception are
mentioned. First, perception has to enable us to respond similar to similar things. Second,
perception has to enable us to avoid what is harmful and pursue what is beneficial. These two
standards are alternative formulations of the two proposals about the function of perception that
are compared in this chapter. Retaining similarity relations is the criterion for accurate or correct
perception. Avoiding harmful things and pursuing beneficial things is the criterion for guiding
adaptive behaviors. Plainly, the two standards mentioned by Nagel are often in conflict with one
another. The deadly coral snake and the harmless milk snake are very similar in their visual
appearance. However, one is harmful and the other, for a hungry hunter, beneficial. We cannot
simultaneously respond to these two visually similar snakes similarly, while also avoiding what
is harmful and pursuing what is beneficial.

Situations in which perceiving what is physically similar as similar is in conflict with perceiving
things that are harmful as different from things that are beneficial are interesting for
understanding what the function of perception is. Examining such situations will reveal whether
perception prioritizes guiding behaviors or collecting correct information. When evolutionary
processes can shape our perceptual systems either to ensure that we avoid what is harmful and
pursue what is beneficial or to respond similar to things that are similar, what is the outcome? In
this section, I will show that the outcome is that evolution through natural selection selects the
perceptual system that ensures adaptive behaviors over the alternative perceptual system that
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ensures correctness of the collected information. The chemical senses, especially the perception
of bitter tastants, provide good case studies to illustrate this outcome26.

Bitter tastants
Smell, taste, and other modalities combine to form the experience of flavor. One of the basic
tastes that contribute to flavor is bitter taste. Extremely diverse chemicals, like hydrolyzed
proteins, alkaloids, rancid fats, and poisons (Martin 2013) (page 65), all have a bitter taste
(Figure 12). These bitter tastants are produced by a large variety of different plants. What most
of the plants in which bitter tastants are found have in common is that they are inedible,
unhealthy, or even toxic. As a consequence, whenever a bitter tastant is perceived, the
appropriate behavioral response is to spit out what is in your mouth. Bitter tastants are therefore
an excellent example of physically diverse stimuli that all require the same behavioral response.
The perceptual qualities associated with these stimuli correlate much stronger with the
appropriate behavioral response than with any physical feature of the stimuli. Hydrolyzed
proteins and rancid fats are perceived as being similar, although they are physically very diverse.
Non-rancid fat is physically more similar to rancid fat than hydrolyzed proteins. However,
because rancid fat and hydrolyzed proteins have reduced nutritional value and because

26

The perception of temperature also provides excellent examples that have been discussed in
detail by Akins Akins, K. (1996). "Of sensory systems and the "aboutness" of mental states." The
Journal of Philosophy 93(7): 337-372.. As Akin shows, the thermoreceptive system does not
have the function of measuring the temperature in the environment as accurately as possible.
Instead, its function is to help the perceiver execute behaviors that aim at avoiding damage
through cold or heat. Evidence that this is the case is that the same physical stimulus is perceived
to be of different temperature with different parts of the skin. Areas of skin that cover structures
that are more delicate "exaggerate" temperature extremes. Similarly, the endpoint of (more
dangerous) rapid temperature changes are perceived to be of different temperature than when the
same endpoint has been reached through (less dangerous) gradual temperature change.
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rancidification can produce toxic compounds, they are perceived as bitter. Because non-rancid
fat is an excellent source of energy, it is not perceived as bitter. The physical similarity between
the stimuli is not reflected by perception. This shows that, when efficiently guiding behaviors
involves misrepresenting similarity relations between stimuli, as it is the case in bitter
perception, then perception will misrepresent the physical world.

Figure 12: Six structurally diverse molecules that are perceived as bitter (Laska, Rivas
Bautista et al. 2009).

The correlation between bitter perceptual qualities and the appropriate behavioral response of
spitting out whatever is perceived is good, but it is not perfect. Sometimes, bitter foods and
drinks are incorporate into our diet, which seems to contradict the idea that bitter taste is a
signature of inedibility. Theobromine in chocolate and caffeine in coffee are two examples of
bitter alkaloids consumed by humans. However, these chemicals are not examples of non-toxic
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bitter tastants. Instead, they have been incorporated into our diet because they are toxic. At low
enough doses, these toxins, like many others, act as stimulants. To bypass the evolved response
to bitter substances, large amounts of sugar can be added to coffee or chocolate to make bitter
stimulants palatable.

Other bitter compounds are edible even at high doses. Evolution is an ongoing arms race
between those who try to eat plants, and plants that try to avoid being eaten. A good defense
against being eaten available to plants is to become toxic. Once toxic plants evolved, an equally
good defense against being eaten is to taste like a toxic plant. This strategy of imitating the
warning signal of a harmful species is known as Batesian mimicry. The similarity between
harmless milk snakes and venomous coral snakes is the result of Batesian mimicry. Bitter tasting
compounds that are edible may also be the result of Batesian mimicry. To avoid being eaten by
humans, announcing that one is inedible through bitter taste is sufficient as long as many plants
that taste bitter are actually inedible. Because our perceptual systems coevolve with the natural
environment they perceive, the correlation between the perception of bitterness and the optimal
behavioral response is not perfect. Some inedible compounds are not bitter and some bitter
compounds are edible. However, the correlation between the perceptual quality and the
appropriate behavior is much better than the correlation between the perceptual quality and the
physical properties of the stimuli.

Evolution of perceived similarity
Bitter tastants are not the only case of perception that successfully guides behavior in the absence
of a system that is concerned with collecting accurate information about similarity relations in
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the physical world. In olfaction, perceptual qualities are also more closely related to the
appropriate adaptive behavioral responses than to the physical features of the stimulus (Castro
and Seeley 2014). Consider for example molecules with a musky smell, which are found in
glandular secretions of a wide variety of animals as well as in many different plants. The
different molecules that are perceived as musky have very different chemical structures (Kraft
2004). The same is true for other smells like camphor or almond. In both cases, diverse sets of
stimuli are perceived to have similar perceptual qualities.

One can speculate how chemical sensors that are sensitive to a wide variety of different
chemicals that are physically different but require the same behavioral response, like the bitter
tastant receptors, have evolved. The first step in the perception of tastants is that they are bound
by a receptor molecule on the surface of a sensory neuron. There are different types of receptor
molecules that bind to different types of taste molecules. Whether a given type of receptor
molecule binds to a taste molecule or not depends on the receptor's molecular structure. The
molecular structure of the receptor is determined by its amino acid sequence, which in turn is
determined by the DNA sequence of its gene. Mutations in the receptor gene can alter the
structure of the receptor and therefore change which chemicals can activate the receptor. Imagine
that the first receptor in evolutionary history that bound a bitter tastant did bind to solanine, a
bitter tasting toxin found in many plants. To be adaptive, activation of the receptor must have
triggered the spitting out of the solanine-containing food that activated the receptor. Over time,
random mutations have produced slight variants of this receptor. If any of these variants gained
sensitivity to a second chemical that is found in a different inedible plant species, then the
mutation was advantageous, because it increased the ratio of edible over inedible plants
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consumed. If the mutation made the receptor sensitive to a chemical found in edible plant
species, it resulted in the edible plant being not consumed. This mutation therefore decreased the
ratio of edible over inedible plants consumed and therefore was non-advantageous. In this
manner, a receptor that detects the difference between edible and inedible plants can evolve.
"Edible" and "inedible" are not features of the physical world, but they are properties that are
relative to the perceiver27. As the hypothetical bitter receptor evolved into a reliable indicator of
whether the perceiving organism should swallow or spit out the perceived food, it evolved away
from accurately representing similarity of chemicals. The stimuli the receptor responded to
became more and more physically diverse.

The mechanistic explanation of the evolution of a receptor sensitive to diverse molecules that all
require the same behavioral response illustrates how a chemosensory system that guides behavior
without collecting accurate information about similarity relations in the physical world can
evolve from a system that collects accurate information. The mechanistic explanation also
illuminates why cases like this are more likely to be found in the chemical senses than in vision.
The reason for this difference is that the visual system perceives identity and location of objects,
whereas the olfactory system only perceives identity of odorants. Just like many taste molecules
require the same behavioral responses, there are instances of visual perception in which different
visual objects require the same behavioral response. Whether somebody throws a rock, a book,
or a shoe at you, the right response in all three cases is to move out of the object's trajectory. The
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Whether a compound is edible and how nutritious it is for a given organism depends on the
organism's digestive system and physiology. Cows have a specialized stomach for digesting
grass. Termites can digest wood with the help of symbiotic bacteria in their guts. Neither grass
not wood are good food sources for humans who lack the adaptations to make use of these food
types.
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same behavioral response is required regardless of what is perceived, just like in the case of
bitter tastants. However, the required behavioral response to having any object thrown at you
depends strongly on where the object is perceived. If it is perceived at eyelevel in the front,
ducking is the best response. If it is perceived lower, stepping to the side will be more
appropriate. If it is perceived to the left, the left arm should be raised to cover the face. If it is
perceived to the right, the right arm should be raised to cover the face. When it comes to the
perception of location, each location requires a different behavioral response because behaviors
that are responses to the location of a perceived object are directed behaviors.

Consider a fictional situation to illustrate how the need for accurate presentation of the location
of objects in vision results in a perceptual system in which similarity in the physical world is
often reflected in similarity in perception. Assume that the presence of a lion, a rattlesnake, and
an alligator all require the same behavioral response: freezing. Being able to discriminate these
three animals is not advantageous because the optimal behavior in response to detecting them is
the same. Now, if the three animals are perceived olfactorily, the olfactory system may evolve
into a system that does not discriminate between lions, snakes, and alligators. An odorant
receptor that mediates the freezing behavior could evolve to bind the different odors given off by
the three different animals. We would lose the ability to discriminate these animals olfactorily
because discriminating them has no adaptive value.

Now consider an alternative scenario. Assume that the appropriate behavioral response to lions,
rattlesnakes, and alligators is running away from them. Further, assume that the animals are
perceived visually. In this situation, we would not only need to know that we are encountering a
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lion, rattlesnake, or lion, but also where the animal is. Running away from it requires locating it
in space. In this situation, the visual system would not lose the ability to discriminate the three
animals, although discriminating them has no adaptive advantage. The reason for this is that how
the animal's identity is perceived is severely constraint by the need to perceive its location. A
system that has to perceive the location of objects will automatically also perceives the shape and
the movements of objects, and rattlesnakes are shaped very differently from lions. They therefore
also move differently through the visual space. This is why in vision and other modalities in
which spatial perception plays an important role, guiding behaviors adaptively and collecting
accurate information about the physical world often coincide.

The perception of space (and the perception of time, which I have not discussed here) is a
notable exception to the rule that the similarity of percepts does not reflect similarity in the
perceived stimuli but similarity in the adaptive behavior that the stimuli require. The reason for
this exception is that successfully executing behaviors directed towards objects in the physical
space requires accurate information about the position of the objects in physical space.

5.3. Alternative notions of correctness
Members of different animal species perceive the same physical stimuli vastly different. Even
individuals of the same species evolved to perceive the same stimulus differently depending on
their behavioral goals. Furthermore, when perceiving similar things similarly is in conflict with
perceiving harmful things to be different from beneficial things, perceptual similarity reflects
behavioral relevance rather than physical similarity of the stimuli. This type of evidence shows
that perception is not about perceiving the physical world correctly, but about guiding beneficial
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behaviors. However, this conclusion only holds when correct perception is defined as perception
in which the physical similarities in the world are reflected in similarities between percepts. A
possible way to continue to resist a behavior-centered function of perception in light of this
evidence is therefore to adjust the notion of perceptual correctness. Two alternative notions of
correctness have been suggested in this context28.

Perceptual system-dependent correctness
One alternative way of thinking about correctness in the context of perception is to define correct
perception as perception that is triggered by its ordinary causes. When this definition is applied,
then the gustatorily perception of bitterness is correct if it is triggered by the molecules that
ordinarily activate the bitter receptor. This is akin to the proposal that perception represents
open-ended disjunctive properties (Lycan 2014). The information that is collected by the
perception of bitterness therefore is "What I currently have in my mouth is either sucrose
octaacetate or denatonium benzoate or quinine or naringin or salicin or caffeine........". This
information is correct when I have one of these chemicals in my mouth. An alternative and
shorter way of saying the same thing is that the information about the physical world that I
collect when perceiving bitterness is "What I currently have in my mouth is capable of activating
the bitter receptor". This information is correct when something I have in my mouth is capable of
activating the bitter receptor. Correctness of perception, under this notion, is dependent on the
perceptual system. As the human bitter receptor evolves, the molecules it binds change.
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Both of these possible responses are discussed by Akins as potential defenses of what she calls
"the traditional view". She calls the first possibility I discuss in this section "the a priori defense"
and the second the "appeal to biologically salient properties" Akins, K. (1996). "Of sensory
systems and the "aboutness" of mental states." The Journal of Philosophy 93(7): 337-372..
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However, under the notion of perceptual system-dependent correctness, this change does not
result in a change of how correct the receptor perceives the physical world. The old version of
the receptor and the new version of the receptor perceive the world differently, but both perceive
it correctly. The visual perception of an animal with a single photosensitive cell is as correct as
the visual perception of the animal with the most sophisticated apparatus. Indeed, all perception
by properly functioning perceptual system is by definition correct perception when correctness is
defined in terms of the perceptual system (Akins 1996).

Perceiver-dependent correctness
A notion of perceptual correctness that, like perceptual system-dependent correctness, does not
rely on the relation between the content of the perception and the stimulus is perceiver-dependent
correctness. The difference between perceptual system-dependent correctness and perceiverdependent correctness is that perceptual system-dependent correctness depends on the interaction
between the stimulus and the perceptual system, whereas perceiver-dependent correctness
depends on the interaction between the stimulus and the perceiver. The perception of bitterness is
perceptual system-dependent correct when the perceived stimulus is capable of activating the
bitter receptor. It is perceiver-dependent correct when the stimulus is inedible or toxic for the
perceiver. In the first case the correctness depends on facts about the perceiver's perceptual
system, in the second case, it depends on facts about the perceiver. This difference can be
illustrated using the example of artificial sweeteners. The perceptual quality of sweetness is
usually associated with tastants that have high caloric value. The appropriate behavioral response
to it is to swallow. Sugars like glucose are typical examples of chemicals that taste sweet and
have high caloric value. Artificial sweeteners are molecules that taste sweet but have low caloric
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value. Under the notion of perceptual system-dependent correctness, perceiving artificial
sweeteners as sweet is correct perception because the perception is triggered by molecules that
ordinarily activate the sweet receptor. Under the notion of perceiver-dependent correctness, the
perception of artificial sweeteners as sweet is not correct because the behavior triggered by sweet
perception (swallowing) is not adaptive for molecules with no caloric content. The reason why
the sweet receptor misinforms us about the caloric content of artificial sweeteners is that these
non-natural molecules were not present in the environment in which the perceptual system
evolved.

Matthen has suggested perceiver-dependence of perceptual correctness in the form of speciesspecific standards of correctness (Matthen 2005). According to Matthen, every species has
different perceptual systems and different ecological needs and therefore needs to perceive the
physical world in a way specific to that species. As was reviewed above, perceptual systems and
perception do not only differ between different species, but also between the sexes and life stages
of the same species. Species-specific standards of correctness are therefore not enough. What is
required are species-, sex-, life stage-, situation-specific standards of correctness.

Perceptual system-dependence and perceiver-dependence of perceptual correctness both propose
that correctness of perception is independent of the relation between the stimulus and percepts.
Instead of a mechanism that collects information about the stimulus, perception becomes a
mechanism to collect correct information about the relation between the perceiver and the
physical world. The molecule binds to my bitter receptor. The bitter plant is inedible for me.
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5.4. Conclusion: Perception evolved for guiding behaviors
I have set this chapter up as a comparison between two proposals about the evolutionary function
of perception: collecting correct information about the environment and guiding behaviors.
Investigating chemosensory perception reveals that perception did not evolve to correctly
represent, map, or collect information about the physical world. Instead, it evolved to guide
adaptive behaviors of the perceiver. Adaptive behaviors are driving evolution with no regard to
the correctness of the underlying perceptions, beliefs, or calculations. For example, there is no
scientific evidence that an individual continues to exist in some form after death. Nevertheless,
the belief in the afterlife, although almost certainly false, is widespread among human societies.
It may have evolved not because it is a true belief, but because it is a false belief that induces
behaviors that lead to increased fitness.

The impression that perception guides behavior by collecting accurate information about the
physical world is most seductive when considering the perception of space in vision.
Successfully hunting a boar requires information about the position of the boar in space
accurately so that boar-directed movements can be executed. Other aspects of visual perception
are constrained by this need for accurate spatial representation and much of visual perception
therefore accurately reflects similarities in position and shape. As I have shown in this chapter,
collecting accurate information about the physical world is not a function of chemosensory
perception or other forms of non-spatial perception. The only function of perceiving smells and
tastes is guiding adaptive behaviors. Collecting accurate information by itself has no adaptive
value, and when perception guides adaptive behaviors by other means, collecting correct
information provides no additional benefit for the organism.
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The conclusion that collecting correct information is not the function of perception depends on a
notion of correctness that defines correct perception as a perception in which similarities
between stimuli are reflected in similarities between perceptions. Some scholars who resist the
behavior-based function of perception have defended the collection of correct information as a
function by redefining perceptual correctness. According to these alternative notions of
perceptual correctness, whether a given instance of perception is an instance of correct
perception does not depend on facts about the stimuli, but on facts about the perceiver. For
example, different species need to respond differently to different stimuli. Whether a given
chemical is toxic for the perceiver depends on the perceiver's physiology. A substance that is
toxic for a human is not necessarily toxic for a trout and the other way around. The similarity in
perception does not reflect the similarity of the chemicals, which would be the same for all
perceivers, but the similarity in toxicity, which depends on the perceiver and differs between
different species. Ultimately, these perceiver-dependent accounts of correctness define
correctness as being dependent on behavior: the correct perception of something toxic is the
perception that results in the evolved adaptive response to toxins.
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Part III: Cognitive processes
So far, I have discussed the perception of perceptual qualities. I have also explored how these
qualities can be combined in time and space, whether these combinations amount to something
like perceptual objects, and what the function of perceiving and combining perceptual qualities
is. Throughout, I have pretended that perception is separate from other cognitive processes and
that the different perceptual modalities are not connected. Now, in the last part of my
dissertation, I will acknowledge that the distinction between perceptual and non-perceptual
processes is largely arbitrary. A satisfying account of olfactory perception has therefore to
include an analysis of the relation between olfaction and non-perceptual cognitive processes, as
well as of the relation between olfaction and other perceptual modalities.

In chapter 6, I will discuss the privileged connection between olfaction and emotional processes
and the weakness of the connection between olfaction and language. I will contrast olfaction
with vision to show that how perception is connected to specific non-perceptual processes
depends on the modality under investigation. The connections between olfaction and emotional
processes reflect the evolutionary history of olfactory perception. Because each modality has a
different evolutionary history, it is not possible to generalize from the connectivity observed in
one modality to the connectivity of all other modalities. In chapter 7, I will address the structure
of the mind more generally. I will argue against using the concept of modularity to describe the
structure of the mind and instead propose that the mind, much like the brain, is best thought of as
a collection of overlapping functionally coupled networks. In the second part of chapter 7, I will
investigate some of the functionally coupled networks involving olfaction with a special focus on
cognitive penetration and crossmodal perception.
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Chapter 6: Connections between olfaction and cognitive processes
Olfaction is often considered the most animalistic and primitive of our senses. Odor stimuli
induce desires, emotions, and physiological responses that make us respond to certain smells in
automatic ways. Reason is powerless to intervene. In contrast, vision is said to provide us with
information that is used in rational analysis that leads to us deliberately choosing the most
appropriate behavior. In this chapter, I will show that these caricatures of smell perception and
visual perception have a basis in reality. The results of behavioral experiments, as well as
neuroanatomical and functional evidence, demonstrate that olfaction has a privileged connection
to emotional processing. On the other hand, plenty of evidence shows that the connection
between olfaction and language centers is comparably weak. This heterogeneity of the relations
between a given perceptual modality and different cognitive processes has to be acknowledged
by any account of perception. There are no paradigm examples for the relation between
perception and cognition. Instead, the relation between a given perceptual system and a given
cognitive process depends on their shared evolutionary history.

In this chapter, I will discuss the connectivity between olfaction and two non-perceptual
processes: language and emotional processing. This discussion will confirm that the connections
between perception and non-perceptual processes differ substantially between olfaction and
vision. This heterogeneity of the connections between perceptual systems and cognitive
processes reflects the different evolutionary history of these systems and defies a generalizable
account of the relation between perception and cognition.

6.1. Olfaction and language
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The sight in my opinion is the source of the greatest benefit to us, for had we never seen
the stars, and the sun, and the heaven, none of the words which we have spoken about the
universe would ever have been uttered. But now the sight of day and night, and the
months and the revolutions of the years, have created number, and have given us a
conception of time, and the power of enquiring about the nature of the universe; and from
this source we have derived philosophy, than which no greater good ever was or will be
given by the gods to mortal man. This is the greatest boon of sight.
Plato's Timaeus

Plato tells us that visual perception is a requirement for language; without sight, "none of the
words we have spoken about the universe would ever have been uttered"29. Language, in turn, is
the tool of philosophy. Without vision, there would therefore be no philosophy, which is
probably why philosophers concerned with perception have such a strong preference for vision
over all other modalities. That Plato's intuition has some truth to it has been confirmed by
psychology and neuroscience. It is easier for us to name and talk about colors then to name and
talk about smells. There are two aspects of this difficulty to talk about smells. One problem is the
lack of a smell vocabulary. Many languages have words for colors, like "blue" and "green"
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A similar proposal has been made by Michael Tomasello in his Origins of Human
Communication Tomasello, M. (2008). Origins of Human Communication. Cambridge, MIT
Press.. Tomasello argues that human communication evolved from joint attention and shared
intentionality. Joint attention is the phenomenon of an individual attending to an object after
observing that another individual attends to the object. When we come across a group of people
looking out the window, we are likely to join them to find out what interesting thing is going on
outside. Joining others attention seems natural and does not require any conscious reasoning.
However, being able to do that requires understanding what others perceive when their eyes are
directed in a certain direction. This ability is sometimes referred to as "mindreading", because it
requires inferring the content of another individual's mind in the absence of communication. This
cognitively complex process is so sophisticated that it is rarely found in non-human animals.
Joint attention in humans is only possible for visual attention. We can see what someone is
looking at, but not hear what they are listening to, feel what they are touching, or smell what they
are sniffing. Only through vision can one individual observe another individual in the process of
perceiving Tomasello, M., M. Carpenter, et al. (2005). "Understanding and sharing intentions:
The origins of cultural cognition." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28(5): 675-+..
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(Berlin and Kay 1969). At least the English language does not have equivalent words for smells.
Words used to describe smells are either judgments about the smell and its effects ("horrid",
"soothing"), or, most frequently, the name of the source ("flowery", "leathery"). Why do we lack
a smell vocabulary? It is possible that the lack of a smell vocabulary is caused by cognitive
architecture. However, it is also possible that language coding is, for some reason, better suited
to express some sensations rather than others. A third alternative explanation is that the cultural
forces that shaped language happened to shape English in a way that reflects the relatively higher
importance of colors compared to smells for the culture in which it evolved (for a review of these
three possible explanations and of modality-dependent ineffability in general, see (Levinson and
Majid 2014)). Because there are alternative explanations, the difference between our smell
vocabulary and our color vocabulary do not show that there is an impoverished connection
between olfaction and language centers. However, our limited abilities to talk about smells are
not only due to the lack of an appropriate vocabulary. A second problem with talking about
smells is that, even when there is an appropriate word to label a smell, we often fail to access it.
This inability to access language to name smells or talk about them provides the evidence for a
poor connection between olfactory processing and the language center that I will discuss in this
section.

Naming smells
It is difficult for us to name a smell. To some degree, this is because, during development, we
form much fewer associations between smells and verbal labels than between sights and verbal
labels. Adults spend considerable time with preverbal children looking at picture books and
pointing at drawn objects while saying, "this is a fire truck" or "this is a cow". Much less time is
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spent holding odors under children's' noses while uttering the odors' names. As a consequence,
most of us have many more associations between visual appearances and names than between
smells and names. However, for some odors, like coffee, sweat, gasoline, or garlic, there have
been (for people with life histories similar to mine) many chances to learn the name of the odor.
Interestingly, even for those very common and familiar odors, naming the odor is astoundingly
difficult. In one experiment, the majority of participants were unable to name the smells of beer,
urine, roses, or motor oil (Desor and Beauchamp 1974).

The inability to name an odor can have different reasons. The process of naming odors, just like
any naming process, consists of three steps. First, the odor has to be identified. After the odor has
been identified, the verbal label that is associated with the odor has to be activated. Finally, the
response has to be generated (Johnson, Paivio et al. 1996). The identification step can be further
subdivided. To identify an odor, it has to be detected, discriminated from other odors, and
recognized. Odor recognition consists in matching the perceived smell to a previously perceived
smell. Recognition does not imply the ability to name. One can recognize an actress in a movie
from having seen her previously in another movie without being able to name her (Chobor 1992)
(page 356). The poor performance of subjects in odor naming experiments could be due to
difficulties at any of the steps involved in the naming process. The most likely explanation for
the difficulties with odor naming is that accessing linguistic semantic information about odors is
difficult (for the evidence that this is the case, see (Stevenson 2009)). This would mean that the
subjects do recognize the odor, but are unable to name it. To test whether subjects recognized the
odor but cannot name it, one would have to add a test for odor recognition that does not depend
on verbal report to the experiment. One could, for example, ask subjects who could not name the
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odors of motor oil, urine, or beer, which one of the three they would rather drink. My prediction
is that subjects would decide to drink beer more frequently than urine or motor oil. Similarly, I
predict that they would be unlikely to pour the beer in their car's engine. If these predictions are
true, then the deficits in odor naming are due to the difficulty of accessing linguistic labels for
the odors. Either way, correct odor identification cannot be revealed by naming. Naming requires
that, in addition to identification of the smell, the associated verbal label is activated and the
response generated. From a failure to name an odor, it cannot be concluded that the odor was not
identified correctly.

That the poor performance in odor naming is not due to problems in identifying the odor, but due
to problems in making the connection between the perception and the appropriate verbal label is
illustrated by the prevalence of the tip-of-the-nose phenomenon (Sulmont-Rosse 2005). The tipof-the-nose phenomenon occurs when people are incapable of retrieving from memory the word
that is associated with an odor, although they correctly identified the odor. The tip-of-the-nose
phenomenon is named in analogy to the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon, which is the failure to
retrieve a word from memory in combination with the feeling that retrieval is immanent
(Schwartz and Metcalfe 2011). Tip-of-the-nose phenomena are not caused by problems with
odor identification, but by our inability to name odors. This is demonstrated by experiments in
which subjects fail to name an odor correctly, but after they are provided with a list of odor
names that includes the name of the odor that they have to name, or other semantic information
about the odor, they can name the odor (Sulmont-Rosse 2005) (Gilbert 2008) (page 127).
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Talking about smells
It is very difficult to name an odor, even for a subject who knows the odor name and does
recognize the odor. Another striking difference between olfaction and vision with respect to
language is how difficult it is to say anything about an odor that we recognize, but cannot name.
In vision, we commonly talk about things we cannot name. We can talk about someone's visual
appearance and behavior without knowing his or her name. In fact, knowledge of the person's
name would not make a difference in what we are able to say about them. In vision, when an
object cannot be named, it is still possible to retrieve a large amount of information about the
object from memory (Lambon Ralph, Sage et al. 2000). We can describe the appearance of an
actor whose name is on the tip of our tongue. We can list the movies he was in and describe his
appearance in the hope that somebody else will help us out and provide the name of the actor that
we currently cannot access. In olfaction, this is not the case. Very little can be said about an odor
unless we are able to name it (Jönsson, Tchekhova et al. 2005). Stevenson writes: "What this
suggests is that access to semantic information in vision is partially (if not fully) independent of
the ability to name an object, while for olfaction a name appears necessary to access the same
store of semantic information." (Stevenson 2009) (page 1008). It can be argued whether
Stevenson is right and the problem is access to semantic information or more specifically access
to linguistic semantic information. In an experiment that compared perfume experts with
novices, it has been shown that the ability to perform actions that depend on semantic
information like grouping of perfumes is to some degree independent of the ability to apply
linguistic descriptors to those same perfumes (Veramendi, Herencia et al. 2013). This, like the
speculation above that even subjects who are not able to name the odors of beer and motor oil are
unlikely to drink motor oil instead of beer, suggests that it is not all semantic information, but
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specifically linguistic semantic information that is difficult to access in olfaction. Regardless of
whether accessing any type of semantic information, or only accessing linguistic semantic
information is problematic, the difficulty to access information about recognized odors that
cannot be named further illuminates the fragility of the connection between olfactory perception
and language processes.

It can be speculated that we did not evolve a stronger connection between olfaction and language
because language is not necessary for olfaction to perform its function. Olfactory information is
not used for abstract problem solving. Instead, olfactory-guided behavior is mainly concerned
with executing simple behaviors when an odor is encountered (Herz 2001; Herz 2005). In
addition to this speculative evolutionary explanation, several neuroanatomic explanations for the
poor connection between olfaction and language have been suggested. The lack of a thalamic
relay in olfaction (Herz 2005), the fact that odor information is predominantly processed in the
right hemisphere of the brain (for a review, see (Royet and Plailly 2004)) whereas language is
predominantly expressed in the left hemisphere (Binder, Frost et al. 1997), and potential
competition for computational resources (Lorig 1999) have all been suggested as contributors to
our diminished capacity to name and talk about odors.

Whatever the reason for our inability to semantically process odor information is, it dramatically
influences verbal reports about multimodal perceptions. Visual information always dominates
when a verbal report is produced based on sensory information from different modalities. When
visual and olfactory information are in conflict, the verbal report unfailingly reflects visual
perception. This has been demonstrated in an experiment that set up a direct competition
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between conflicting visual and olfactory perceptions. Students of the Faculty of Oenology of the
University of Bordeaux were asked to describe the taste of different wines. They tasted, in
different sessions, a red wine (a cabernet-sauvignon/merlot) and a white wine
(sémillon/sauvignon), as well as the same white wine, but with odorless red color added to it.
The students described the taste of the white wine using words that are usually used to describe
white wines. The red wine was described using words that are commonly found in descriptions
of red wines. The interesting outcome of the experiments were the words that the students used
to described the taste of the wine that tasted like white wine but looked like red wine. The
description of this wine was more similar to the description of the red wine than to the
description of the white wine (Morrot, Brochet et al. 2001). In other words, when visual
information is available, the experts' description of wine taste is dominated by color rather than
smell.

As part of the same study, the authors also analyzed the words used in thousands of wine tasting
comments that they obtained from wine critics. They divided the tasting comments into those
about white wines and those about red wines. What they found is that "the odors of a wine are,
for the most part, represented by objects that have the color of the wine" (Morrot, Brochet et al.
2001). Descriptors like "honey", "lemon", "grapefruit", "straw", and "banana" are often used to
describe white wines, but never to describe red wines. On the other hand, the most common
descriptors that are more frequently applied to red wines than to white wines are "cherry",
"blackcurrant", "raspberry", "violet", and "redcurrant". Morrot and colleagues did not test the
winemaking students whether they are capable of telling which of the three wines taste the same.
It is likely that the students would have been able to distinguish between the red wine and the
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white wine with the red food color despite the color of the two wines being indiscriminable.
Despite the inability to base verbal reports on olfactory perception, humans have an excellent
sense of smell and perform very well in olfactory discrimination tasks (Bushdid, Magnasco et al.
2014). That experts can be tricked into verbally describing the taste of a white wine that is
colored red as if they would describe a red wine is not a consequence of an underdeveloped
sense of smell. It is a consequence of the dominance of vision over olfaction when it comes to
producing a verbal report. Vision has a privileged connection to language processes and
therefore has a stronger impact on verbal reports than conflicting information from other
modalities such as olfaction30.

6.2. Olfaction and evaluation
While olfaction has little impact on verbal reports about perception, it is often thought to play an
important role in inducing and regulating certain emotions. Nabokov wrote, "Smells are surer
than sights or sounds to make your heartstring crack." The same thought has been less poetically
expressed by the psychologist Rachel Herz: "... the sense of smell and emotional experience are
fundamentally interconnected, bidirectionally communicative and functionally the same." (Herz
2007) (page 15). That smell and emotions are "functionally the same" means that there are
striking similarities between how both odors and emotions motivate behaviors. It has been said
that "More than any other sensory modality, olfaction is like emotion in attributing positive

30

Dominance of vision over information from other modalities during multi-modal perception is
often observed. A famous example is the ventriloquism effect. Although the voice attributed to
the ventriloquist's dummy comes from the speaker's mouth, it is perceived as coming from the
dummy's mouth because visually, the dummy's mouth is perceived as moving whereas the
speaker's mouth is not. What is special about the cases discussed here is that vision does not
appear to change the olfactory perception as much as it specifically changes the verbal report.
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(appetitive) or negative (aversive) valence to the environment." (Soudry, Lemogne et al. 2011)
(page 21). Humans use olfactory information mainly to evaluate food, locations, and other
humans (Stevenson 2009). These evaluations result in changes in affective states and they are
associated with highly adaptive behaviors.

Paradigmatic examples of the olfaction-emotion-connection (which has been reviewed in detail
before: (Ehrlichman and Bastone 1992; Köster 2002; Herz 2007; Stevenson 2009)) are the
influence of odors on emotions involved in romantic love and sexual arousal (Herz 2007;
Stevenson 2009), and the close connection between olfaction and disgust (McBurney, Levine et
al. 1977; Stevenson 2009; Stevenson, Oaten et al. 2010). Disgust, love, and sexual desire are
examples of evaluative emotions, and the parallels between emotions and olfaction are only
found for simple evaluative emotions. Regulating more complex emotions that are based on
understanding complex social relations and other people's intentions require a semantic analysis
that cannot be performed based on olfactory information. These more complex emotions are
therefore mainly regulated by visual and auditory input that can convey social relations and
intentions. Listening to a dark and tormented poem is more efficient at inducing sadness than any
olfactory stimulus. Jealousy or gratitude are usually induced and regulated by visually observing
people act in certain ways.

The simple evaluative emotions that are closely connected to olfaction are also usually
associated with physiological responses. Being disgusted increases the likelihood of shuddering,
retching, and vomiting. Being sexually aroused increases heart rate and blood flow to the
genitals. Emotions also are closely related to moods, which can be considered longer lasting
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states that increase the likelihood of specific emotions. Squeamish people are more easily and
frequently disgusted and people with a high libido are more frequently and easily sexually
aroused. It is an important and unresolved question what the relations between moods, emotions,
and physiological responses are. The most notable dispute is whether, as proposed by William
James, emotions are the perception of physiological responses. For the purpose at hand, it will
not be necessary to answer these questions. Instead, I will limit myself to providing evidence for
an exceptionally close connection between olfactory processing on the one side and evaluative
emotions, moods, and physiological responses on the other side.

Olfaction as inducer and regulator of evaluative emotions
Odor perception is largely the perception of odor valence. Plato suggested that "pleasant" and
"painful" are the only odor categories (Plato). More recently, multidimensional scaling
techniques uncovered that valence is the most important perceptual dimension in olfaction
(Haddad, Khan et al. 2008). For colors and tones, valence is not an important perceptual
dimension. When we are asked to arrange several odors in a one-dimensional space, we will
likely order them at least in part according to their pleasantness. Colors, on the other hand, are
more likely to be ordered from blue to red, and tones from low to high. This does not mean that
all colors or all tones are equally pleasant. Very high tones are usually considered unpleasant and
people tend not to like yellow-greenish colors. However, the difference in valence between the
smell of rotting corpses and vanilla smell is larger than the difference in valence between yellowgreen and your favorite color. Most people would rather live in an apartment in which the walls
are painted in the least pleasant color than in an apartment that is filled with the least pleasant
smell.
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A well-known effect of the strong affective quality of smells is olfaction's capacity to elicit vivid
memories. Odor-induced memories are often very emotive and produce a strong feeling of
"being there" (Stevenson 2009). This capacity of odors to generate detailed vivid memories is
called "Proust effect" after the author Marcel Proust (Chu and Downes 2000). Proust described
in In Search of Lost Time, involuntary vivid childhood memories that were induced by the smell
of madeleines. Memories like those described by Proust are so remarkably vivid because the
close connection between olfaction and emotion can give even mundane odors strong affective
relevance. Affectively relevant memories, like those of weddings and car crashes, are always
more vivid than other memories. In odor-triggered vivid memory, everyday situations can gain
the same vividness by hi-jacking the affective power of odors.

Further evidence for the close connection between olfaction and evaluative emotions is that
emotional and physiological responses are more difficult to voluntarily modulate when they are
odor-induced than when induced by other means. Olfaction induces evaluative responses in an
unmediated, direct, and automatic fashion. The smell of a preferred food is a potent inducer of
salivation and subsequent consumption of the food. The smell of rotten corpses is a potent
inducer of vomiting and subsequent behavioral odor avoidance. In comparison, pictures of food
and pictures of rotten corpses are far less potent in inducing salivation or vomiting. Furthermore,
the emotional and physiological responses induced by visual stimuli are easily modified by
background information. The sight of a rotting corpse will not induce a strong affective response
when the perceiver knows that it is an actor in make-up or a digital special effect in a movie. For
smells, such background information is powerless to attenuate the affective response. The smell
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of decaying bodies can be recreated in the laboratory from synthetic molecules that have names
like "putrescine" and "cadaverine". Exposing people to the synthetic corpse smell is likely to
induce vomiting even when the subjects of the experiment have been told prior to the experiment
that the smell they are about to perceive is a mixture of molecules that were synthesized in a
factory, rather than the odor coming off rotten corpses. Overcoming visually-induce emotions is
much easier than overcoming odor-induced emotions. This difference shows that the connection
between visual perception and emotional processes is much more flexible and fragile than the
connection between emotion and olfaction.

All of the observations and experiments discussed above suggest that there is a privileged
connection between olfaction and evaluative emotions. Skeptics will ask for an experiment in
which the modalities are directly compared. However, comparisons between modalities are
difficult because the results of the comparisons depends on the stimuli that were chosen for
comparison (Ehrlichman and Bastone 1992). In one experiment, it was shown that odor stimuli
elicited stronger affective responses than the corresponding visual stimuli. Subjects were asked
to smell an odor, for example the odor of freshly brewed coffee, or view a corresponding scene,
for example somebody pouring coffee from a pot into a cup. Then they were asked to write down
"whatever immediately came to mind". Subjects wrote shorter reports in response to the
olfactory stimulus that in response to the visual stimulus, indicating that verbal reports are
dominated by visual input. However, the reports in response to the olfactory stimulus contained
more affective words than the reports in response to the visual display (Hinton and Henley
1993).
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Shared neuroanatomy of olfactory and emotional processes
Mechanistically, the close connection between olfaction and evaluative emotions can be
explained in terms of neuroanatomy. There is large overlap between the brain regions that
process emotions and smells (for a review, see (Soudry, Lemogne et al. 2011)). Much of the
processing of emotions and olfactory information occurs in an evolutionary ancient brain
structure called the limbic system31. Many of the brain structures in the limbic system play
important roles both in the processing of olfactory information, and in the processing of
emotions. Consider for example the amygdala, an almond-shaped group of nuclei that is part of
the limbic system. The amygdala is involved in the regulation of emotion (Aggleton and Young
2000; Salzman and Fusi 2010). Especially well studied is the role of the amygdala in regulating
fear and aggression. In addition to this role, the amygdala also processes olfactory information.
The amygdala receives strong direct input from the primary olfactory cortex, but very little direct
input from the visual system (Zald and Pardo 1997; Gutiérrez-Castellanos, Martínez-Marcos et
al. 2010; Pessoa and Adolphs 2010). In rats, around 40% of the neurons in the amygdala are
responsive to odors (Cain and Bindra 1972). Even more intriguingly, the connection between the
primary olfactory cortex and the amygdala is bidirectional (Zald and Pardo 1997).

A second brain structure that is involved in both olfactory processing and the processing of
emotions is the olfactory bulb. The olfactory bulb receives direct input from the olfactory
sensory neurons. It is where the first steps of olfactory information processing happen. The

31

This part of the brain is also known as "reptilian brain", because we share it with reptiles, or
"rhinencephalon" (literally, "nose brain"), because it processes smells. It is not a functionally
unified system but rather a set of neighboring brain structures including the primary olfactory
cortex, the limbic lobe, the hippocampus, and the amygdala.
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olfactory bulb also plays a role in emotional regulation, which is surprising for such a peripheral
structure that is only one synapse removed from sensory neurons. The olfactory bulb is so
important for the processing of emotion, that rodents in which the olfactory bulb has been
removed surgically are an animal model for depression. The behavioral, endocrinological, and
molecular changes seen in these animals are similar to those observed in patients with
depression. Furthermore, these changes can be reversed by the same interventions that are used
to treat patients suffering from depression, including antidepressants and electroconvulsive
shock. The depression-like symptoms in mice without an olfactory bulb are not merely a
response to the lack of olfactory input. Mice with an intact olfactory bulb in which olfactory
input has been interrupted through other methods do not show depression-like symptoms. These
results suggest that the olfactory bulb, which is the first and most important center of olfactory
processing, also plays an important role in regulating emotions (for a review, see: (Song and
Leonard 2005)).

The part of the neocortex that processes olfactory information is the orbitofrontal cortex, which
is located above the orbits in which the eyes are situated. The orbitofrontal cortex is only found
in mammals (Gottfried 2007) and it is, unlike the visual cortex, not well connected to the frontal
areas that are involved in semantic analysis (Price 2007). The role of the orbitofrontal cortex in
olfactory processing is a matter of ongoing research. A lesion study of a single patient showed
that brain injury that was largely limited to the right orbitofrontal cortex did completely abolish
conscious processing of olfactory information. The patient's ability to modulate his sniffing
behavior in response to olfactory stimuli was unaffected and he showed normal skin conductance
responses to odors (Li, Lopez et al. 2010). Based on this study, which is broadly consistent with
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previous studies of patients with orbitofrontal damage or lesions (see references in (Li, Lopez et
al. 2010)), it has been proposed that the orbitofrontal cortex is the neural correlate of olfactory
consciousness. Others have suggested that the main role of the orbitofrontal cortex is to process
the hedonic value of smells (Rolls, Kringelbach et al. 2003). In addition to its role in olfactory
perception, the orbitofrontal cortex also plays a key role in regulating affect, emotion, and
motivation (Zald and Rauch 2008; Gottfried and Zelano 2011). The main role of the orbitofrontal
cortex in this context seems to be to link reward to hedonic experience (Kringelbach 2005).
Damage to the orbitofrontal cortex can lead to disinhibited behavior that can include gambling,
swearing, drug addiction, and hypersexuality.

The amygdala, the olfactory bulb, and the orbitofrontal cortex are just three examples of brain
structures that play important roles in olfactory processing as well as in the processing of
emotions. Other structures within the limbic system show similar profiles. The large overlap of
brain regions that process emotions and brain regions that process olfactory information provide
the mechanistic explanation for the privileged connection between olfaction and the processing
of evaluative emotions.

6.3. Conclusion: Olfaction is well connected to emotional, but not to linguistic processing
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that olfaction has a strong impact on evaluations
and emotions, while our capacity to process olfactory information linguistically is very limited.
This is not a new insight. Over 2,000 years ago Plato wrote that odors "have no name and they
have not many, or definite and simple kinds; but they are distinguished only as painful and
pleasant" (Plato). Today we know that the reason for the privileged connection between olfaction
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and evaluative emotions is that the same neuronal networks in the brain that process olfactory
information also process emotions. The connection between olfaction and emotions is
presumably not the only privileged connection between a perceptual modality and a nonperceptual cognitive process. Vision seems to have a privileged connection to language
processes. An analysis of proprioception, the sensing of the relative position and movement of
body parts, would reveal a strong connection between proprioception and motor regulation. That
one can find this type of modality-specific connections shows that sensory information from a
given modality is made available only to those processes that can use the information for
adaptive behaviors. The motor system needs to know the current angle between the forearm and
upper arm, so that it can execute directed arm movements. The language system does not need to
know the current elbow angle because being able to report the position of your forearm verbally
does not convey strong adaptive advantages.

The sense of smell has evolved to be an evaluative rather than a descriptive sense. Olfactory
information is used mainly to make decisions about rejecting or accepting food or mates
(Stevenson 2009). Describing verbally the smell of spoiled meat is not crucial for survival;
having a negative emotional response to spoiled meat that is stronger than hunger is crucial for
an adaptive, odor-guided, behavioral response. The connection between olfaction and emotion is
so close that Rachel Herz wondered "whether we would have emotions if we did not have a
sense of smell; I smell therefore I feel?" (Herz 2007) (page 14). Herz's thoughts mirror those of
Plato, who wondered whether we would have reason without vision and those of Michael
Tomasello, who wondered whether we would have language without vision. Summarizing the
different relations between perceptual modalities and cognitive processes, Trygg Engen wrote:
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"Functionally, smell may be to emotion what sight or hearing is to cognition" (Engen 1982)
(page 3).

The philosophical impact of the heterogeneity in the connections between perceptual systems
and non-perceptual systems is that epistemological accounts that deal with perception have to
confront the fact that they dealt with only one form of perception. However, the more profound
point is metaphilosophical. The privileged connection between vision and language is the main
reason why I felt that it was necessary to undergo the current research project to expose and
correct the misguided ideas in the philosophy of perception that are based on the exclusive
engagement with visual perception. The tool of philosophy is language and the connection
between vision and language is stronger than the connected between other modalities and
language, which gives vision privileged access to the minds of philosophers.
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Chapter 7: The structure of the mind
The privileged connection between olfactory perception and emotional processing that I
discussed in the previous chapter is a result of the interdependence and coevolution of the two
processes. It is just one example of a non-perceptual process that evolved together with the
sensory system from which it receives its input. The proprioceptor system, which provides
information about the relative position and movement of body parts, would not have evolved in
the absence of a motor system that can use the information provided by it. On the other hand, the
motor system would not have evolved the capacity to quickly adjust and correct ongoing motor
patterns, if it had evolved in the absence of a sensory system that provides the information about
the position of body parts that is necessary for guiding these corrective movements. A perceptual
system only conveys an adaptive advantage in the presence of a non-perceptual system that can
make use of the information that the perceptual system provides. Similarly, cognitive systems
can only contribute to guiding adaptive behaviors when they receive information about the
environment from sensory systems.

To which other systems a perceptual system is connected determines how the perceptual system
functions and what role it plays for the organism. In this chapter, I will therefore consider the
structure of the mind and olfaction's position in this structure. The first section of this chapter
will be methodological. I will discuss how to individuate the parts of which the mind is made up
and discuss how connections between the parts can be discovered. I will argue against the
popular strategy of dividing the mind into modules and instead propose to think of the mind in
terms of functionally coupled networks. In the second section, I will address two specific
questions using the methods developed in the first section. The first question is whether there is
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information flow from non-perceptual parts of the mind to olfaction. The second question is
whether there is flow of information between olfaction and the other sensory modalities.

7.1. Uncovering the structure of the mind
Before strategies to uncover the structure of the mind are considered, one should question
whether the mind is structured in an interesting way that is worth discovering. Strong evidence
for a structure of the mind is provided by the study of individuals with localized damage to the
brain. The effects of localized brain damage are often restricted to specific mental processes. In
many cases, perception in a specific modality is compromised while the other modes of
perception remain intact. Language comprehension or production can also be specifically
impaired. In many cases, memory formation or retrieval are impacted without a strong effect on
other mental processes. This shows that the mind is divided into relatively independent parts.
One part can be damaged while the others remain intact. The functional decomposition of the
mind into distinct parts is only one aspect of the structure of the mind. The parts of the mind are
also interconnected in interesting ways. It is not the case that every part of the mind is connected
to every other part of the mind equally, as I have shown in the previous chapter, using the
connections between olfaction and language and between olfaction and emotion as examples.
The structure of the mind therefore consists of parts and connections between the parts. There are
tensions between dividing the mind into parts and describing connections between the parts.
When two parts of the mind have a very strong exclusive connection, on what basis can they be
described as two connected parts as opposed to a single part of the mind? I will argue below that
the best way to account for these tensions is to describe the structure of the mind as a collection
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of networks. Before I discuss this suggestion, I will critique the common strategy to describe the
mind as a collection of modules.

A critique of the concept of modularity
Current accounts of the structure of the mind usually refer to the parts of the mind as "modules".
In this context, "module" is a technical term that can be defined in different ways. Most of its
definitions are unrelated to the word's dictionary definition that considers modules to be
"distinct, self-contained units from which are larger structure can be build". The terminology of
modularity of the mind goes back to Fodor (Fodor 1983). Fodor defined modules as those parts
of the mind that satisfy nine criteria. The nine criteria, as paraphrased by Prinz (Prinz 2006), are:
(1) Localized: modules are realized in dedicated neural architecture
(2) Subject to characteristic breakdowns: modules can be selectively impaired
(3) Mandatory: modules operate in an automatic way
(4) Fast: modules generate outputs quickly
(5) Shallow: modules have relatively simple outputs (e.g., not judgments)
(6) Ontogenetically determined: modules develop in a characteristic pace and sequence
(7) Domain-specific: modules cope with a restricted class of inputs
(8) Inaccessible: higher levels of processing have limited access to the representations
within a module
(9) Informationally encapsulated: modules cannot be guided by information at higher
levels of processing
The different definitions of "module" that can be found in the literature are derivatives of Fodor's
original definition. Different definitions mainly differ in which criteria they emphasize. The two
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criteria that have received the most attention are informational encapsulation and domainspecificity (Samuels 2006). A part of the mind is informationally encapsulated if it does not
receive information from higher centers of processing in the brain. Fodor, in later writings,
focuses on informational encapsulation as a sufficient criterion for modularity (Fodor 2000). A
part of the mind is domain-specific when it processes a restricted type of information, for
example olfactory information or information about linguistic rules. Many theorists consider
domain-specificity to be the most important, if not only, criterion that needs to be satisfied for a
part of the mind to be a module (Cosmides and Tooby 1994; Sperber 1994). Others have picked
different subsets of the criteria for their definition of "module". For Carruthers, for example, five
of Fodor's nine criteria are relevant to decide whether a part of the mind is a module (Carruthers
2006) (page 12).

Not surprisingly, how the structure of the mind is described depends on the definition of
"module" that is employed. If parts of the mind have to be informationally encapsulated to be
considered modules, then the mind is not modular, except for the perceptual systems, which are
modules (Fodor 1983). If modules are identified as parts of the mind that are domain-specific,
then the mind is a large collection of modules (Sperber). The thesis that the mind is modular
through and through, known as the massive modularity thesis, has been especially popular with
evolutionary psychologists (Pinker 1997). If modules have to satisfy all of Fodor's nine criteria
for modularity, then no part of the mind qualifies as a module (Prinz 2006). Other combinations
of the modularity criteria that have not been explored in detail presumably will result in different
distributions of modules in the mind.
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This is only a very brief overview over the concept of modularity and how it has been used to
investigate the structure of the mind (for a more detailed review, see (Robbins 2010)). However,
it should be sufficient to unpack the concept and see what it can contribute to uncovering the
structure of the mind. The strategy for identifying modules of the mind is to test parts of the
mind whether they satisfy certain criteria. What is rarely discussed is that this strategy can only
be applied after the parts of the mind have been individuated through some other process. Only
after the mind has been divided into parts can the parts be tested for modularity. Many
disagreements about the modularity of a certain part of the mind are, on closer inspection, based
on disagreements about what the part that is tested for modularity is. Take for example the
question whether vision is modular, when "module" is defined as an informationally
encapsulated part of the brain. The main argument against informational encapsulation are topdown influences on visual perception. Pylyshyn avoids the discussion of these top-down
influences by dividing vision into "early vision" and the rest. He then moves on to argue that
early vision is informationally encapsulated (Pylyshyn 1999). Instead of discussing whether a
given part of the mind is informationally encapsulated or not, the parts of the mind are
individuated so that they fit the desired outcome. If we accept that early vision is informationally
encapsulated, then we will also accept that edge-detection in the visual system is informationally
encapsulated. Why is edge-detection in the visual system then not considered a module?

In another example how conclusions about the modularity of the mind depend on how the parts
of the mind are individuated, Prinz and Samuels exchange silly examples of potential domains
that would influence conclusions about the domain-specificity of parts of the mind (Prinz 2006;
Samuels 2006). Prinz suggests, "the particular animal used by Lawrence to cross the Arabian
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Desert", while Samuels offers "camels in London on Tuesdays" and "planning wheat-free picnics
in 2005". Neither of them offers an individuation procedure that would avoid the result that there
are parts of the mind concerned with these domains. I hope that these examples suffice to show
that we need to know what the parts of the mind are, before there can be a fruitful discussion
about which parts qualify as modules. Furthermore, we have to be careful not to confuse testing
parts of the mind for modularity for individuating parts of the mind.

The structure of the mind consists not only of the parts of the mind, but also of the connections
between those parts. Modules, as discussed, are a subset of the parts of the mind that satisfy the
criteria required for being a module. We have seen that the relation between modules and the
parts of the mind is that some parts of the mind, for example those that are domain-specific or
those that are informationally encapsulated, are modules. What is the relation between modules
and the connection between the parts of the mind? The two most frequently discussed criteria for
modularity, informational encapsulation and domain-specificity, are both network properties that
concern the inputs received by a module. Fodor's criteria that do not concern a module's role
within a network, but the module itself (that it is fast and automatic, and that the underlying
neuroanatomy is localized in the brain and develops in a characteristic way) have largely been
abandoned.

The analysis of the relation between modules and the structure of the mind shows that the
concept of modularity is only of limited usefulness when the goal is a comprehensive description
of the structure of the mind. There are two limitations of the concept of modularity. First,
modules are parts of the mind with certain properties, which means that the modular structure
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only captures the parts of the mind that show a certain property (or set of properties). Whatever
property is used as a criterion for modularity, it is certainly wrong to postulate that the portions
of the mind that do not fulfill the criterion cannot be structured. Nobody would argue, I think,
that there can be no structure in the absence of informational encapsulation or in the absence of
domain specificity. This structure is not included in an account of the structure of the mind based
on modules. The second inadequacy of using modularity as a framework to describe the structure
of the mind is that, although the most common definitions of "module" all define modules as
parts of the brain that have a certain position within a network, modularity does not explicitly
acknowledge the network structure of the mind. I suggest that describing the mind in terms of
overlapping functionally coupled networks instead of in terms of modules will give a more
accurate view of how the mind is structured.

Functionally coupled networks that connect parts of the mind
Functionally coupled networks that connect the parts of the mind can be investigated using
different methods. One possibility is to use introspection. When smelling food is more likely to
make us hungry than touching food, this can be interpreted as evidence for a closer connection
between olfaction and hunger regulation than between touch and hunger regulation. However,
introspection has three disadvantages. One disadvantage is that it is better suited for discovering
connections between parts of the mind than for individuating parts of the mind. It is not clear
how introspection could be useful to decide between the proposal that there is a part of the mind
concerned with planning wheat-free picnics in 2005 and the proposal that there is a part of the
mind that is concerned with planning in general. The second disadvantage is that a project to
elucidate the structure of the mind based on introspection would come up with a very
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impoverished structure. Just because we are not aware that one process influence another process
does not mean that there is no such influence. Investigating the structure of the mind will
therefore miss many connections. Finally, it is a disadvantage of using introspective evidence to
discover the structure of the mind that there is no procedure for weighing the evidence in cases
of disagreeing introspections between individuals.

Another possibility to study the networks of the mind is with behavioral experiments. Behavioral
experiments avoid two of the problems of introspective evidence. When touching food makes us
eat more food in a behavioral experiment, then this is evidence for a connection between the
parts of the mind that process tactile information and the parts of the mind that regulate food
intake, regardless of the subjects' self-reports about the existence of such a connection.
Furthermore, in behavioral experiments the sample size is larger than in introspection and it is
therefore possible to discover inter-individual variability or agreement. The structure of the mind
is likely to be partly hard-wired and partly shaped by previous experiences and it is interesting to
distinguish innate and acquired structure.

A limitation that behavioral experiments share with introspection is that they are better suited to
discover connections between parts of the mind than to individuate the parts of the mind. I
cannot imagine a behavioral experiment that could distinguish between the proposal that vision
is one of the parts of the mind and the competing proposal that early vision is one of the parts of
the mind. A further disadvantage of using behavioral experiments to reveal the structure of the
mind is that behavioral experiments treat the mind as a black box. When a behavioral experiment
shows that smells induce emotions, it shows that olfaction and emotional processing are

155

connected. However, the results do not show how they are connected. There may be a direct
connection, but many alternative explanations are possible. There may be, for example,
connections between olfaction and memory and between memory and emotion. Smells may elicit
memories and memories, in turn, elicit emotions. Combining evidence from introspection and
from behavioral experiments can be helpful to decide between the alternative structures that may
underlie the behavior.

In addition to introspection and behavioral experiments, neuroanatomy, and especially functional
neuroanatomy can also provide evidence about the structure of the mind. Like the other source of
evidence, functional neuroanatomy has its disadvantages. The most troubling problem with
drawing conclusions about the structure of the mind from observing the brain is that it
presupposes an association between brain areas and parts of the mind. That there is such an
association has become apparent when methods of visualizing brain activities were invented. The
associations between brain and mind are most robust in sensory areas. Activity in the olfactory
bulb is much more likely to be associated with smelling than with seeing whereas the visual
cortex is most active during visual perception. Many structure-function-associations have also
become apparent in the central brain. Activity in the amygdala is more likely to be associated
with experiencing fear than with counting. The functional mapping of the brain is a large and
ongoing research project with more than 1,000 new publications added to the literature every
year (Smith 2012).

The big advantage of using evidence from functional neuroanatomy to discover the structure of
the mind is that it can potentially provide a basis for individuating parts of the mind based on
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specified criteria. This would not be possible using introspection or behavioral experiments. The
general approach for individuating parts of the mind through functional neuroanatomy that I
have in mind is to group mental activities that are associated with the same patterns of brain
activities together as parts of the mind. Obviously, much more work would have to be done to
show that this approach would be successful. There are many problems, both theoretical
problems and practical problems. Theoretically, it has to be decided what counts as the same
pattern of activation. Practically, the limited temporal and spatial resolution of functional brain
imaging limits the precision with which patterns of brain activity can be compared. Regardless of
these problems, considering the lack of alternatives, I believe that functional neuroanatomy
provides a promising path to individuating parts of the mind.

Once the parts of the mind have been individuated in such a way, the functional connections
between them can be studied. A powerful method of elucidating connections between different
brain regions is intrinsic functional connectivity magnetic resonance imaging (Buckner, Krienen
et al. 2013). This method visualizes brain activity in the resting state and uncovers the spatial
patterns along which activity spreads through the brain. Activity in one area of the brain that
regularly follows after activity in another area of the brain is evidence for information flow
between the two areas. The two areas are functionally coupled. Functionally coupled networks in
the brain are a subsystem of the anatomical networks and they are severely constraint by them.
When two regions are not anatomically connected, then they are not directly functionally
coupled. However, a direct anatomical connection does not imply that the two regions are
functionally coupled. To illustrate how the study of functional coupling goes beyond the study of
neuroanatomy, consider a hypothetical example. Region A may be anatomically coupled to
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region B and region B to regions C, D, E, and F. Visualizing brain activity may however reveal
that, after region A is active, region B is active and afterwards regions D and F, but not region C
and E. A further refinement over the anatomical network that the functional network provides is
that it allows assigning directions to the connections between nodes. Activity in region G may
frequently follow activity in region F, but activity in region G does not induce activity in region
F. However, anatomical connectivity provides an important framework for the study of
functional connectivity.

Together, introspection, behavioral experiments, and functional neuroanatomy can individuate
the parts of the mind and reveal the connections between them. Evidence from all sources has to
be considered, but the biological evidence should be given special consideration. Describing the
mind in terms of parts and connections between them instead of describing it in terms of modules
does not just mean that "modules" are now called "parts" and connections between the parts are
added to the description. Instead, it means that the structure of the mind is described in terms of
functionally coupled networks. The parts of the mind are nodes in the network. Nodes are
defined by their position within the network. They are points at which connections intersect or
branch. None of the criteria that are used to identify modules applies necessarily to all nodes of
functionally coupled networks. Informational encapsulation is not a necessary feature of nodes in
functionally coupled networks. Each node receives the input that is necessary for it to play its
role within the network. Some of these nodes may not receive input from central processes and
would therefore be informationally encapsulated modules. Domain-specificity is also not a
necessary feature of nodes in a network. In some nodes, only a certain type of information is
processed. These are domain-specific nodes with only a single input, like "cognitive process 2"
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in Figure 13. Other nodes receive many different inputs and are therefore not domain-specific,
like "cognitive process 3" in Figure 13. The relation between the functionally coupled networks
and modules is therefore that the modules are subsets of the nodes of the functionally coupled
networks. Which subset of the nodes can be considered modules depends on the criteria for
modularity. Researchers, who find nodes that receive input from only a single source interesting,
will define modules in terms of domain-specificity. For those that are more interested in where
the nodes' input comes from, informational-encapsulation is the relevant criterion. Both
approaches have in common that they illuminate only a very small subset of the entire structure
of the mind.

Perhaps I am overly optimistic that a combination of different sources of evidence will reveal the
functionally coupled network that constitute the mind. Given the failure of the concept of
modularity to capture how our minds are structured, I think that it is a worthwhile attempt. If the
approach I proposed here will work, it will reveal a complex structure of the mind with no
overarching organizing principles. Different evolutionary pressures at different times throughout
the evolution of brains and minds have resulted in a collection of diverse, highly effective, yet
inelegant solutions. Functionally coupled networks can overlap; nodes can be part of several
networks, like "cognitive process 3" in Figure 13, which is part of both the blue and the black
network. A further level of complexity is added by the fact that connections within networks can
have different strength (reflected by the different widths of the arrows in Figure 13). All these
complications show that the structure of the mind is very complex and much less orderly and
elegant than often assumed. It has no resemblance to engineered modular software packages, as
the metaphor of "modules of the mind" suggests.
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7.2. Olfaction's position in the mind
Two questions about the structure of the mind have received much attention. Is perception
influenced by higher cognitive processes? Are the senses separated? These two questions can be
addressed using the framework of functionally coupled networks that I have introduced in the
previous section. Within this framework, the questions are whether there are connections from
cognitive processes to perceptual processes and whether perceptual processes in different
modalities are connected. The connections between olfaction and non-perceptual processes that
have been discussed in chapter 6 are parts of networks in which information flows from the
periphery to the center. In this section, networks in which information flows in the opposite
direction or perpendicular to the flow from periphery to center will be discussed.

Cognitive penetration
The effect of cognition on perception has been termed the "cognitive penetration of perception".
Examples of cognitive penetration of perceptual systems are counterexamples to the thesis that
perceptual systems are informationally encapsulated and therefore to Fodor's proposal that the
perceptual systems are modules (defined as informationally encapsulated parts of the mind). The
term "cognitive penetration" has been coined by Pylyshyn, who argued that early vision is
cognitively impenetrable (Pylyshyn 1999). The most intuitive argument for cognitive
impenetrability of early visual perception is that several visual illusions resist cognitive
influence. Take for example the Müller-Lyer illusion: a straight line segment with two
arrowheads on both ends looks shorter than a line segment of the same length with two arrow
tails on both ends. That this illusion persists after the subject understands that it is an illusion is
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shown by the fact that even after one measures the two line segments to confirm that they have
the same length, the line segment with the arrowheads on its ends looks shorter than the one with
the arrow tails32.

Contrary to Pylyshyn, it has been argued that there are convincing examples of cognitive
penetration in the visual system. Siegel likes to use the example of a pine tree (Siegel 2006).
According to her, the perception of a pine tree changes when the perceiver learns to identify pine
trees and distinguish them from other types of trees. Similar examples can be given for other
kinds of acquired expertise. To a trained pathologist, a tissue sample under the microscope may
look different than it looked to her before she trained as a pathologist. The problem with these
examples is that it is easy to simply deny that the perception changed. Macpherson discusses an
interesting example of cognitive penetration in which this is more difficult to deny the changes in
perception because they are confirmed through performance-based psychophysics (Macpherson
2012). In an experimental setting, subjects were given shapes cut out of orange paper. Some of
the shapes were the shapes of objects that are characteristically thought of as red (like a heart)
whereas others were of the shapes of objects not characteristically red (like a mushroom). The
task was to match each of the shapes to a colored background. The background color that the
subjects matched to shapes of characteristically red objects was, on average, redder than the

32

It is perhaps an unrealistically high standard for cognitive penetrability to expect additional
information to always have the expected effect on other cognitive mechanisms. Our knowledge
that matter consists mainly of empty space between atoms does not change how a table looks or
feels to the touch. I have perhaps read more books on playing squash than most professional
players. The fact that I still could not beat a professional player does not show that my motor
systems are cognitively impenetrable. The flexibility and plasticity of biological processes is
limited. That a cognitive process does not change in the expected way when additional
information is provided does not necessarily mean that the information is not available to the
process. There are other explanations.
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background color that was matched to shapes of objects that are not characteristically red. When
the cutout was in the shape of a not characteristically red object, the subjects selected a more
yellowish color (remember that the color of the cutouts was orange) (Delk and Fillenbaum
1965). This result provides strong evidence that the belief that a perceiver holds about the
characteristic color of the object that is perceived can influence the perceived color.

The discussion of cognitive penetration in the literature is mainly concerned with cognitive
penetration in vision. As I have discussed in chapter 6, the connections between perception and
cognition evolved differently in each of the modalities. All modalities have to be investigated
individually. Olfaction is a good modality for the study of cognitive penetration because
introspection and behavioral experiments suggest that olfactory perception is strongly modulated
by cognitive processes (for reviews, see (Stevenson and Boakes 2003; Gottfried and Wu 2009;
Yeshurun and Sobel 2010). An example of cognitive penetration in olfaction is the influence of
verbal labels on perception. The pleasantness of the same stimulus is rated very differently when
it is labeled "cheddar cheese" than when it is labeled "body odor". These differences in reported
perception are also accompanied by differences in brain activity (de Araujo, Rolls et al. 2005).
Anecdotal reports also suggest that odor perception differs between different cultural groups. An
impact of culture on perception indicates that beliefs and background information can penetrate
perception. Unfortunately, the presumed cross-cultural differences in odor perception have not
been studied systematically yet.

Introspective evidence is difficult to defend against skepticism and behavioral experiments
cannot discriminate between an influence on perception and an influence on how behaviors are
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linked to perception. To investigate whether there is cognitive penetration in olfaction, it is
therefore helpful to study the brain in an attempt to identify the potential neural correlate of
cognitive penetration in the olfactory system. This is the same strategy of investigating the
structure of the mind through investigating how it is implemented in the networks of the brain. In
this section, this general strategy is applied to the specific question of cognitive penetration in
olfaction.

The brain structures in which olfactory information is processed have been identified. If the
olfactory brain receives input from cognitive areas and this input alters the processing of
olfactory information, then perception is influenced by cognition. Cognitive penetration has to be
relativized to processing stage (Lycan 2014). There could be an influence of cognition on the
very peripheral sensory neurons, or, at any of the higher levels of olfactory processing. I will
investigating the potential neural correlates for cognitive penetration in the olfactory system
starting with the olfactory sensory neurons.

Olfactory sensory neurons are the neurons in the nose that bind to odors. In humans, the
responses of olfactory sensory neurons to the odors they encounter do not depend on cognitive
processes. However, in other species strong influences of the perceiver's state on the activity of
these sensory neurons have been described (see for example the dependence of the sensitivity of
olfactory sensory neurons on the perceivers' state in many insects discussed in section 5.1.:
(Davis 1984; Root, Ko et al. 2011; Saveer, Kromann et al. 2012)). The strategy behind such
changes is to perceive only behaviorally relevant stimuli. When stimuli are relevant only in
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specific situations, they should only be perceived during these situations. Humans have not
developed such a system. We do not become smell-blind to food odors after lunch.

In the next step of olfactory processing, the olfactory sensory neurons project to the olfactory
bulb, where information about the molecular structure of odorant molecules is processed
(Shepherd et al., 2004). In addition to the input from olfactory sensory neurons, the olfactory
bulb also receives information through massive and diverse centrifugal fibers. These fibers
originate in brain areas including the olfactory cortex, the brain stem, and the basal forebrain
(Matsutani and Yamamoto, 2008). The information processing in the olfactory bulb is influenced
by activity in all these diverse regions of the brain. Consistent with these anatomical findings,
information processing in the olfactory bulb of rodents differs markedly depending on the
behavior the animal is engaged in and its prior experiences (Kay and Laurent, 1999). Processing
in the olfactory bulb is for example modulated by prior experiences with the perceived odor
(Kato et al., 2012). The massive feedback from higher brain areas to the olfactory bulb is the
neural correlate of cognitive penetration in human olfaction. Through these connections,
memories and mental states can influence how odors are perceived.

As it is the case with other modalities, in some instances olfactory perception appears penetrable
whereas in other instances it appears impenetrable. Perhaps overall olfactory perception is more
pliable than vision. The suggestion that a "grilled 40-oz. dry-aged porterhouse steak" smells
different after one has just consumed such a steak (Gottfried 2007) is more plausible than the
suggestion that the way the steak looks depends on whether the perceiver is hungry or satiated.
However, this can also be denied. It is difficult to convincingly and reliably differentiate between

164

changes in perception, and changes in the preferences, tastes, or evaluations of the perception.
However, a striking fact about olfaction is that the olfactory bulb, the first processing station of
olfactory information, receives massive input from central brain structures. Unless these
structures are vestigial structures that have lost their function, olfaction is cognitively penetrated.

Crossmodal perception
Behavioral experiments and evidence from introspection show that perception in one modality
can influence perception in another modality. One of the most dramatic examples is the McGurk
effect, which is a demonstration of how watching the movements of a speaker's lips influences
how the sounds they are making with their lips are perceived (McGurk and MacDonald 1976).
Subjects report a strong influence of the lip movements on what they hear. Demonstrations of the
McGurk effect can be found online. Another example of the influence of perception in one
modality on perception in another modality that can easily be experienced first-hand is the
dependence of visual perception on the perception of gravity. If you look at the rows in front of
you in an airplane before take-off, they seem to be at the same level with you. If you look at
them again while the plane is taking-off, they seem to be elevated although the relative position
between you and the rows in front of you has not changed. The visual perception changes
depending on information about relative position from other modalities.

The influence of perception in other modalities on olfactory perception is very pronounced.
There is some evidence that orthonasal olfaction (in which the odor molecules reach the
olfactory sensory neurons through the nostrils) can be influenced by perception in other
modalities. However, the most dramatic cases of crossmodal perception are found in retronasal
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olfaction. When smells are perceived retronasally, the odor molecules reach the olfactory sensory
neurons through the throat when the odor source is in the mouth. Although retronasal olfaction
has the same stimuli and the same sensory organ as orthonasal olfaction, it is not usually referred
to as "smell" Instead, it is a component of what is usually called "taste". When a wine taster says
that a wine tastes like apple, she is not referring to a perception that is caused by tastants
activating taste buds. Instead, she is referring to a perception that is caused by odorous molecules
that smell of apple and activate the olfactory sensory neurons. Odorants from wine in the mouth
reach the olfactory sensory neurons in the nasal cavity through the pharynx to elicit this aspect of
the wine's taste. The scientific term for what is commonly called "taste" is "flavor". Scientists use
the word "taste" for the perception that is mediated by the taste buds on the tongue whereas they
use the word "flavor" for the multisensory perceptions elicited by food in the oral cavity.
Scientists would not say that the wine tastes like apples, but instead that it has an apple flavor.
Flavor has been called, maybe paradoxically, a "multisensory modality" (Taylor and Roberts
2004; Shepherd 2011; Small and Green 2012). The chemical senses work together with texture
and temperature perception to produce flavor perception.

Taste is the main contributor to flavor. Humans perceive five basic taste qualities: sweetness,
sourness, saltiness, bitterness, and umami (a savory taste). Recent research suggests that we also
have dedicated sensory neurons for other tastants, like fat (Laugerette, Gaillard et al. 2007) and
calcium (Tordoff, Alarcón et al. 2012). Flavor nuances are added to these basic tastes through the
contribution of olfaction. When perceived through taste alone, all Jelly Beans have the same
flavor: sweet. However, when olfaction is added, some Jelly Beans have coconut flavor whereas
others have popcorn flavor. One can experience this difference by pinching the nose shut with
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two fingers, then starting to chew a Jelly Bean and then opening the nose. The shift in flavor
from sweet to sweet pineapple is due to the odorous molecules released by the Jelly Beans that
can reach the olfactory epithelium only when air flows from the mouth to the nose through the
pharynx. In addition to taste and olfaction, chemesthesis also contributes to perceived flavors.
Chemesthesis is the sensitivity to chemicals of areas of the skin or mucous membranes. The
mucous membrane of the oral cavity contains many chemesthesis-mediating neurons (Green
2004). The "hotness" of chili peppers and the "coolness" of menthol do not involve temperature
perception, but chemesthetic perception of molecules that are sensed by temperature sensors.
Similarly, the "tingling" induced by carbonated drinks is not touch but chemesthesis (Green
2004). In addition to the chemical senses, touch, temperature, and other senses also contribute to
flavor perception.

"Flavor" is not just a term for the simultaneous occurrence of perceptions in these modalities.
Instead, the different modalities involved in flavor perception influence each other. The
perceptual qualities experienced when drinking chilled, sweet, fruity Riesling can be different
from the sum of the perception of drinking water chilled to the same temperature as the Riesling,
tasting a sugar solution of the same concentration as the wine, and smelling the fruity odorants
found in it. For reviews of the crossmodal interactions in flavor perception, see (Taylor and
Roberts 2004; Shepherd 2011). Examples of intermodal modulation of olfactory perception
during flavor perception is that combining a tastant with an odorant can enhance the perceived
intensity of the odorant (Green, Nachtigal et al. 2011) as well as its detectability (Dalton,
Doolittle et al. 2000).
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The principal evidence for crossmodal perception, like the principal evidence for any structure of
the mind, comes from introspection and behavioral studies. Such evidence is easily disputed. In
fact, some of the top comments on the websites hosting the demonstration video of the McGurk
effect are from people reporting to be immune to the influence of the perception of lip movement
on their auditory perception. As in the case of cognitive penetration, it becomes therefore
important to investigate whether there are neural correlates of crossmodal perception in
olfaction. If some neurons connect photoreceptors to olfactory sensory neurons in the human
brain, we can conclude that information is exchanged between the two modalities.

Neuroanatomy and functional connectivity can tell us whether the required wiring for
crossmodal penetration of perception is present. There are two complication to evaluating
whether a neuronal structure should count as a potential neuronal correlate of crossmodal
perception. The first complication is that interactions between two modalities may be direct or
indirect. In the section of cognitive penetration, I have already discussed the massive feedback
from central brain structures to the olfactory system. This feedback could carry information
about perception in other modalities, thereby providing the basis for crossmodal perception. The
second complication is that the interaction can be at different levels of processing. A neuronal
connection between photoreceptors and olfactory sensory neurons would be a very clear
indication of information exchange between vision and olfaction. But what about a connection
between two modalities at a much higher level of sensory processing?

A review of the wiring at the level of the neocortex has concluded that there are so many
interactions that modalities can penetrate each other. In fact, the interactions are so ubiquitous
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that it is difficult to identify individual modalities (Shimojo and Shams 2001). However,
anatomical connections between the olfactory system and the other sensory systems at lower
level of processing than the neocortex are sparse. The lowest levels of processing at which
visual, gustatory, and olfactory information are thought to converge are the orbitofrontal cortex
and the amygdala (Rolls and Baylis 1994; Rolls, Critchley et al. 2009). Despite the lack of direct
anatomical connections between olfaction and other sensory systems in the periphery, it has been
shown that in rodents piriform cortex neurons are influenced by gustatory stimuli (Maier,
Wachowiak et al. 2012). If these findings generalize to the human brain, the feedback neurons
that are the substrate of cognitive penetration are also the best candidate for the neural correlate
of the strong crossmodal influences on olfactory perception.

7.3. Conclusion: The mind is a collection of functionally coupled networks
Our mind has a complex structure of interconnected parts. A metaphor that reflects this structure
much better than that of the modular mind is to consider the mind is a collection of functionally
coupled networks. Each of these networks consists of different nodes that are interconnected.
Nodes can be shared between networks and the connections between them have different
strengths. The structure of the functionally coupled networks does not follow an overarching
design principle. Each network followed its own evolutionary trajectory and found its own
unique, idiosyncratic solutions to the problem it evolved in response to. The lack of order and
homogeneity that has been discovered in our mind prompted Gary Marcus in his book Kluge:
The Haphazard Construction of the Mind, to call the mind a "kluge" (Marcus 2008). A "kluge" is
a solution to a problem that is effective yet inelegant and clumsy.
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Discovering the clumsy, inelegant functionally coupled networks that structure the mind requires
a combination of different methods. Introspection and behavioral experiments should be
supplemented by neuroanatomy and functional neuroanatomy, which provide the neural
correlates for the networks of the mind. Because there are no general principles of how the
networks are organized, each question has to be addressed individually. There are no general
answers about how perception connects to cognition, or if and how different perceptual
modalities are connected to each other. Questions such as these have to be addressed case by
case. Some sensory processes probably receive very little input from cognitive processes (like
"sense 1" in Figure 13), whereas others receive much cognitive input (like "sense 3" in Figure
13). Each sense was shaped through evolution through natural selection by different needs and
constraints. The mind needs to be described to be understood.

Figure 13: The mind as a collection of overlapping functionally coupled networks. In this
hypothetical example, three networks are shown. A red network, which consist of sense 1
and cognitive process1, a blue network, which consists of sense 1, sense 2, cognitive
process 3, and sense 3, and a black network, which consists of sense 2, and cognitive
processes 1 to 3.

In this chapter, I have described the inputs that olfaction receives from non-perceptual processes,
as well as the inputs it receives from other perceptual modalities. Olfaction, probably more so
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than some other perceptual modalities, is modulated by both types of input. However, from this
observation, no general conclusions about cognitive penetration and crossmodal perception can
be drawn.
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Conclusion: Comparing olfaction and vision
The primacy of vision over other modalities has led to a bias in our understanding of perception.
The visuocentrism that dominates our thinking has very deep roots that are reflected in our
philosophical vocabulary. We can "glimpse" or "see" the meaning of a proposition. Using a
tactile instead of visual metaphor, we can also "grasp" it. After we grasped enough propositions,
we will form a certain "view" or "outlook" on the topic. Ideas are talked about as if they are
visual objects that are placed before us. They can be "viewed" from certain "angles". Different
"positions" can be taken with respect to a certain "view". There are no comparable olfactory
metaphors. Undoubtedly, this way of speaking has given vision a special status in philosophy of
perception. Philosophy books have titles such as "Seeing and Knowing" (Dretske 1969) or
"Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" (Rorty 1981). Philosophers always have a "point of
view", whether it is a logical point of view, a scientific point of view, or the view from nowhere.

I hope that this dissertation will trigger a reexamination of the assumptions about perception that
are built into the philosopher's vocabulary. I do not mean to deny that in humans vision is the
most important and interesting modality. Humans happen to be active during the day, when the
light from the sun allows us to perceive the space around us visually. If humans were active at
night, we might have evolved echolocation like bats, to navigate in the dark. The current state of
philosophy of perception is in large parts due to the fact that at some point in evolutionary
history our ancestors were more likely to be eaten at night than during the day. Once our
ancestors become active during the day, it was important to optimize visual perception, even if it
meant to reduce further the usefulness of olfaction. The most important evolutionary event that
shifted importance from olfactory perception to visual perception was the shift from walking on
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all fours to walking only on the hind legs. Our head, and with it the sense organs for both vision
and olfaction, were moved up from the ground when we became bipedal. This further accelerated
the evolution away from an olfactory creature to a visual creature. Close to the ground, down in
the bushes, there is much less to see and much more to smell. However, at eyelevel (or
noselevel) vision is much more useful than olfaction.

Understanding that the different ways in which humans perceive visual stimuli and odors have
been shaped by the unique evolutionary history of our species leads to the realization that there
are no differences between how visual stimuli are perceived in all species and how olfactory
stimuli are perceived in all species. The differences between the two modalities that I have
discussed in this dissertation are differences between how visual perception is implemented in
contemporary humans and how olfactory perception is implemented in contemporary humans.
Many of the features that are associated with one modality in humans are associated with another
modality in other species. In humans, visual perception has spatial structure whereas olfactory
perception does not. For us, colors can be, and usually are, arranged in a spatial pattern, while it
is not possible for humans to perceive a spatial arrangement of smells. The presence of spatial
structure in vision and its absence in olfaction are due to the structure of the human sensory
systems. Nothing in the nature of olfactory perceptual qualities prevents them from being
spatially arranged. It is easy to imagine an olfactory system that mediates spatially structured
olfactory perception. Our whole body could be covered in odor-sensitive cells. We then would
experience the smell stronger at the side of our body that is facing the odor source. This is how
we perceive heat and why we can tell whether we walk towards or away from the sun based on
the pattern of heat perception on our skin. Similarly, we cannot conclude that visual perception is
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inherently spatial from the fact that human visual perception has spatial structure. Many animal
species can perceive visual stimuli, but do not have image-resolving eyes, and therefore do not
perceive spatially arranged visual perceptual qualities. The simplest eye consist of only a single
photoreceptor (Jékely, Colombelli et al. 2008). With such an eye, all that can be perceived is the
level of illumination. A species of marine mollusks has hundreds of small simple eyes distributed
over their body surface (Boyle 1969). They perceive a light source in the same way in which
humans perceive a heat source.

In the light of this diversity between different perceptual systems, the focus on human vision as a
basis for philosophy of perception seems misguided. To make progress, other forms of
perception have to be investigated. In this dissertation, I have considered human olfaction.
Throughout the rest of this conclusion, I will compare the central findings about olfactory
perception with what we know about visual perception to show what kinds of biases one can
except when the focus is on a single modality.

At the level of perceptual qualities, olfaction is more complex than other senses. There are more
smells than colors or tones. Consequently, arranging the perceptual qualities of olfaction into a
similarity space has not been possible yet. For colors or tones, this first step of putting order to
perception has been accomplished. However, once the perceptual qualities are individuated,
olfaction is much less complicated than vision. What is perceived during olfactory perception in
normal cases are individual olfactory perceptual qualities. The olfactory perceptual qualities are
not arranged spatially and the temporal structure of odor perception is much impoverished
compared to the other senses. This is in contrast with visual perception, which normally is the
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perception of visual scenes that are arrangements of color qualities in space. A philosophy of
perception based on smells would focus heavily on the nature of perceptual qualities rather than
on how they are arranged in time and space. As a consequence, entities that consist of spatially
and temporally arranged perceptual qualities, like perceptual events and perceptual objects,
would not be part of perceptual philosophy if olfaction would be the paradigm sense.

The lack or relative unimportance of spatial and temporal information in odor perception also has
consequences for our understanding of the relation between the physical world and our percepts.
In vision, space and time are mapped through perception; perception represents the temporal and
spatial relations in the physical world. Relative position and distance in the physical are often
accurately represented through perception. This is adaptive because when the perceiving
organism responds behaviorally to a stimulus, the responses have to be directed and timed based
on the spatial and temporal structure of the physical world to have the intended effect on the
physical world. This large overlap between similarities in the physical world and similarities in
percepts has resulted in the idea of perception as a representation of the physical world. In
olfactory perception, perceptual qualities are not arranged in space. When perception without
spatial structure is considered, the similarities found in the physical world between stimuli do not
appear to be conserved in perception. I have discussed this here for tastants and smells, but it is
also apparent in the case of colors, where each perceived color can be the consequence of a very
large number of physically very different stimuli33. In olfaction, physical similarity between odor
molecules is not reliably mapped onto similarities between the perceptual qualities associated

33

Different mixtures of light of different wavelengths that result in the same perceptual color are
called metamers Rodrigues, A. B. J. and R. Besnoy (1980). "What is metamerism?" Color
Research and Application 5(4): 220-221..
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with the stimuli34. Because olfactory perception consists of the perception of perceptual qualities
with no spatial structure, the relation between similarities in olfactory stimuli and similarities in
olfactory perception is weak. If olfaction were the paradigm, the idea that perception represents
the physical world would not have the same appeal it has when visual perception is considered.
In olfaction, perceptual qualities are closer aligned with appropriate behavioral responses to the
stimuli than with the physical features of the molecules. Olfactory perception illustrates that what
perception does is not mirroring reality, but guiding behaviors.

Another striking difference between vision and olfaction is that olfaction is more difficult to
demarcate than vision. While differentiating vision or audition from other forms of perception,
olfaction is in some respects closely related to other chemical senses and involved in the
multimodal perception of flavors. Individuating modalities based on representations, phenomenal
character, the proximal stimulus, or the sense organs will lead to dramatically different results in
the case of the chemical senses, while all four methods largely agree about how to individuate
vision or audition. The difficulty of individuating olfaction may have contributed to its relative
unpopularity among philosophers of perception. Some apparent disagreements in the philosophy
of olfactory perception are a consequence of olfaction being individuated differently by different
scholars.

34

Of course, it is possible to some degree to predict the perceptual quality of a molecule based
on its physical features. Molecules containing a sulphur atom, for example, have a distinct smell.
It is also possible that future research will show that the relationship between physical features of
molecules and perceptual olfactory qualities is closer than currently appreciated (for a review of
structure-odor relationship research, see Rossiter, K. J. (1996). "Structure−Odor Relationships."
Chemical Reviews 96(8): 3201-3240.)
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In addition to the more fluid boundaries between olfaction and other sense modalities, olfaction
is also difficult to distinguish from non-perceptual processes like emotion processing. Olfactory
and emotional processing share the same neuronal substrate and evaluative emotions such as
disgust are intricately linked to odor processing. There is also widespread cognitive penetration
of the olfactory sensory system. Olfaction illustrates therefore the interconnectedness of the mind
better than many other modalities that have a different evolutionary history.

That the different evolutionary histories of the different modalities result in differences in how
they are connected to cognitive processes is also reflected by the differential ineffability of the
senses. Naming and talking about what is perceived through olfaction is more difficult than
naming and talking about what is perceived visually. This also has far-reaching consequences.
As speculated above, the perception that is most easy to talk about is the obvious candidate for
philosophers to investigate. This may have contributed to the bias towards visual perception in
philosophy. The strong connection between vision and language also has methodological
consequences for the empirical study of perception. In visual psychophysics, the ability to name
a stimulus is often used as a read-out. Often the reliance on verbal report is pushed so far that the
absence of a verbal report is interpreted as the absence of perception, or at least the absence of
conscious perception. In olfaction, the danger of drawing conclusions about perception based
exclusively on verbal reports is less pronounced.

Taken together, an olfaction-based philosophy or perception would be much different from the
familiar version based on visual perception. Where to go from here? One possibility is that the
account of olfactory perception given here is seen as a supplementing the well-established
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account of visual perception. The two accounts differ, but the differences between them do not
amount to different suggestions about how we should think about perception. Instead, the
differences between the account of visual perception and the account of olfactory perception
reflect the fact that visual perception in humans is fundamentally different from human olfactory
perception. An alternative to embracing the heterogeneity of perception is to try to identify
features that are shared by all instances of perception. The differences between the perceptual
systems are so pronounced that some are skeptic that a unified account that applies to all types of
perception can be developed (Martin 1992). I am more optimistic and believe that enough
features are shared between all forms of perception that an interesting general account of
perception can be developed. The most striking similarities between olfaction and vision that the
analysis presented in this dissertation revealed are that both types of perception involve
perceptual qualities and that they both serve to guide behaviors. This, I propose, could be a
starting point for a modality-neutral theory of perception.
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